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ABSTRACT 
The central theme of this thesis is methodological 
pluralism in systems science: that is, how it might be 
possible to draw upon different systems methods that 
are traditionally thought to be based in 
incommensurable paradigms. The thesis is split into 
three sections. Section One begins by reviewing ideas 
about pluralism as they have been expressed in the 
literature on Critical Systems Thinking. This section 
also sets out the basic 'problem' pluralists have to 
deal with - that the approaches drawn upon are usually 
thought of as philosophically contradictory. An initial 
(partial) resolution of the problem is presented. 
Section Two takes a step back in order to examine why 
the focus upon pluralism is important. Here the social 
and ecological contexts of the debate are explored. It 
is discovered that many of the issues we are currently 
dealing with in systems science, especially complex 
global issues, can only be dealt with adequately 
through a pluralist research practice. Section Three 
looks at the implications of these social and 
ecological arguments for a pluralist systems science, 
and reexamines some of the philosophical ideas lying 
behind Critical Systems Thinking. Through this re-
examination a different understanding of ontology 
begins to emerge. Having developed a set of interlinked 
arguments ranging from the ontological to the 
practical, the thesis concludes with an assertion that 
pluralism is actually necessary for the continued 
legitimation of systems science. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE AIMS OF THE THESIS 
The central theme of this thesis is ｭ･ｴｨｯ､ｯｾｯｧｩ｣｡ｬ＠
pluralism in systems science: that is, how it might be 
possible to draw upon different systems methods that 
are traditionally thought to be based in incommensurate 
paradigms. 
In this introductory chapter, which lays out the aims 
of the thesis, I have tried to use a minimum of complex 
definitions and jargon in order to give a simple 
framework of ideas that can be used as a reference 
throughout. 
It should be noted that, not only have I deliberately 
written much of this thesis in the first person, but 
the language is also more colloquial than is normally 
the case in scientific work. Colloquialisms are usually 
frowned upon because they introduce emotion into what 
is 'supposed' to be a purely analytical text. My own 
attitude to this is summed up in the following 
quotation from Honderich (1976): 
"To my mind, no breath of apology is owed to those 
16 
who may say that they do not expect to find 
emotional matter within serious reflection. On the 
contrary, one must feel remiss for offering so 
small a reminder of human experience, or feel a 
despondency in the realisation that so little will 
be tolerated". 
1.1 The Structure 
I have divided the main body of the thesis into three 
sections that reflect separate, but interrelated, 
arguments: 
Section 1 will review ideas about pluralism as they 
have been expressed in systems science, and the 
Critical Systems perspective which has come to underpin 
them. Within this review a pluralist framework that 
contextualizes a number of different systems methods 
will be presented. 
This section will also set out the basic 'problem' 
pluralists have to deal with - that the approaches 
drawn upon are usually thought of as philosophically 
contradictory. An initial (partial) resolution of the 
problem will be presented. 
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Section 2 will take a step back in order to examine why 
the focus upon pluralism is important. Here the social 
and ecological contexts of the debate will be explored. 
We will 
dealing 
global 
see that many of the issues we are currently 
with in systems science, especially complex 
issues, can only be dealt with adequately 
through a pluralist research practice. 
Section 3 will look at the implications of these social 
and ecological arguments for a pluralist systems 
science, and will re-examine some of the philosophical 
ideas lying behind Critical Systems thinking. Through 
this re-examination a different understanding of 
ontology will emerge. 
Having developed a set of interlinked arguments ranging 
from the ontological to the practical, the thesis will 
conclude with an assertion that pluralism is actually 
necessary for the continued legitimation of systems 
science. 
Over the coming pages I will provide more details about 
18 
the contents of each of these three sections. In doing 
so, five central, interlinked aims of the thesis will 
be clarified. 
1.2. Section 1: Pluralism and Critical Systems 
Let us now move on to detail the contents of Section 1 
in more depth: 
1.2.1 Introducing the Basic Issues 
Before even beginning to address the issue of 
pluralism, it will be necessary to answer some basic 
questions about the role of the philosophy of science. 
There are some who believe that science has a built in 
adaptation mechanism, so that "science as it is 
actually done .... is also science as it ought to be 
done" (Masterman, 1970). These writers therefore argue 
that it is only legitimate to describe the theory and 
practice of science, rather than prescribe changes. 
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I intend to argue against this view on the grounds that 
prescriptive philosophies can themselves be seen as a 
necessary part of the self-correcting mechanism of 
science. 
This grounding will set the scene for an essentially 
personal account as to how and why I came to believe 
that pluralism must become a central focus for the 
philosophy of science. Personal accounts such as this 
will be seen to have the function of exposing writers' 
inevitably limited perspectives to critical appraisal. 
Having established a personal history of the key 
experiences that led me to write this thesis, I will be 
free to move on to a detailed review of Critical 
Systems ideas. 
This review will focus on the use of up-front 
emancipatory ideals that encourage democratic dialogue 
and seek to prevent scientific elitism. It will also 
contain an explanation of how pluralism is said to 
differ from other approaches to methodology, including 
other approaches in which researchers draw upon more 
20 
than one working method. I will then be able to start 
on a discussion of my own first thoughts in trying to 
develop this field. 
1.2.2 The 'Problem' of Pluralism 
The Critical Systems understanding of pluralism offers 
a central innovation: it gives us a meta-theory which 
allows us to be explicit about the ways in which 
different methods might most appropriately relate to 
different research contexts. 
However, this also presents us with a 'problem'. Some 
of the Critical Systems literature seems to suggest 
that such a meta-theory takes us beyond the need to see 
any single philosophical paradigm (in the sense implied 
by Kuhn, 1970) underpinning it. I will need to ask, 
"how can this be possible?" 
I will argue that pluralism must involve researchers in 
the use of a philosophy that sees pluralist meta-
theories as valid and, because this is not a 
universally accepted position, pluralism cannot be 
21 
meta-paradigmatic. 
Once it becomes clear that there is indeed some sort of 
philosophical paradigm underpinning pluralism, it 
becomes necessary to identify it. The obvious 
candidate, given that the Critical Systems 
understanding of pluralism is different from any other, 
is Critical Systems Thinking itself. 
The first aim of this thesis, then, will be to explain 
why a pluralist meta-theory must be paradigmatic. 
1.3. Section 2: Contexts of the Debate about Pluralism 
Section 1 should leave the reader with a fairly 
coherent position to work with, so in Section 2 we will 
take a step back to look more generally at what might 
lie behind the desire for pluralism. 
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1.3.1 Unity and Pluralism 
We will begin by asking "what does methodological 
restriction do to science?" This is where the title of 
the thesis - Unity and Pluralism - becomes meaningful, 
because one of the answers I will present is that 
methodological pluralism is actually essential if we 
are to pursue the ideal of the unity of science. 
This is the ideal which suggests that, ultimately, the 
subject matter of science should not be seen as 
fragmentary. This is not to say that we should be 
aiming toward a single Grand Truth, or even that we 
want unification of scientific institutions. Diversity 
of exploration is vitally important as a stimulant to 
debate and change; but, ideally, no part of this 
diversity should be excluded from the subject matter of 
science. 
In order to work towards the ideal of unity, systems 
scientists try to dispense with disciplinary boundaries 
altogether (and even traditional disciplinary 
scientists accept complementarity 
discipline and others). 
23 
between their 
The second aim of the thesis will be to explain why 
methodological pluralism and pursuit of the ideal of 
the unity of science are so intimately bound together. 
1.3.2 Social and Ecological Contexts 
Following this, the third aim will be to take one 
further step back and examine the social and ecological 
contexts of this debate. 
In particular it will be suggested that, while the 
purpose of systems science is often said to be dealing 
with complexity, the understanding of complexity we 
usually work with is rather impoverished. This 
impoverishment is shown up in some of the issues that 
we are currently trying to deal with - especially 
issues of a global, ecological nature. 
Using a practical example of the interdependence we 
find between the notions of ecological harmony, social 
justice and personal freedom, I will argue that we need 
24 
a vision of complexity that begins to reintegrate the 
objective, normative and subjective "worlds" of 
understanding. Methodological pluralism will be 
presented as an answer to the question of how we are to 
address this newly identified complexity. 
Following this, 
rethink of the 
systems science. 
I will be in a position to suggest 
conventionally 
I will argue 
accepted history 
that the issue 
a 
of 
of 
reintegrating the objective, normative and subjective 
realms has a lot in common with holistic, pre-
Aristotelian and pre-Cartesian mediaeval Christian 
thinking (although there are significant differences 
too, such as the latter's mysticism). 
Interestingly, I believe that it will be possible to 
demonstrate that the emergence, 
marginalization and re-emergence of 
ideas has an ecological context. 
25 
suppression, 
these holistic 
1.4 Section 3: Epistemology, Ontology and Legitimation 
If methodological pluralism is so important, both to 
the project of systems science (pursuing the ideal of 
the unity of science) and to our current need to deal 
with an enhanced understanding of complexity, then it 
is vital that our pluralist practice be theoretically 
coherent. 
1.4.1 Ontology 
Having identified the fact that any pluralist 
perspective must be paradigmatic, we have to reveal our 
paradigmatic assumptions. 
Most Critical Systems thinkers have underpinned 
pluralism with Jurgen Habermas's (1972) epistemological 
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests (to be 
described in the main body of the thesis). However, I 
intend to demonstrate that this theory makes major 
humanist assumptions that are inappropriate in the 
light of our current ecological concerns. 
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I will therefore be in the position of having to 
develop a new philosophical argument. A start will be 
made on this project (only a start, because to pursue 
all the ramifications will undoubtedly take several 
years' more work). The beginnings of a new vision of 
ontology will be presented that, I will suggest, shows 
promising potential as a credible philosophical 
underpinning for our notion of pluralism. 
The fourth aim of this thesis will therefore be to make 
a start on demonstrating how the Critical Systems 
understanding of pluralism might be underpinned by a 
credible vision of ontology. 
1.4.2 The Legitimation of Systems Science 
At this point we will have generated a line of argument 
running from ontology, through an enhanced 
understanding of complexity, into research methodology. 
Thus, it will be argued, the Critical Systems notion of 
pluralism is both credible (not based on logical 
contradiction) and legitimate (in terms of being able 
27 
to deal with some of the pressing, complex problems of 
today). 
It is this issue of legitimacy that we will end with. 
Only a systems practice that is pluralistic can help us 
pursue the ideal of the unity of science in an adequate 
manner, and it is only a pluralist systems science that 
can deal with the enhanced complexity that many of the 
current issues we are facing, especially global issues, 
present. Pluralism is therefore essential for the 
continued legitimation of systems science. 
The fifth aim of the thesis, then, is to demonstrate 
how pluralism might enhance the legitimacy of systems 
science for the future. 
1.5 Conclusion 
In concluding this introduction, let us just repeat the 
five central, interlinked aims of this thesis: 
(1) To explain why a pluralist meta-theory must be 
paradigmatic. 
28 
(2) To explain why methodological pluralism and 
pursuit of the ideal of the unity of science are 
so intimately bound together. 
(3) To examine the social and ecological contexts 
of the debate about pluralism. 
(4) To make a start on demonstrating how the 
Critical Systems understanding of pluralism might 
be underpinned by a credible vision of ontology. 
(5) To demonstrate how pluralism might enhance the 
legitimacy of systems science for the future. 
Along the way many other subsidiary issues will be 
explored, and many will no doubt remain unexpressed, 
but these are the five central, interlinked issues I 
will return to at the end of the thesis. 
29 
SECTION 1 
PLURALISM AND CRITICAL SYSTEMS THINKING 
30 
CHAPTER 2: WHY IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE USEFUL? 
As explained in Chapter 1, the central theme of this 
thesis is the need for methodological pluralism in 
systems science. However, in claiming that we have such 
a need, and putting forward the view that it is both 
possible and desirable that we should meet it, I am 
already making a massive assumption: that critical 
inquiry into the rights and wrongs of science is a 
valid endeavour. 
2.1 Description or Prescription? 
I am, of course, only the latest in a long line of 
people who have argued that scientists should be doing 
this, or should be doing that. There are some who say 
that the philosophy of science should only be 
descriptive rather than prescriptive: that we should 
think about what scientists are doing, but that it is 
inappropriate for us to suggest changes in theory or 
practice. 
31 
Masterman (1970), in a paper that is now widely seen as 
providing a seminal argument in support of Kuhn (1962), 
offers just such a viewpoint when she argues angrily 
with the stances taken by both Feyerabend (1962) and 
Popper (1963) on the grounds that they are merely 
pontificating. She states that: 
In 
"Science as it is actually done ... is also science 
as it ought to be done. For if there is not some 
self-correcting mechanism that operates within 
science itself, then there is no hope that, 
scientifically speaking, things will ever be set 
right when they go wrong. For the one thing 
working scientists are not going to do is change 
their ways of thinking, in doing science, ex more 
philosophico, because they have Popper and 
Feyerabend pontificating at them like eighteenth-
century divines". 
this critique Masterman appears, if I have 
understood her argument correctly, to assume that no 
working scientist wishes to learn about and share in 
understandings of validity that have been influenced by 
people not engaged directly in the practice of science. 
If this were indeed the case, one cannot help but 
wonder why the writings of Popper et al are taught by 
working scientists on so many undergraduate science 
courses. 
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More importantly, however, she appears not to have 
considered the possibility that arguments about what 
might be right or wrong, valid or invalid, in science 
are actually part of the self-correcting mechanism she 
talks about. 
Because I share Masterman's faith in our ability to 
self-correct, or at the very least in the need to try 
and self-correct, I make no apology for talking about 
what systems science should be about, although I hope 
that it will become clear that what I am arguing for is 
very different from the changes proposed by many 
others. 
Most philosophers of science have made a case for the 
validity of only one narrow epistemological view, and 
only one corresponding approach to inquiry (proscribing 
all others). In contrast, I wish to argue, following 
and building upon the seminal work of Jackson and Keys 
(1984), that all methods have both legitimacies and 
limitations according to the contexts they are applied 
in, and that it is possible to offer a credible 
ontology in order to provide theoretical coherence for 
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methodological pluralism. 
A wish to promote openness and conciliation between 
working scientists using different methods lies at the 
heart of this proposition, as does a desire to address 
complex ecological and social issues that we cannot 
hope to deal with using restricted methodologies. 
2.2 Conclusion 
Here I have argued that prescriptive philosophies of 
science are essential for the promotion of constructive 
changes in our scientific practices. This clears the 
ground for the rest of this thesis which is undeniably 
prescriptive in its arguments. 
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CHAPTER 3: PERSONAL EXPERIENCES 
In documenting a research project such as this I 
believe it is essential to offer some account of the 
personal experiences that led me to formulate my ideas 
in the way I did. The reasons for this are summed up by 
Hollway (1989) who, when introducing her own research, 
said that: 
"It would be impossible to present these questions 
fully without talking about myself: the point that 
I was at in my life and aspects of its history, 
the cultural and political conditions that 
produced it, how these shaped my interest in 
certain areas of contemporary social theory. These 
factors together produced the conditions which 
made possible my research questions and shaped how 
I addressed them". 
Making personal conditions explicit in research not 
only makes communicating meaning easier, but also 
exposes the inevitably limited life experience of the 
writer to the scrutiny of the reader. 
Some sections of this thesis are concerned with the 
need for critical appraisal of research in terms of 
what we think of as objective truth, rightness 
(normative values) and meaning for individuals. A 
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reader might wish to cite empirical evidence to refute 
a particular claim a writer has made, s/he might wish 
to argue that the writer has not addressed the 'real 
issues', or s/he might wish to inquire into aspects of 
the writer's life in order to understand why s/he wrote 
what s/he wrote. Presenting a selective history of 
personal experiences aids the conduct of this latter 
form of critique. 
So, let me recount what I consider to be my own 
relevant experiences. 
3.1 Studying Psychology 
At undergraduate level, from 1979-1982, I studied 
psychology, which at that time was an extraordinarily 
restrictive discipline in terms of methodology. The 
course I chose was especially orientated to 
experimental methods which were, by and 
justified through reference to the earlier 
popper (e.g., 1959). 
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large, 
works of 
To give an example of the extent of the bias, in three 
years we had just one lecture on psychoanalytic theory, 
and much of that was taken up invalidating it on the 
grounds that it wasn't open to falsification through 
use of experimental methods. 
However, at the time, because I didn't know any more 
than I had been taught, I simply experienced the course 
as irrelevant to the concerns that had taken me into 
psychology: a wish to find ways of evaluating human 
services in terms of our needs and desires. It took 
several years of hands-on experience in research for me 
to realise just how limited the methodology I had been 
taught really was. 
3.2 Research at Portugal Prints 
For eighteen months or so after graduation I did 
independent research on various issues, such as the 
future of health education in secondary schools, the 
pros and cons of different therapeutic interventions 
for problem drinkers, and the use of decision theory as 
a structuring aid in counselling. As all this work was 
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basically theoretical I did not have to confront the 
methodology problem again for quite a while. 
Following a year spent in Residential Social Work, I 
returned to research in order to conduct a long-term 
evaluation of Portugal Prints; an innovative, 
community-based design and printing workshop for people 
with mental health problems. 
At this facility, approximately 20 people between the 
ages of 18 and 55 participated in a co-operative. They 
not only designed, printed and packaged their own line 
of greeting cards, but also offered a general printing 
and design service. 
The "workers" (as the clients of the facility were 
called) attended for up to two years, mostly part-time, 
and were supported by four full-time members of staff. 
Vocational counselling and basic computer literacy were 
offered as well as an optional art group. Workers were 
paid their expenses plus a small attendance allowance, 
and also shared the profits from their work. However, 
this rarely amounted to enough to affect the payment of 
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welfare benefits, which everybody received. 
All in all it could be said that Portugal Prints 
offered a real work environment, but without some of 
the pressures open employment can bring. Further 
details of the running of the facility can be found in 
Reynolds (1984) and Evans (1990). 
When I first had talks with the staff and workers of 
Portugal Prints, we discussed what the criteria for 
evaluation should be. The obvious one for any 
vocational rehabilitation facility was whether or not 
people were successful in finding and keeping work 
after attendance. 
However, there was a general consensus that the most 
important thing the facility did for people was help 
restore a sense of self-worth. Most of the workers had 
been unemployed for several years and, often after 
several breakdowns, their morale was pretty low. 
Everybody seemed to be saying that, by giving people 
the status of "worker", Portugal Prints helped them 
look more positively at their abilities and, in the 
long run, their whole selves. 
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By this time I had made some progress in thinking about 
methodology, in that I had moved from the hard-line 
experimental position we were taught. I had already 
thought through the issue of control groups and had 
decided that it was unethical to refuse help to a group 
of people if there was a reasonable suspicion that the 
intervention being evaluated might be beneficial. 
However, the understanding I was still taking into the 
research was that evaluation criteria had to be 
objectively measurable. 
My immediate reaction, then, to the discovery that what 
people wanted was an evaluation of how the facility 
affected peoples' feelings of self-worth, was concern. 
I explained that I thought it was going to be very 
difficult to conduct valid research in this area, but 
agreed to try to find a reliable and well validated 
measure of self-esteem that we might be able to use. 
NOw, in saying this I didn't quite realise just how 
naive I was being. When I conducted a literature search 
I discovered that no supposedly objective measure can 
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distinguish between a rating of high self-esteem and a 
rating of the wish to be seen to have high self-esteem 
(Kenny, 1956; Cowan and Tongas, 1959; Cowan et aI, 
1960) . 
Kenny showed that this holds true for all sorts of 
standardised instruments (personality questionnaires, 
rating scales and Q sorts), and Cowan and Tongas were 
forced to conclude that Itself concept and ideal self 
measures .... are so heavily saturated with social 
desirability as to lose meaning independent of the 
latter variable It . 
Following this discovery I went back to Portugal Prints 
and told them that it would be impossible to assess 
self-esteem. As a compromise I agreed to use Rotter's 
measure of locus of control (1966), an instrument which 
assesses the degree to which a person attributes events 
in their lives to the action of external forces or 
internal will. 
Although I suspected that social desirability would 
influence this too, nobody had done any research into 
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it, so I conveniently put the possibility to the back 
of my mind and told myself that it was a well respected 
instrument and that there is a wealth of evidence that 
it correlates with all sorts of other important 
variables (Rotter, 1966). 
Other than locus of control, all the variables I ended 
up looking at were either demographic or concerned with 
the assessment of mental health. Indeed, the only issue 
of overlap between the needs of the workers and staff 
and my methodology was an assessment of whether people 
found work after attending. 
The irony here was that the facility was already 
monitoring this, so I had simply taken over one of 
their jobs! Not surprisingly, as the research continued 
over a three year period, I became severely 
demoralised. I had allowed methodology to determine the 
questions I could ask so that my research had become 
largely irrelevant to the very people I wanted to help. 
This problem has been commented on by several authors 
(notably Levy, 1981), but is summarised neatly in one 
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sentence by Hollway (1989) who, after going through 
similar experiences, noted that "where method has come 
into conflict with questions it has wanted to ask, it 
has changed the questions and not the methods". 
3.3 Research for the Gordon Hospital 
My experience at Portugal Prints, drawn out over three 
years, gave me plenty of time to reassess my ideas, and 
I determined not to make the same mistake twice. After 
finishing that project I was asked to design a large-
scale evaluation of day care for people with mental 
health problems in the area covered by the Riverside 
Health Authority. 
I had three months in which to put together a proposal 
for funding (which I was under the impression would 
only be turned down in exceptional circumstances), and 
I designed a study which started off with a 
consideration of the needs of those receiving a service 
(as described by the users themselves, their families, 
their friends, and staff giving support). 
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I intended to use objective measures (recidivism, 
employment, etc.), but I wanted to interrelate the 
information from these with the views of those 'on the 
ground'. This, then, was my first intuition of the 
value of methodological pluralism. 
To my horror, 
methodological 
funding was actually refused on 
grounds. Not only did the committee 
assessing the proposal object to the use of subjective 
material, but their view was that such a study would be 
totally invalid unless it used control groups. 
This was, first of all, a clinical impossibility as 
there were too few referrals to the services to refuse 
anyone help. The facilities would have stood half-empty 
while people were asking to attend. 
of control groups was unethical. 
To me, such a use 
However, in a 
conversation I had with one member of the committee, it 
was made clear that they regarded the efficacy of their 
services as unproven, so it would not be a denial of 
help to refuse a service! 
After my experiences at Portugal Prints I thought the 
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difficulties I had experienced were simply a result of 
my own ignorance. Now, however, I realised that the 
views I had inherited from my undergraduate training 
were deeply entrenched in key institutions, and that 
they exercised their power to keep their own research 
discourse dominant while burying any potential for 
alternative discourses to develop. 
3.4 The Microjob Research 
At this stage it became vital for me to find a setting 
in which I could develop such an alternative discourse 
(I had already formulated the tentative label of 
"integrated systems methodology" in my head), and it 
was not long before I was offered one. The 
Rehabilitation Resource Centre in the Department of 
Systems Science at City University secured a contract 
to evaluate an innovative computer training project for 
people with disabilities by the name of Microjob. 
Microjob 
(January 
funding 
was in operation for an 18 month period 
1987 to June 1988), and the application for 
for the facility (submitted to the European 
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Social Fund in October 1985) made the rationale of the 
project clear: 
ItMicrojob aims to assist people with disabilities 
to obtain employment in the open market 
particularly in the field of Information 
Technology - through the provision of a range of 
linked services designed to meet individual 
needs It . 
These linked services included vocational guidance and 
assessment, a basic course in computer literacy, in-
depth training in various applications of computers, 
help in finding appropriate aids and adaptations, 
training in job-search skills and placement in 
employment (or further education). Further details of 
the basic structure and function of the service can be 
found in Folkes (1988), Midgley (1988) or Midgley and 
Floyd (1988). 
When I set about starting this evaluation I thought 
that I was a lone voice, as the only writers on 
qualitative methodology that I had read were Weiss 
(1972, 1973, 1977), Broskowski (1976) and Patton (1978, 
1980) . 
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While I felt that these authors were streets ahead of 
other thinkers in the field, they nevertheless all 
advocated formative methodology (where the researcher 
and the staff of the facility being evaluated learn 
from each other in a heuristic process) instead of 
summative (where the researcher presents a final report 
for the facility to do with as it will). Personally, I 
thought that there was room for both. 
Also, in the case of Patton in particular, because his 
primary intent was to build an evaluation practice that 
can at all times be seen by participants to be relevant 
to the task in hand, he tended to focus on consensus 
amongst participants in determining the value-base of 
the research. This ignores the possibility that 
situations might arise where there is no significant 
area of consensus, or that the consensus is seen to be 
so objectionable by the researcher that s/he cannot 
sanction the subjugation of her or his own perspective 
to the will of the majority. 
I felt very strongly that, as well as an integrated 
approach to methodology, we also needed an approach 
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that brought values and ideology to the forefront of 
consideration. 
When I conducted this research I made the decision to 
register for a Masters degree. As a literature review 
was a necessary part of my M.Phil. thesis, I was guided 
into a new area of reading. To my immense relief there 
was a whole body of literature, some of it still in 
press, documenting the birth of a new approach. 
This new approach was Critical Systems, which dealt 
explicitly with my concerns. Ideology was indeed of 
prime interest, and I also found I could lay aside my 
tentatively labelled "integrated systems methodology" 
in favour of the term pluralism. 
As I will show in Chapter 4, the idea of pluralism 
addressed my one doubt about linking methods together. 
I knew that each different method somehow had· to be 
aligned in a one-to-one relationship with its most 
appropriate practical context, but I was unsure how 
this was to be done except through pure intuition 
during the conduct of each individual research project. 
In a seminal paper, Jackson and Keys (1984) took a 
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great stride forward when they started the process of 
defining ideal-type contexts that would be clearly 
recognisable to most people conducting research in 
organisations. 
In evaluating Microjob, then, I worked from a Critical 
Systems perspective. The evaluation itself has been 
written up most fully in a thesis (Midgley, 1988) and a 
final report (Midgley and Floyd, 1988). Aspects of it 
have also been documented in several shorter papers 
(Midgley, 1989a, 1990ai Midgley and Floyd, 1990). The 
validity of the methodology itself has also been 
discussed in a number of places (Midgley, 1988, 1989a, 
1990a) . 
3.5 Conclusion 
So, this is what led me to Critical Systems Thinking 
and the present thesis. Having successfully applied the 
idea of pluralism in practice, and realising how more 
limited methodological discourses have become 
entrenched in powerful institutions that dominate the 
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funding of research and the training of researchers, I 
became fired with the challenge of focussing my own 
research energies on developing the new paradigm. 
Having documented my own rather tortuous path toward 
the ideas in this thesis, I will be in a position, in 
the next chapter, to look more closely at the notion of 
pluralism as it has been expressed in the Critical 
Systems literature. 
Notes 
1. Such a summary will be "selective", not only because 
the writer must obviously try to be relevant, but 
because s/he will inevitably be working with an 
incomplete understanding of his or her own processes of 
development. 
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CHAPTER 4: PLURALISM 
I have already touched upon the idea of pluralism, and 
the purpose of this chapter is to flesh out our 
understanding of the concept. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 I will move on to a discussion of 
Critical Systems Thinking (the perspective into which 
this understanding of pluralism has been integrated), 
presenting the key ideas as they have been documented 
in the literature by a variety of authors, before 
entering into a critique of these in coming chapters. 
Although describing pluralism first will prevent a 
strictly chronological exposition (Critical Systems 
ideas emerged in the literature about four years before 
pluralism was first explicitly discussed ln systems 
science), it makes more sense in terms of the primary 
issues that are of concern in this thesis. 
4.1 Pluralism 
In the context of management science methodology, it 
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was Reed (1985) who originally coined the term 
"pluralism". Reed's initial work was then built upon 
and substantially developed by the systems scientists 
Jackson and Keys (1984), Jackson (1987a) and Flood 
(1989a). The thoughts of these authors will be detailed 
throughout this chapter. 
Interestingly, the idea of pluralism arose as much in 
response to a protracted philosophical debate between 
hard (positivistic1 ) and soft (interpretive) systems 
thinkers as to direct observations of problems in 
research practice. 
Flood (1989a) claims, in my view rightly, that the 
tendency for most people to characterise their own 
position as the only valid one in this debate has 
caused a degree of stagnation in systems thinking. As 
he says, it is essential to overcome this if 
researchers are to continue to aim for a flexible and 
responsive research practice that still acknowledges 
the value of theory. 
Disillusion with the philosophical debate has resulted 
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In many researchers taking a 'pragmatic' line in which 
theory is simply thrown out of the window, leading to 
all sorts of problems in practice (see later in this 
chapter). Because this debate has been an important 
factor in the birth of our current understanding of 
pluralism, it is worth reviewing it in a little more 
detail. 
4.2 Paradigmatic Conflicts: Hard versus Soft 
As Jackson (1982, 1985a, 1987b) and Flood (1989a) have 
pointed out, the main philosophical debate that has 
dominated the systems literature over the past decade 
or more has been this conflict between authors sticking 
to the more traditional hard systems methodologies in 
their approaches to human problematic situations (e.g. 
Hall, 1962; Jenkins, 1969a; Atthill, 1975; and 
Daellenbach et ai, 1983) and those taking a soft line 
(e.g. Churchman, 1968a, 1971, 1979; Ackoff, 1974, 1981; 
and Checkland, 1972, 1975, 1981, 1985). 
As both approaches have demonstrable practical utility, 
this has led to attempts by certain writers to subsume 
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one within the other. In 1974, for example, M'Pherson 
attempted to demonstrate that soft systems thinking is 
a sub-set of hard. By way of reply, Checkland (1981) 
put the reverse view that hard ideas are a sub-set of 
the soft methodology and can be used in "special cases" 
when there is total agreement between participants on 
the nature of the problematic situation. Of course 
neither M'Pherson's or Checkland's views were accepted 
by the other camp. 
4.3 Breaking the Stalemate 
Recently, however, there have been attempts to break 
this stalemate by changing the goal-posts of the 
debate. Instead of simply looking at hard versus soft 
(and the underlying conflict between positivistic and 
interpretive philosophies), some authors have chosen 
instead to examine the way different practitioners 
design and defend their methodologies; or, to put it 
more cynically, they have looked at peoples' 'styles of 
combat' . 
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Jackson (1987a) detailed four categories of 
methodological consideration. Following Reed (1985), he 
labelled these pragmatism (a supposedly atheoretical, 
'mix-and-match' approach), isolationism (fixation upon 
just one approach, with all others deemed invalid), 
imperialism (fixation upon one main approach, but 
drawing 
(drawing 
others in as and when necessary) and pluralism 
upon methods ｾｮ＠ a theoretically explicit 
manner according to perceived situational context). 
4.4 Six Approaches to Methodology 
Flood (1989a) built on these ideas and sub-divided 
isolationism into methodological isolationism and 
theoretical isolationism. He also split imperialism 
into imperialism by annexation and imperialism by 
subsumption. Thus Flood talks about six distinct 
approaches to methodology2. 
As these terms are all so new, it will be necessary to 
explore their meanings before a critique can be entered 
into. The following definitions have been reproduced 
verbatim from Flood (1989b): 
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Pragmatism. "The most striking feature about the 
pragmatic approach is that no reference is made to 
inferable underlying theory or methodological 
rules. The main emphasis is on intra-
methodological partitioning; i.e. using parts and 
techniques in a heuristic (trial and error) 
fashion. The use of a single whole methodology is 
not inconsistent, although somewhat unlikely, with 
this approach. There are no explicit 
considerations of either theoretical or 
methodological commensurability; nevertheless, 
superficially the pragmatist is assuming measures 
by the same standard." 
Pluralism. "No two approaches contrast so starkly 
as pragmatism and pluralism. In fact, the only 
areas of 'overlap' are somewhat dubious anyway; 
i.e. inter-methodological partitioning which the 
pragmatist could (in principle) undertake, and 
theoretical commensurability which is widely 
contrasting even in their 'agreement'. In terms of 
recognising pluralism, the key observations are 
methodological incommensurability and theoretical 
commensurability (at a metalevel of reasoning) at 
once. Equally important, however, is inter- and 
intra-theoretical partitioning, which paves the 
way for context and methodology to be linked." 
Theoretical Isolationism. "Reference to theory is 
made, although only the tenets of one paradigm are 
accepted, whilst all others are objected to; i.e. 
there is theoretical incommensurability. Another 
label for this is a 'world-view' approach. In this 
case differing methodological approaches are 
accepted, there is methodological 
commensurability, but each is 'seen' only to work 
from one world-viewpoint. In other words, certain 
contexts demand only a subset of concepts from the 
adopted paradigm. Concepts from an 'inferior' 
paradigm may deal with these certain contexts, but 
for other contexts their 'inferiority' is shown in 
the form of anomalies. In relation to pluralism 
the vital difference is the methodological 
commensurability of theoretical isolationism, 
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which then pairs with theoretical 
incommensurability." 
Methodological Isolationism. "There is one very 
important distinction between methodological and 
theoretical isolationism, and that concerns 
methodological commensurability. In this case, a 
single methodology is isolated within some 
paradigm, and to which users remain loyal to the 
exclusion of all other methodologies. The 
methodology itself may 'require' minor 
modifications following reductionist analysis." 
Methodological Imperialism by Annexation. "This 
can be seen as an 'advanced form' of isolationism 
that adds on 'bits' of other methodologies, often 
in response to outstanding anomalies. In this 
sense there is no final and complete inter-
methodological partitioning, however, intra-
methodological partitioning is necessary in order 
that annexation may be carried out." 
Methodological Imperialism by Subsumption. "In 
this approach a methodology is adopted that may 
call upon other methodologies at a specific point 
in order to act as sub-methodologies to deal with 
specific matters, e.g. if the 'what' had been 
decided through use of the 'mother' methodology, a 
'how' methodology may then be drawn into the 
process .... There is a great similarity and no 
outright contradiction between this approach and 
theoretical isolationism. The main differences are 
that in theoretical isolationism different 
methodologies are used in differing contexts, 
whereas, subsumption means that one methodology is 
used for all contexts although different 
methodologies may be called upon to 'help out'." 
Flood (1989a) analysed the advantages and disadvantages 
of all these approaches and, in a similar manner to 
Jackson (1987a), concluded that pluralism is the most 
attractive, although imperialism by subsumption was 
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recognised as holding some potential. 
The criteria both Jackson (1987a) and Flood (1989a) 
used in making this judgment were firstly a belief that 
openness and conciliation should be encouraged between 
supporters of the positivist and interpretive 
paradigms, and secondly the need for theoretical 
coherence. 
Flood (1989a) goes into some detail about what he sees 
as the problems of the other approaches. 
Pragmatism, according to him, is problematic because 
its refusal to recognise the implicit nature of theory 
and ideology in all actions renders it incapable of 
examining its own hidden agendas. Linked with this, 
pragmatists are seen to maintain and increase the power 
of elites by seeking, on the whole, to "keep their 
clients happy". Also, because of the restricted nature 
of pragmatic analysis, adopted approaches may embody 
theoretical contradictions that their practitioners can 
never be aware of. 
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Midgley (1989b) also notes a further difficulty faced 
by pragmatists: if all learning about methodology 
within the pragmatic approach is by trial and error, 
and there is no common frame of reference shared by all 
pragmatists, then one individual's learning with regard 
to methodology cannot be communicated to other 
practitioners without the likelihood of 
misinterpretation. 
In contrast, methodological isolationism is criticised 
by Flood for its "static" nature. 'Reductionist' 
analysis may bring about limited change to the single 
methodology adhered to, but practice remains severely 
restricted. 
Theoretical isolationism, on the other hand, is 
recognised by Flood to be a sustainable proposition 
the only restriction he sees is that all followers of 
one sole theory are by definition rooting their 
practice in a single 'world view', and therefore 
automatically alienate others with a different 
perspective. 
Imperialism by annexation is attacked in scathing terms 
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and described as "advanced isolationism". In Flood's 
words (1989a), 
"Because new approaches emerge some isolationists, 
feeling dissonance about their approach because of 
anomalies which may exist, consequently respond by 
developing their own approaches. A more cynical 
view is that annexationists are rapacious in their 
research, tracking down the 'tidbits' and drawing 
upon them, whilst discarding the (so perceived) 
offal" . 
Imperialism by subsumption is questioned for the way it 
reshapes subsumed methodologies to fit in with the 
dominating perspective - thus insights that could be 
gained from the appreciation of other viewpoints are 
never really taken on board. 
Ultimately, Flood maintains that in terms of developing 
openness and conciliation (as opposed to theoretical 
coherence which is the other criterion Flood uses to 
evaluate the approaches), "imperialism .... must fail on 
the same reckoning as pure isolationism: i.e., complete 
domination is unlikely because of paradigmatic 
conflicts". 
The only remaining category is pluralism, which, 
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following Jackson (1987a), is identified as the most 
fruitful approach in terms of developing openness and 
conciliation. 
Flood's (1989a) definition of pluralism is centred 
neatly around the sentence: "the key observations are 
methodological incommensurability and theoretical 
commensurability (at a meta-level of reasoning) at 
once". That is, working methods drawn from the various 
paradigms are appropriate for different perceived 
situations but, while this might mean that they have to 
be separately defined at the methodological level, at a 
'higher' theoretical level they can be seen as 
complementary. 
4.5 The System of Systems Methodologies 
So, what does pluralism mean in practice? Jackson and 
Keys (1984) developed four categories of context which 
were later expanded to six by Jackson (1987b). These 
authors called the resulting grid of contexts a "System 
of Systems Methodologies". 
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This has been described in the literature using a 
number of different terminologies. In producing my own 
description over the coming pages I have chosen to 
adopt the terminology of Flood and Jackson (1991), with 
a single, minor modification3 . 
The grid defining the six contexts of application has 
two axes, and is presented here in Figure 4.1. One axis 
is labelled Participants (referring to perceptions of 
the relationships between participants) and the other 
is System (referring to perceptions of complexity). 
The Participants dimension is seen as having three 
states: unitary (a perception of full agreement between 
participants on definitions of terms and problematic 
areas), conflictual (a perception of disagreement 
between participants) and coercive (a perception of 
disagreement that is masked, or potential disagreement 
that is not being allowed to surface, due to power 
relationships between participants). 
The System dimension is seen as having two states: 
simple and complex. 
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Figure 4.1: The System of Systems Methodologies 
UNITARY 
C: I CONFLICTUAL 
-.. 1 
,,' I 
':::1 (.1 
-I 
'1\ 1-------------
COERCIVE 
------------------------------------------------
SIMPLE : COMPLEX : 
------------------------:-----------------------: 
Simple-Unitary: All : Complex-Unitary: Many : 
key variables easily : interacting systems, : 
appreciated, with no : with no disagreements : 
disagreements between : betNeen those defined : 
those defined as : as involved or : 
involved or affected. : affected. : 1 1 
------------------------1-----------------------1 
Simple-Conflictual: : Complex-Conflictual: : 
Clear and unambiguous : Unclear disagreements 
disagreements between : between equals (in 
equals (in terms of : terms of power I 1 
1 
1 
I 
power relationships). : relationships). 
Simple-Coercive: One 
party wielding power 
over another so that 
disagreements are not 
allowed to surface and 
the dominant vision is 
not subjected to 
challenge. 
-----------------------1 
Complex-Coercive: A : 
ｰ｡ｴｴ･ｾｮ＠ of power : 
that has all those : 
defined as involved : 
or affected wrongly : 
believing that the : 
status quo is : 
satisfactory. : 
The six contexts in the system of systems methodologies 
are arrived at by cross-referencing the two dimensions, 
and these six can be labelled simple-unitary, complex-
unitary, simple-conflictual, complex-conflictual, 
simple-coercive and complex-coercive. 4 
Various systems methods have been aligned with these 
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different contexts [Jackson and Keys (1984), Banathy 
(1987), Oliga (1988), Flood and Jackson (1991)]. All 
these authors' suggestions have been brought together 
in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2: Table of Context-Linked Methods 
SIMPLE COMPLEX 
Methods Responsive I Methods Responsive 
to Simple-Unitary to Complex-Unitary 
Contexts: Contexts: 
( 1 ) Classical OR ( 1 ) Organizational 
( 2 ) Systems cybernetics 
engineering ( 2 ) Sociotechnical 
( 3 ) Systems analysis systems 
( 4 ) Living systems thinking 
UNITARY process analysis ( 3 ) General 
( 5 ) Management systems theory 
cybernetics ( 4 ) Modern 
contingency 
theory 
( 5 ) Living system 
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In broad terms, when Jackson and Keys (1984) and 
subsequent authors conducted this alignment of methods 
with their ideal contexts of application, hard systems 
methods (from the positivist tradition) were said to be 
most appropriate for the unitary contexts, soft methods 
(interpretive) were regarded as best for conflictual 
situations, and emancipatory methods were aimed at 
coercive contexts. 
These were 
Positivistic 
not arbitrary alignments 
methods were said to be best 
however. 
suited to 
unitary contexts because formulating a picture of 'the 
truth' in response to a set of questions will only be 
of relevance to those people who agree that this set of 
questions is the right set. 
If there is disagreement over what the basic issues are 
(i.e., the context is conflictual), then this will not 
be addressed by provision of a simple set of facts that 
are orientated to answer questions that only some 
people regard as important. 
Similarly, if we are dealing with coercion, the facts 
provided will simply strengthen the hand of those who 
65 
have control over what issues are addressed by allowing 
them to pursue their aims more effectively. When there 
is genuine agreement on the nature of the problem, 
however, then positivistic methods do provide useful 
answers. 
In contrast, interpretive methods were aligned with 
conflictual contexts because, when there is open and 
non-coercive disagreement, interpretive methods can be 
helpful in providing a basis for mutual understanding 
and decision-making. 
However, when there is agreement on what the problems 
are (i.e., the context is unitary), then there are few 
differences between viewpoints to explore. Furthermore, 
interpretive methods are equally unhelpful in coercive 
contexts because open disagreement is not easy to 
surface, and we will inevitably end up simply 
supporting the dominant vision. 
In contrast once again, emancipatory methods were 
aligned with the coercive contexts because, when mutual 
understanding is difficult to achieve and a necessity 
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for 'taking sides' arises, these methods can help in 
subjecting dominant visions to dialectical challenge. 
When there is genuine agreement on the right course to 
pursue (i.e., the context is unitary), such dialectical 
challenge will usually be redundant. Alternatively, if 
we try to use emancipatory methods when disagreement is 
open (i.e., the context is conflictual), then their 
challenging nature may well threaten the potential for 
mutual understanding that could make conflict easier to 
handle in other ways. 
We therefore see that each type of methodology has its 
legitimate uses, but each also has significant 
limitations. 
4.5.1 Methodological Additions 
It should be noted that, in figure 4.2, I have included 
several methods not suggested by previous authors. 
These are the LOM Programme, education (Critical 
Pedagogy), and consciousness raising groups. 
67 
First of all the LOM Programme, initiated by Gustavsen 
(1986) and Gustavsen and Engelstad (1986), lS long 
overdue for integration into this body of literature. 
This is a well-tried Action Research methodology based 
upon collective democratic decision-making. 
Second, there is the method I have called education. 
This was 
literature 
introduced into the Critical Systems 
by Flood and Gaisford (1989), although it 
obviously has roots in Critical Pedagogy. 
Critical Pedagogy was developed by Freire (e.g., 1972, 
1973) in Brazil. His basic idea was to make literacy 
politically relevant to people whose lives were 
dominated by poverty. In teaching adult literacy, his 
approach was to begin by focussing upon words that have 
immediate relevance to peoples' everyday experience. 
These initial 'lessons' were hardly didactic however: 
through group discussion his students developed their 
awareness that the central elements of their lives 
their land, food, work and family - had a political 
dimension. Literacy was an important tool with which 
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they could take power in their own lives, both 
individually and collectively. Essentially what they 
learned was the meaning of, and the means to gain, 
freedom. 
Critical Pedagogy emerged in the context of the 
literacy struggle in Brazil, and Flood and Gaisford 
(1989) have (implicitly rather than explicitly) pointed 
the way for systems thinkers to develop Freire's ideas 
for wider application. 
While Freire's Critical Pedagogy involves consciousness 
raising of a sort, it is largely directed by an 
explicit pre-formed ideology, and consequently a 
structured methodology. This is, of course, entirely 
appropriate when the form of coercion is simple and 
obvious. 
When coercion is hidden and only vaguely glimpsed, 
however, such directive methods cannot help. As Flood 
and Jackson (1991) acknowledge, although the problem of 
developing systems methods to address complex-coercive 
contexts (characterised by false consciousness) was 
first identified in 1987 (Jackson, 1987b), we are no 
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further forward four years later. 
As an inspiration to begin work in this area we might 
turn to some of the Feminist literature, especially the 
experiences of women setting up consciousness raising 
groups in the mid-1980s. Hollway (1989) has already 
considered how these experiences might inform the 
discipline of psychology, and her analysis might well 
prove useful for systems scientists. 
I will not digress by exploring these methods any further 
here. I hope to do this in future work. 
4.6 Creative Methodology Design 
Pluralism encourages openness and conciliation between 
supporters of currently isolationist methodologies and 
philosophies, but it also promotes creative methodology 
design. 
A glance through the literature will reveal that most 
researchers who have used the System of Systems 
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Methodologies to reflect upon their interventions in 
organisations have tended to define their research in 
terms of just one category of context and have 
therefore ended up applying a single 'off the shelf' 
systems method (e.g., Jackson, 1987ci Flood and 
Jackson, 1991). 
However, my own experience (e.g., in Midgley, 1989a, 
1990a) is that research problems are very rarely so 
straight-forward that they can be reduced down to just 
one category of context in this way. Indeed, such 
reduction can lead to a significant impoverishment of 
our understanding of situations (Gregory, 1990), and I 
have found that methods often have to be interrelated 
systemically in order to address complex issues. 
New methodologies can be developed that draw on parts 
of older, previously distinct methods to create a 
practice that is genuinely flexible and responsive to 
perceptions of the situation under investigation. This 
technique of bringing together a variety of methods 
according to perceived need has been termed 
methodological partitioning by Flood (1989b), and for 
further details see Midgley (1989a, 1990a). 
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Now, at first sight this would seem to contradict the 
pluralist idea of working methods remaining 
incommensurate at the methodological level. However, 
this is not so. With methodological partitioning, as 
method and context are still paired in a one-to-one 
relationship, the assumption of methodological 
incommensurability is not violated. 
To explain further, the research task can be 
conceptualised as a series of questions, each of which 
has a single context. In deciding upon an appropriate 
methodology the researcher will have to draw upon 
working methods relevant to all the contexts defined. 
More often than not the questions will be interrelated, 
so the working methods will have to reflect this 
through a systemic process of methodology design using 
a pluralist meta-theoretical construct (such as the 
system of Systems Methodologies) to aid critical 
reflection. 
We therefore move from a picture of a pluralist meta-
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theory as an ideal to aid the selection of single 'off 
the shelf' methods (which, despite notional recognition 
of methodological partitioning, the System of Systems 
Methodologies has largely been seen as) to one in which 
it becomes an integral part of a creative process of 
methodology design. 
4.7 An Ideal of Research Practice 
It is very important to be aware that the System of 
Systems Methodologies is most expressly not a 'rule 
book' to be followed systematically. It should be 
regarded as an ideal of research practice that is 
useful for critical reflection on methodology design. 
Ideals can be defined as theoretical constructs guiding 
critical reflection. They are principles which we 
aspire to, or believe underlie our actions in the 
world. 
popper (1959) describes truth as an ideal because, 
while human perception is conceived as fallible, truth 
is still something we aim towards. Also, Bauman (1976) 
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has claimed that socialism is an ideal, in that it 
represents what he describes as an "active utopia". 
Practical politics may require compromise, but 
socialism is a guiding principle which helps to inform 
theory and practice for those on the political left. 
In using the System of Systems Methodologies as an 
ideal, it is recognised that practical situations may 
require compromises with what we might like to do in an 
ideal world, and researchers must be prepared to 
embrace the flexibility necessary to achieve these 
compromises. 
Jackson (1990) has considered this issue in detail, and 
has successfully demonstrated that the few researchers 
who have attempted to use the System of Systems 
Methodologies as a systematic, inflexible rule book 
(e.g., Banathy, 1987, 1988, and Keys, 1988) have ended 
up violating the basic premise of pluralism as 
developed in systems science. 
When practical compromise to achieve desired ends in 
human problematic situations is refused (i.e., when 
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those ends are not being considered as an issue in 
methodology design), absolutism about methodological 
rules results in the researcher taking a positivistic 
line (this being the only tradition in the philosophy 
of science in which absolutism has ever been 
acceptable), instead of maintaining a meta-position. 
Thus the use of interpretive and emancipatory methods 
becomes contradictory. 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have provided an overview of the 
development of the idea of pluralism as it has emerged 
in systems science. Now we will be able to go on to 
look at the paradigm of Critical Systems Thinking, into 
which these thoughts about pluralism have been 
integrated. 
Notes 
1 . 
on 
I have used the term "positivistic", and have also 
occasion talked about views of science "with a 
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positivist root", to refer to all those isolationist 
perspectives in the philosophy of science that hold 
objective truth to be the only ideal worthy of pursuit 
(whether or not truth is seen as absolute), and which 
espouse epistemological value-neutrality (i.e., those 
which maintain that knowledge must always be seen as 
independent from values - see Chapter 9 of this thesis 
for more details). I feel it is important to be aware 
that these assumptions can indeed be seen to stem from 
classical positivism, but I do not want to denigrate 
these modern, tenable perspectives by referring to them 
as "positivist" (classical positivism has long since 
been found to be untenable). This polemical use of 
"positivism" as a pejorative term has been promoted by 
critical and constructivist theorists such as 
Horkheimer (1937), Adorno (1957), Lorenzen (1969), 
Wellmer (1970), Habermas (1972) and Offe (1972), but as 
pluralism actually seeks to promote the appropriate use 
of positivistic ideas, such denigration should be 
deemed inappropriate. 
2. It should be noted that there is a difference 
opinion between Flood and Jackson as to the utility 
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of 
of 
defining six approaches to methodology rather than the 
original four. In response to Flood (1989a), Jackson 
(1991a) accepts that we have to be clear about the 
differences between isolationism and imperialism on the 
methodological and theoretical levels, but nevertheless 
says that some of Flood's categories can be rolled 
together without impoverishing our understanding. For 
the purpose of this thesis I have stuck with Flood's 
six categories (1989a), largely because I feel that the 
term imperialism by subsurnption needs to be 
differentiated from other forms of imperialism and 
isolationism. In Chapter 7 I will argue that 
imperialism by subsurnption is difficult to distinguish 
from pluralism, and in Chapter 8 I will offer a 
resolution to this problem. Although one could argue 
that I am making it difficult for myself by accepting 
Flood's categories rather than Jackson's, there is a 
danger of missing a central philosophical issue, that 
of the nature of paradigms, by not confronting this 
difficulty (see Chapter 7 for details). Indeed, I have 
found that all sorts of important questions arise from 
close consideration of the nature of paradigms (many of 
the arguments in this thesis have developed out of such 
work). My reason for using Flood's system (1989a), 
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then, is purely practical (relating to my present 
research needs). Both Flood and Jackson's views are, it 
seems to me, equally valid: one could even say that 
there is no substantive difference between them - they 
only really differ in the extent to which they break 
the ideas down into detailed sub-categories. 
3. The term "conflictual", as used here to refer to 
situations where there are multiple viewpoints, is part 
of Flood's terminology (1989a). Originally Jackson and 
Keys (1984) called these situations "pluralist", but 
this introduces an obvious area of confusion with the 
wider notion of pluralism, which is why Flood chose to 
use "conflictual" instead. Ultimately, however, it 
appears that neither Flood nor Jackson were happy with 
the word "conflictual", and in their latest works 
(e.g., Flood, 1990ai Flood and Jackson, 1991; Jackson, 
1991a), they return to using the word "pluralist" as a 
label for situations where there are multiple 
viewpoints, and adopt the term complementarity to refer 
to the over-arching perspective. While this makes some 
sense in terms of avoiding a confusion with political 
pluralism, I prefer to stick with Flood's terminology 
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(1989a) because the link between unity and pluraljsm is 
so important to maintain (see Chapter 9 of this thesis 
for details). Unity and Complementarity just doesn't 
have the same ring to it! 
4. In conversations I have held with M.C. Jackson, he 
has made it clear that he believes that the two 
dimensions 
should be 
of the System of Systems 
seen as independent of 
Methodologies 
one another. 
Personally, I have never seen how this could be the 
case. It seems to me that the term "complexity" (which 
is central to the System dimension) changes its meaning 
as we move across the Participants dimension. This is 
not an issue I wish to explore in the main body of the 
thesis, but for the record let me detail how I see the 
term "complexity" changing. In unitary contexts (when 
there is agreement between participants), simplicity 
refers to our ability to appreciate all key variables 
that impinge on a given task relatively easily. 
Complexity, on the other hand, refers to situations 
where it is thought there are intricate interactions 
between different systems. In conflictual contexts 
(when there is open disagreement between participants), 
simplicity refers to knowledge about where differences 
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between people lie. In contrast, complexity refers to 
situations where there are a whole set of conflicting 
perspectives and nobody is absolutely sure why this 
should be, or what the underlying issues really are. In 
coercive contexts (when disagreement or potential 
disagreement is being suppressed), simplicity refers to 
situations where one group wields power over another 
and it is clear what is going on. Complexity, 
other hand, refers to situations where none 
participants are even aware of coercion 
because they have all internalised a 
consciousness'). 
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on the 
of the 
(perhaps 
'false 
CHAPTER 5: AN INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL SYSTEMS IDEAS 
Talk of flexibility, practical context and critical 
reflection in the previous chapter brings me on to a 
discussion of Critical Systems Thinking, into which the 
System of Systems Methodologies and ideas about 
pluralism have been integrated. 
Over the 
history of 
although, 
next two chapters I intend to outline the 
the movement and many of the key ideas, 
as you read on, it will become apparent that 
every author who has worked under the Critical Systems 
banner has his or her own unique vision. It seems that, 
while each person has a lot in common with others in 
the 'movement', nobody is afraid of divergent opinion, 
even if this means contradicting key assumptions made 
by others. 
For this reason I have not followed Schecter (1990, 
1991) and Jackson (1991b) in structuring my review 
around a set of "commitments" Critical Systems thinkers 
are all said to make, but prefer to show a more or less 
chronological development of ideas (except the idea of 
pluralism already presented) which will not try to 
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force divergent understandings together artificially, 
or diminish contradictions. 
Having demonstrated what we will come to see as a 
magnificent creativity on the part of the Critical 
Systems research community, we will then, and only 
then, conclude in Chapter 6 by drawing out some central 
threads linking all the authors together. 
Given my own involvement in the Critical Systems 
community, this will inevitably be a partial account: 
I can only work with the literature in relation to my 
own ideas, testing out my interpretations with other 
people where possible, and so I will almost certainly 
be missing nuances that others have picked up on. For 
as near a complete picture as possible, I would 
recommend reading other reviews too (e.g., Flood, 
1990a; Ulrich, 1990a; Jackson, 1991b). 
Let us start, then, with an analysis of the Critical 
Systems perspective as it was developed before the 
concept of pluralism came to be integral to it. 
82 
5.1 Embryonic Critical Systems Ideas 
In the 1980s, an early strand of critical thinking 
emerged in the systems literature out of what was seen 
as a need to integrate 1970s social theory into systems 
thinking (most especially the works of Habermas, 1972, 
1974 and 1976a). 
Now, Habermas's writings are deep in their analysis and 
immensely broad ln their scope, so it would be 
impossible to do them justice by trying to precise them 
in just a few short paragraphs. 
For now, then, let us simply note Habermas's central 
concern (1978) that traditional scientific inquiry, 
hermeneutic science and self-reflective critique all 
have their place in addressing different human 
interests - interests embedded in the need for 
environmental control, common social understanding and 
emancipation from false consciousness respectively. 
Of these, it is self-reflective critique that Habermas 
sees as pivotal. Ultimately we pursue the ideal of 
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undistorted communication. This is a postulated ideal 
speech situation in which no false consciousness is 
manifest, and in which arguments can be won or lost by 
"the peculiarly unforced force of the better argument" 
(Habermas, 1974). 
In pursuing the ideal of undistorted communication we 
can draw upon traditional science and hermeneutics to 
provide support for our self-reflective activity, which 
in turn helps us to conduct our traditional scientific 
and hermeneutic inquiries in a non-oppressive fashion. 
This ideal of undistorted communication is central 
because Habermas claims that meaning originates in 
communicative action - a "transcendental link" between 
the practice of communication (using socially shared 
classificatory systems) and human activity (Habermas, 
1978). 
Given such 
consciousness 
not in the 
affected by 
an assumption, freedom from false 
(false meaning leading to action that is 
best interests of the actor and those 
such action) comes to be of paramount 
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concern. I will say more about the influence of 
Habermas, and its obvious roots in Marx's understanding 
of false consciousness, later in this chapter. 
The first movement towards a Critical Systems paradigm 
was initiated by Jackson (1982) in response to an 
attempt by Mingers (1980) to underpin Checkland's Soft 
Systems Methodology with Habermasian theory. Mingers 
tried to improve soft systems thinking with an infusion 
of critical ideas, but Jackson argued that this is not 
possible within the Soft Systems paradigm because of 
the interpretive assumptions Checkland makes. 
Over the coming pages I will review Mingers' argument 
and also Jackson's response to it - a response that can 
be said to have led to the birth of Critical Systems 
Thinking. 
Mingers' basic argument (1980) is that there is a 
substantial overlap between Checkland's Soft systems 
Methodology (e.g., 1972, 1975) and Habermas's social 
theory. Rather than characterising Checkland's work as 
purely interpretive (the theoretical alignment that is 
now most commonly made), Mingers suggests that it might 
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actually be critical in its theoretical roots. 
Mingers makes such a diagnosis on the basis of three 
seeming similarities between the works of the two 
authors: 
First, both Habermas and Checkland accept that there 
are elements of human action that are physiological in 
character, and are therefore beyond our capacity to 
change, while other elements are "purposive/rational" 
(Checkland, 1981), and are therefore subject to 
potential change. 
Second, both recognise the weakness of hard systems 
ideas in coming to grips with human subjectivity. 
Third, according to Mingers (1980), 
"both aim to write theory and praxis and develop a 
rational approach to the realm of communicative 
interaction in order to bring about change in the 
world and help people solve their own problems". 
However, Jackson (1982) is severely critical, both of 
Mingers' interpretation of Habermas, and his 
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characterisation of the supposed 'similarities' between 
Checkland's and Habermas's thought: 
First, while it is true that both authors make a 
theoretical differentiation between human actions with 
a physiological and a social root (the former being 
impervious to human attempts at change), Jackson notes 
that Checkland offers no practical means of identifying 
the difference between them. 
Habermas accepts the need for 'hard' inquiry in order 
to make such a distinction, while Checkland does not. 
Therefore, in Soft Systems Methodology, there can be no 
explicit historical analysis to determine the roots of 
ideas of what is and is not social In origin (i.e., 
there is no explicit requirement to reveal false 
consciousness)l, and therefore we ultimately have to 
resort to a consensus about what is amenable to change 
that we have no means of validating. 
Secondly, while Jackson (1982) accepts that 
hermeneutics are important for both Checkland and 
Habermas, he points out that the theories of the latter 
87 
go much further than simple hermeneutics. Consequently, 
Haberrnas offers us a sounder theoretical framework for 
helping people to solve their own problems. As Jackson 
(1982) indicates, 
"he can provide a theory of distorted 
communication and a theory of the kind of social 
structure which brings about distorted 
communication. This gives people the chance to get 
to the root of their problem". 
Underlying the problems Jackson (1982) finds with 
Mingers' analysis is what he sees as a basic 
misinterpretation of Habermas's work. He claims that 
both Mingers and Checkland see the essential difference 
between Soft Systems Methodology and critical theory as 
the overtly political stance taken by the latter. 
According to Jackson, however, this is missing the 
point: 
"The major difference is theoretical. Habermas 
recognises that though the social world is created 
by Man, it is not 'transparent' to him. It escapes 
him, takes on objective features and constrains 
him. Man is still in the grip of unconscious 
forces and his actions still have unintended 
consequences. In these circumstances hermeneutics 
cannot be the sole method appropriate to the 
social sciences. There must also be a positivist 
moment in social inquiry in which the objective 
features of the social world - when men do appear 
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to act as things - can be studied. There is need 
too for a critical moment (corresponding to an 
'emancipatory' interest). The hope is to reduce 
the area of social life where men act as things 
and to increase the realm of the hermeneutic 
where rational men's intentions become realised in 
history. Though the major difference is 
theoretical it does have a political result. 
Habermas's work opens up the possibility of 
political action to accomplish real change - it is 
radical. Checkland's methodology confines itself 
to working within the constraints imposed by 
existing social arrangements - it is regulative". 
While Mingers (1980) simply wants to add a critical 
theory onto Checkland's hermeneutic practice, Jackson 
(1982) demonstrates that this is impossible without 
severely limiting ones critical capacities. 
Now, the Critical Systems movement itself has evolved 
out of Jackson's argument, but the critical-hermeneutic 
strain of thought has not died out. Fuenmayor (1985) 
has also attempted to show that there is a critical 
kernel in Checkland's work, and he chooses to base much 
of his thinking on Husserl's phenomenology (e.g., 1929) 
to achieve this, thereby avoiding Jackson's Habermasian 
critique. 
Through such an analysis, Fuenmayor has developed what 
he calls Interpretive Systemology, and his research in 
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this area is still on-going (see Fuenmayor, 1989, 1990, 
1991a,b,c, for recent interesting thoughts)2. 
5.2 Critical Systems Heuristics 
The first work to explicitly identify the term "Critical 
Systems" was Ulrich's critical systems heuristics 
(1983). 
The major challenge social scientists face, according 
to Ulrich, is inherited from Kant (1788). Kant 
identifies two strands of reason: theoretical 
(concerned with reflection upon truth) and practical 
(concerned with reflection upon what is right) . As 
Ulrich (1983) says, 
"reason is theoretical, according to Kant, when it 
produces understanding or knowledge of what is or 
what happens; it is practical when it helps us 
determine what ought to be or what ought to be 
done, i.e., when the problem involves our will". 
Our central problem, Ulrich maintains, is that we still 
have no satisfactory philosophy that can help us make 
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validity judgements in the area of practical reason. 
Can, for example, such judgements be based on anything 
more than subjective criteria? 
In reviewing the history of attempts to deal with this 
problem of practical reason, Ulrich notes that the 
philosophy of science has bifurcated so that some 
authors have taken a purely analytical approach (e.g., 
Albert, 1971; Popper, 1972; and Spinner, 1974) while 
others have taken a dialectical position (e.g., 
Horkheimer, 1937; Adorno, 1957; Lorenzen, 1969; 
Wellmer, 1970; and Offe, 1972). 
The analytical philosophers maintain that knowledge is 
essentially value-free, and thereby neuter the whole 
question of practical reason, while the dialectical 
philosophers see themselves as championing the Kantian 
vision, but without addressing the validity question in 
sufficient depth. As Ulrich (1983) observes, 
"neither side has thus far realised the Kantian 
program of a practical reason that would 
critically justify itself. One need not elevate 
oneself to the status of the arbiter in order to 
observe that on the one hand the scientists 
[Popper, et al] operationalise practical reason by 
reducing it to theoretical-instrumental reason, 
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while on the other hand their opponents [Adorno, 
et al] insist on the irreducible character of 
practical reason without having shown how 
practical reason can be practiced". 
Traditional systems science, according to Ulrich 
(1983), has taken the analytical route, and the task of 
critical systems heuristics is to correct this 
imbalance. However, we cannot simply swing over into 
the dialectical camp which takes the possibility of 
valid practical reasoning for granted, but must address 
the validity problem head-on. 
Ulrich (1983) offers an interesting answer to the 
question of practical reason. First of all he makes it 
clear that reflection upon moral and ethical judgements 
cannot take place in a purely theoretical realm, but 
must be embedded in a heuristic. In other words, they 
must be related both to on-going reflection on the 
practical circumstances in which we find ourselves, and 
to the learning that results from the actions that we 
take. 
Ulrich also conducts an in-depth exploration of the 
social creation of meaning, following Habermas's theory 
92 
of communicative action. Through this he concludes that 
the criterion for valid inquiry into the making of 
value-judgements has to be normative acceptability to 
all concerned citizens (i.e., all those involved in, or 
affected by, the judgement). 
This conclusion comes about because, if meaning cannot 
be said to be 'owned' by anyone individual (it is 
dependent on socially shared classificatory systems), 
then any value judgement that is made by a researcher 
has its roots in the wider community. 
Given that individuals are never in a position to know 
absolute truth or have an absolute idea of what is 
right (their understandings will inevitably be 
distorted by the power relationships they are subject 
to) , 
the 
aware 
the best a researcher can do is to refer back to 
community from which the understanding s/he is 
of originated. In practice this means those 
involved in, or affected by, the research in question. 
Because the essential criterion for valid inquiry into 
any area of practical reason is normative acceptability 
to all concerned citizens, Ulrich's critical systems 
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heuristics 
liberation. 
problematic 
inevitably 
The idea 
situations 
proposes a 
is that 
within the 
relationships and organisations 
recognise an emancipatory purpose. 
moral baseline of 
all research into 
sphere of human 
should ideally 
This means that research should explicitly consider how 
the situation being investigated touches all the people 
involved or affected (directly or indirectly), and 
should promote their interests. Definition of who is 
involved or affected comes about through making 
critical boundary judgements. 
Ulrich (1983), following the dialectical thinkers 
(especially Habermas), also takes the view that 
knowledge and inquiry cannot legitimately be seen as 
separate from values. Thus he claims that 
epistemological value-neutrality is untenable. 
To support his argument he engages in a critique of the 
ideas of Weber (1907) who claims that one has to 
separate means from ends. Thus, for Weber, ends are 
value-laden, but means are neutral and called upon to 
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meet ends. Ulrich (1983) objects to this In the 
following way: 
"Counter to what the German sociologist Max Weber 
(1907) assumed in his decisionistic model of the 
relation of science (theory) to politics 
(practice), decisions on means cannot be kept free 
of normative implications by referring all value 
judgements to the choice of ends; for what matters 
is not the value judgements that an inquirer 
consciously makes (or not) but the life-practical 
consequences of his propositions (regardless of 
whether they concern 'means' or 'ends') for those 
affected" . 
The above reference to "life-practical consequences" is 
absolutely central to Critical Systems Thinking. For 
Ulrich (1983), the 'mere' acceptance of the relevance 
of value judgements in directing research is not 
enough. As we have seen, it is essential that these 
value judgements be concerned with ensuring that, as 
far as possible, all those involved in, or affected by, 
research are considered, and that an emancipatory goal 
is declared. 
When we talk about practical consequences for "all 
those involved and affected", we must of course 
recognise that the method chosen, as well as the ends 
being declared, will indeed have a real impact on 
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participants. 
Now, just as Kant (1787) maintains that there can be no 
absolute truth in the realm of theoretical reason 
(because we can only know our knowledge constructs 
the real world lies beyond our perception), Ulrich 
follows with the claim that there can be no absolute 
right and wrong. Our task, then, is to be continually 
critical: i.e., 
"to make transparent to ourselves and others the 
value-assumptions underlying practical judgements, 
rather than concealing them behind a veil of 
objectivity" . 
Our ideal, then, is to critically reflect on the 
origins of every assumption that "flows into" rational 
inquiry, whether in the realm of theoretical or 
practical reason. However, because we are now talking 
about heuristics rather than purely theoretical 
discourse, we immediately come up against the problem 
of practical restraints on critical reflection. 
Ulrich's ingenious way around this problem represents a 
key innovation: he offers a marriage between critical 
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and systems ideas. Truly rational inquiry is said to be 
critical, in that no assumption held by the inquirer 
should be beyond question, and systemic, In that 
boundaries always have to be established within which 
critique can be conducted. 
Within the context of heuristics, both ideas come to be 
seen as inadequate without the other. Critical thinking 
without system boundaries will inevitably fall into the 
trap of continual expansion and eventual loss of 
meaning (as everything can be seen to have a context 
with which it interacts, questioning becomes infinite). 
However, systems thinking without the critical idea may 
result in a "hardening of the boundaries" where 
destructive assumptions remain unquestioned because the 
system boundaries are regarded as absolute. For me, the 
marriage of the critical and systems ideas represents a 
crucial advance in our understanding of rational 
inquiry in systems science. 
At this stage in the development of Critical Systems, 
the idea of pluralism had not entered the discussion 
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[it only surfaced as a force to be reckoned with in 
Jackson and Keys' paper (1984), dealt with in Chapter 
4]. Therefore Ulrich's methodological response to the 
issues he raises is to offer a single, practical 
approach to work in organizational settings: a new 
systems method, also called critical systems 
heuristics, that is explicit about acknowledging and 
dealing with power relations. 
5.3 The Influence of the Idea of Pluralism 
Independently from Ulrich (1983), Jackson continued to 
develop his thinking about a critical approach to 
management science. By 1985 he had already introduced 
the fundamental tenets of pluralism into the literature 
(Jackson and Keys, 1984), and so his task was to 
integrate this understanding with the critical idea. In 
1985 he had two papers published (Jackson, 1985a,b), 
both of which make substantial, but different, 
contributions to the debate. 
The first, Jackson (1985a), is basically a development 
of his 1982 paper in which he clarifies how Habermas's 
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ideas might be used to build an emancipatory approach3 
that can sit alongside the positivistic and 
interpretive approaches in a pluralist framework. 
Here he is particularly concerned with the utilisation 
of Haberrnas's notion of distorted communication 
(1970a,b), underpinning ideas of false consciousness, 
in order to show how appropriate methodological 
responses to research situations characterised as 
coercive might be developed. Jackson does not mention 
Ulrich's critical systems heuristics here, but there is 
an obvious similarity between the concerns of the two 
authors. 
The second contribution made by Jackson in this year 
(Jackson, 1985b) represents the first attempt to find 
out what might lie behind the idea of aligning working 
methods with ideal-type contexts. Once again Jackson 
draws upon the work of Haberrnas, this time his 1972 
writings: 
"According to Habermas there are two fundamental 
conditions underpinning the socio-cultural form of 
life of the human species - 'work' and 
'interaction'''. 
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"'Work' enables human beings to achieve goals and 
to bring about material well-being through social 
labour. The importance of work to the human 
species leads human beings to have what Habermas 
calls a 'technical interest' in the prediction and 
control of natural and social events. The 
importance of 'interaction' calls forth another 
'interest', the 'practical interest'. Its concern 
is with securing and expanding the possibilities 
of mutual understanding among all those involved 
in the reproduction of social life. Disagreement 
among different groups can be just as much a 
threat to the reproduction of the socio-cultural 
form of life as a failure to predict and control 
natural and social affairs". 
"While work and interaction have for Habermas .... 
pre-eminent anthropological status, the analysis 
of power and the way it is exercised is equally 
essential, Habermas argues, for the understanding 
of all past and present social arrangements. The 
exercise of power in the social process can 
prevent the open and free discussion necessary for 
the success of interaction. Human beings therefore 
also have an 'emancipatory interest' in freeing 
themselves from constraints imposed by power 
relations and in learning, through a process of 
genuine participatory democracy, involving 
discursive will-formation, to control their own 
destiny" . 
It is these interests that Jackson says underpin both 
our search for knowledge and our use of the System of 
Systems Methodologies as an aid to problem management. 
To deal with knowledge-gathering methods first, Jackson 
(1985b) notes that when we have an interest in 
predicting and controlling the environment (a technical 
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interest), it is most appropriate to use systems 
approaches with a positivist root (e.g., traditional 
scientific, mechanical, functional and cybernetic 
methods - Buckley, 1967). 
When we have an interest in promoting mutual 
understanding (a practical interest), interpretive 
approaches corne into play. While Jackson notes that 
interpretivism has found expression in the philosophies 
of hermeneutics and phenomenology, he observes that no 
interpretive knowledge-gathering systems methods have 
yet emerged. 
When we have an interest in challenging oppression and 
uncovering false consciousness (an emancipatory 
interest), historical-reconstructive (e.g., Marxist) 
and psycho-analytic methods corne to the fore. Once 
again, however, Jackson notes that no such methods have 
actually emerged in systems science4 . 
When it comes to using the System of Systems 
Methodologies as an aid to problem management, Jackson 
(1985b) claims that the technical interest lies behind 
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the need to classify situations as simple or complex. 
In other words we need to make a judgement about 
whether prediction and control is going to be easy or 
difficult. 
Similarly, the practical interest lies behind the need 
to classify relationships between participants. We need 
to know whether we already have a consensus, we are 
faced with dissensus, or we are dealing with a 
situation where disagreement is not coming to the fore 
because of repression of the powerless by the powerful. 
Now, in this paper Jackson does not discuss the 
emancipatory interest in relation to the System of 
Systems Methodologies. In 1988, however, he updated the 
work to align the emancipatory interest with coercive 
contexts. If I have understood his argument 
the emancipatory interest would appear 
extension of the practical, which would 
Habermas's work (1972). 
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correctly, 
to be an 
fit with 
5.4 Pluralism and the Three Interests Revisited 
This idea of the three interests lying behind the use 
of different methods has also been picked up by other 
authors (e.g., Oliga, 1986, 1988; Flood, 1990a; and 
Gregory, 1989, 1990). 
Flood (1990a), for 
Habermas's argument 
example, 
(1972) 
explicitly draws 
that knowledges 
upon 
and 
interests are inseparably interrelated: Habermas talks 
in terms of knowledge-constitutive interests because 
knowledges shape interests and interests direct the 
search for knowledges. 
However, Flood (1990a) does not make it clear exactly 
what relationship he sees between the three 
constitutive interests and the System 
knowledge-
of Systems 
Methodologies. Such clarification is left to Flood and 
Jackson (1991) whose vision appears, interestingly 
enough, to be different from that proposed by Jackson 
(1985b, 1988). My interpretation of Flood and Jackson's 
work is that they align the three interests with the 
three categories in the Participants dimension of the 
system of Systems Methodologies: 
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"It is clear that 'hard' and cybernetic systems 
approaches can support the technical interest, 
soft methodologies the practical interest, and 
critical systems heuristics can aid the 
emancipatory interest". 
Flood and Jackson (1991) don't make this alignment of 
the three interests with the Participants dimension 
explicitly. Nevertheless, when we realise that 'hard' 
and cybernetic approaches are considered most 
appropriate for unitary contexts, soft methods for 
conflictual contexts, and emancipatory methods for 
coercive contexts, then this interpretation of their 
alignment might be said to gain some force. 
Thus, it seems to me that Flood and Jackson (1991) are 
suggesting that successful pursuit of our technical 
interest in predicting and controlling the environment 
depends upon there being some agreement on defining 
the problematic areas - i.e., in terms of the System of 
Systems Methodologies, there should ideally be a 
unitary context. In these circumstances, systems 
methods with a positivist root are the most appropriate 
to use. 
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In contrast, when we are dealing with dissensus (i.e., 
in terms of the System of Systems Methodologies, there 
is a conflictual context), our practical interest in 
promoting mutual understanding comes into play. This 
achieves its most adequate expression in the form of 
methods with an interpretive root. 
When we are faced with a coercive context in terms of 
the System of Systems Methodologies, however, our 
emancipatory interest in challenging oppression and 
uncovering false consciousness comes to the fore. The 
emancipatory interest is best expressed through the use 
of emancipatory methods. 
Given that Jackson's original ideas regarding the 
relationship between the three interests and the System 
of Systems Methodologies have not been mentioned in the 
literature for two years (the last time they surfaced 
was in Jackson, 1988), it might be assumed that the 
alignment offered by Flood and Jackson (1991) has 
supplanted it. 
However, in a recently published work (Jackson, 1991a), 
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his original alignment resurfaces. If my interpretation 
of Flood and Jackson's (1991) work is right, we appear 
to be left with two seemingly contradictory messages 
about the nature of pluralism - a problem to be 
addressed later in this thesis. 
5.5 Methodological Ideals in Critical Systems Practice 
We have already discussed Ulrich's attempt 
deal with the problem of practical reason, 
rise to many early Critical Systems ideas 
methodology of critical systems heuristics. 
(1983) to 
which gave 
and the 
We have also seen how the idea of pluralism has been 
integrated into both the theory and practice of 
Critical Systems Thinking (drawing upon the seminal 
works of Habermas, 1972, and Jackson and Keys, 1984, 
respectively). 
However, it is possible to identify another 
strand to Critical Systems Thinking. We 
methodological guidelines are offered 
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important 
find that 
for ideal 
to applied systems research. Also, 
a specific meta-methodology has 
quite 
been 
approaches 
recently, 
developed for 
intervention. 
use in organizational research and 
Both the ideals and the meta-methodology 
will be reviewed briefly below. 
5.5.1 The Methodological Ideals 
Let us start with the methodological ideals. The first 
is that we should accept a moral baseline of 
emancipation. 
This lies at the root of Jackson's argument (1982) for 
a critical management science; is made explicit in 
Ulrich's critical systems heuristics (1983); is 
implicitly brought into the Critical Systems 
understanding of pluralism by Jackson (1985b) when he 
discusses Habermas's knowledge-constitutive interests; 
and is made fully explicit once again 'by Flood (1990b). 
Indeed, it is Flood (1990b) who clarifies the key point 
that the ideal of emancipation always has to be borne 
in mind however the research context is defined. In 
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other words, the ideal of emancipation is not reserved 
solely for coercive contexts when explicitly 
emancipatory methods are called upon. 
As mentioned previously when discussing critical 
systems heuristics, the ideal of emancipation suggests 
that all research into problematic situations within 
the sphere of human relationships and organisations 
should consider how the situation being investigated 
touches all the people involved or affected (directly 
or indirectly), and should promote their interests. 
Midgley (1989a) has argued that, in practice, this must 
involve starting any research project by interviewing 
all known participants, and ensuring that, as far as is 
practicable, these participants actually co-determine 
the design of the research. The scientist is therefore 
explicitly prevented from assuming an "elite" position. 
Of course knowing who is actually going to be involved 
or affected by the work is not always straight-forward, 
especially if there are unequal power relationships 
which result in an affected group or individual not 
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coming to the attention of the researcher through his 
or her initial approach. 
As far as possible it is necessary to retain the 
flexibility to expand the research remit at any time: 
one may, 
reveal 
for example, find that initial interviews 
the involvement of other people who will 
themselves need to be followed up and interviewed (see 
Midgley, 1989a, for a practical example). 
In saying that research should ideally recognise an 
emancipatory purpose, we have to remain aware that what 
is considered to be emancipatory by one person might 
not appear to be so to another, so the definition of 
emancipation must, in an ideal world, be down to the 
individual researcher, in partnership with those seen 
to be involved in, or affected by, the research, to 
determine. 
A statement of the assumptions and/or motivations of 
the researcher and his or her research partners (those 
involved or affected) needs to be made when writing 
reports, as it is just as important not to lose the 
connection between what we do and why we do it when 
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communicating research results as it is when conducting 
the research itself (Midgley, 1988). 
We therefore see that ideology comes to the forefront 
of Critical Systems research practice. The gap is 
closed between conducting research and the reasons why 
it is conducted. This is believed to be necessary in 
order to allow the researcher to be exposed to critical 
comment, not just on the quality of his or her 
scientific method, but on the reasons why s/he does 
what s/he does. 
In the light of these methodological ideals, the 
meaning of the statement that the System 
Methodologies should be regarded as an 
of Systems 
ideal of 
research practice that is useful for critical 
reflection on methodology design becomes clearer. 
We start with a specific emancipatory goal (arrived at 
through democratic dialogue) and, in partnership with 
those involved and affected, and using the System of 
Systems Methodologies to aid our understanding, decide 
on the most effective approach for the research given 
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both the practicalities of the situation and the stated 
ends. 
At any point during its conduct, the research goals, 
the methodology, and/or those defined as involv€d or 
affected may be altered in the light of either changes 
ln practical circumstances, discovery 
hidden information, or impact made by 
of 
the 
hitherto 
research 
itself. Thus the System of Systems Methodologies has an 
on-going role to play in Critical Systems research. 
5.5.2 Meta-Methodology: Total Systems Intervention 
These methodological ideals took time to evolve. They 
emerged gradually through conversations, theoretical 
reflections and practical discovery. By 1991, Flood and 
Jackson felt they were ready to design a meta-
methodology, which they called Total Systems 
Intervention (TSI). 
Until recently, much of the Critical Systems literature 
was written in a specialist language that largely 
restricted its accessibility - it was mainly read by 
111 
professional systems thinkers and philosophers. Flood 
and Jackson (1991), in seeking to make Critical Systems 
ideas accessible to an educated, but non-specialist, 
audience of managers and consultants, came up with TSI. 
Essentially TSI represents a "pragmatisation" of 
Critical Systems ideas. 
TSI uses the System of Systems Methodologies to align 
of various methods with ideal-type contexts 
application. It 
systems methods 
organization. 
also seeks to show 
imply different 
that different 
metaphors of 
For example, implicit in system dynamics is the view 
that organisations are like machines. Cybernetic 
methods, on the other hand, look at organisations as if 
they are neuro-cybernetic learning systems (brains). In 
contrast, many interpretive methods (e.g., soft systems 
methodology) 
emancipatory 
assume 
methods 
a culture 
(such as 
metaphor, and 
critical systems 
heuristics) view organisations as if they are prisons. 
The actual meta-methodology involves gathering together 
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in a group those involved in, and affected by, the 
workings of an organization in order to discover what 
the dominant issues facing people are. These issues 
will tend to be described in terms of the various 
systems metaphors identified by the authors. 
This, together with reflection upon the System of 
Systems Methodologies, should, the authors suggest, 
give enough information to make a reasonably good 
judgement on which specific systems methods are most 
appropriate for the job in hand. For an in-depth 
description of the logic and process of TSI see Flood 
and Jackson (1991). 
Before concluding this final section on methodological 
ideals and meta-methodology, it is worth noting a key 
difference between the practical proposals for 
implementing the ideals put forward by Midgley (1989a), 
on the one hand, and Flood and Jackson (1991) on the 
other. 
Midgley talks about interviewing groups and individuals 
to determine what is needed in terms of methodology. In 
contrast, Flood and Jackson (1991) advocate bringing 
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together a group of participants only. Similarly, 
Midgley discusses the role of the individual researcher 
who has to negotiate with participants to formulate a 
vision of the organization. In TSI, such formulation is 
a group responsibility and the part the researcher 
plays in this is not made an explicit issue. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the reader to some basic 
Critical Systems ideas. In the next chapter I will 
explore some of the more recent diversifications. 
Notes 
1. Revealing false consciousness requires historical 
analysis because, for both Habermas and Jackson, it is 
the notion of forces of power limiting human 
understanding that defines the term. Only if we can 
become aware of the forces of power that have been 
operative in the past can we judge whether a particular 
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belief held in the present is indeed "true" or "false". 
However, it is important to note that, ln the work of 
both Habermas and Jackson, judgements of false 
consciousness are not of an absolute character: like 
all judgements they have to be dealt with critically. 
2. Personally I find Fuenmayor's phenomenological root 
rather problematic. In his 1990 paper he argues that 
the work of Habermas cannot be seen as a significant 
advance on the writings of Husserl. He is able to put 
such a viewpoint across because he equates Habermas's 
desire to liberate people from unconscious 
presuppositions with Husserl's wish to liberate theory 
from interests. I do not find Habermas's position 
unproblematic either: the idea that the acquisition of 
knowledge about oppression will inevitably lead to 
action to challenge it seems to me to be an erroneous 
assumption inherited from Freud. However, Husserl's 
view differs significantly from Habermas's vision 
because Husserl claims that the revelation of interests 
alone breaks the dependence of theory on those 
interests. Therefore, according to Husserl, theory 
becomes interest-free when interests are declared, 
while for Habermas theory can never be interest-free. 
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There are certainly some issues requiring further 
research here. 
3. In his 1985a paper, Jackson appears to use the term 
"critical" to signify appropriate methodological 
responses to coercive contexts. However, in his 1991b 
work, he switches to the term "emancipatory" in order 
to distinguish appropriate responses to coercive 
contexts from the over-arching Critical Systems 
perspective (the latter terminology is in line with my 
own use of the words "emancipatory" and "critical" in 
this thesis). Thus, for example, Ulrich's critical 
systems heuristics offers an emancipatory method when 
seen within the pluralist conception. 
4. It should be noted that Jackson updated his 1985b 
paper three years later (Jackson, 1988) to take the 
works of Ulrich (1983) and others on board. 
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CHAPTER 6: DIVERSIFICATION IN CRITICAL SYSTEMS THINKING 
We now have a reasonably coherent picture of the 
history and main tenets of Critical Systems Thinking. 
However, in the last three years a significant 
deepening and broadening of the philosophical and 
social-theoretical base of the perspective has been 
achieved. 
In particular we can identify Ulrich's 
(1988) of the paradigm of communicative 
development 
action; the 
further reflections on ontology and epistemology 
offered by Flood and Keys (1989) and Flood (1990a); the 
claim that we are in need of "a substantive soft 
systems language" (Flood, 1988, 1990a); the 
explorations of power and ideology provided by Oliga 
(1989a,b, 1990a); and the efforts of Flood (1990a,c,d) 
and wooliston (1990, 1991a,b,c) to come to grips with 
post-modern criticisms of the Habermasian framework. 
Amongst other things, the latter has resulted in a far-
sighted 'unification' of the supposedly contradictory 
perspectives of Habermas and Foucault. 
It is worth reviewing all the above ideas, although it 
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should be noted that, with these recent debates, 
diversity has proliferated to the point where writers 
can regularly be seen to be contradicting each other, 
and any common threads we have identified so far begin 
to look rather tenuous. Let us simply take each of 
these recent contributions in turn: 
6.1 The Paradigm of Communicative Action 
We can begin with Ulrich's development (1988, 1990b) of 
what he calls "the communicative paradigm of rational 
social practice" (Ulrich, 1988). This is essentially an 
extension of his 1983 work on critical systems 
heuristics, and is based in the Habermasian notion that 
knowledge and meaning are social creations, arising 
through communicative action1 . 
In 1983, having focused on the split between 
theoretical and practical reason inherited from Kant 
(1788), Ulrich (1988) went on to examine how his notion 
of valid practical reasoning differs from the 
traditional subjectivist approaches. He states that .... 
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"Subjectively an individual acts rationally if his 
ends are in agreement with his standards of value 
and if he efficiently utilises the means at his 
disposal to achieve these ends. The two conditions 
mentioned correspond to Max Weber's 'ideal types' 
of rational action, 'value-rationality' (Wert-
rationalitat = convergence of purposes and values) 
and 'purposive-rationality' (Zweckrationalitat = 
adequacy of means in regard to purposes). Together 
they are constitutive of the utilitarian concept 
of rationality. This type of rationality is 
oriented toward the success of one's actions, 
whereby ends are assumed to be given and 'success' 
is measured in terms of cost-benefit analysis. It 
clearly belongs to the dimension of theoretical 
reason" . 
Practical reason, then, comes to be defined as the 
'other' of subjective reason within the overall blanket 
category 'reason' (just as, in the original Kantian 
vision, theoretical reason is the 'other' of practical 
reason) . 
I actually find Ulrich's division of the subjective 
from the practical rather problematic, but let us 
pursue his line of inquiry as he seeks to underpin the 
practice of pluralism with an epistemological vision 
based in the communicative paradigm.2 
In order to build a new understanding of pluralism, 
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Ulrich (1988) draws upon another Habermasian taxonomy 
(Habermas, 1984a,b) which proposes that we can 
distinguish between success-oriented action (refBrring 
to the subjectivist, utilitarian paradigm of purposive-
rational action) and consensus-oriented action 
(referring to the communicative paradigm of action 
based on norms acceptable to those involved and 
affected). As Ulrich says, .... 
"The distinction is akin to his [Habermas's] 
earlier discussion of two fundamental dimensions 
of practice, the dimensions of 'work' and 
'interaction' (1971). Rationalisation of these two 
domains implies two entirely different conceptions 
of rationality: rationalisation of 'work' implies 
an expansion of technical control over objectified 
processes, while rationalisation of 'interaction' 
implies an expansion of argumentative means for 
resolving conflicts of interests and needs through 
mutual understanding, which amounts to an 
expansion of control over the domination of men by 
men (power) .... 
Habermas now refines this earlier distinction by 
adding a second distinction, that between 
situations of action in which interpersonal 
relationships do and do not playa role ('social' 
vs 'nonsocial action'). Cross-tabulating the two 
distinctions yields three basic types of action, 
one referring to nonsocial action and the 
remaining two to social action". 
This cross-tabulation can be found in Figure 6.1, in 
which we can identify instrumental action (non-social 
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and success-orientated), strategic action (social and 
success orientated) and communicative action (social 
and consensus-orientated). 
Figure 6.1: Types of Action According to Habermas 
: Success-orientated 
I (own interest) 
Consensus-orientated 
(mutual understanding) 
-------------------------------------------
Non-Social 
Social 
Instrumental 
Action 
Strategic 
Action 
Communicative 
Action 
-------------------------------------------------------
Ulrich (1988) suggests .... 
"that this taxonomy offers itself as a systematic 
framework of three complementary levels of systems 
practice, each of which requires its own concept 
of systems rationality.... The three levels of 
systems practice thus gained are roughly parallel 
to the three levels of planning distinguished 
by .... Jantsch (1975) in his 'vertical integration' 
approach to planning: operational (or tactical), 
strategic, and normative planning". 
Here, then, we have the basis for an alternative to the 
System of Systems Methodologies (and its earlier 
Habermasian underpinnings). 
Ulrich (1988) indicates that the traditions of systems 
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analysis (e.g., as represented in the works of Smith, 
1966; Quade and Boucher, 1968; Emery, 1969a,b; de 
Neufville and Stafford, 1971; Quade et aI, 1978) and 
systems engineering (e.g., as presented by Goode and 
Machol, 1957; Gosling, 1962; Hall, 1962; Chestnut, 
1967; Jenkins, 1969b; Optner, 1973; Daenzer, 1976) 
offer instrumental methods of action. 
He also sees the approaches that attempt to sort out 
the complexities of human problematic situations, such 
as cybernetics, simulation techniques, game theory, 
portfolio management, etc., as techniques of strategic 
action. Some of the methods Ulrich identifies as useful 
here are contained in the works of Rappoport (1960), 
Emery and Trist (1965), Forrester (1971), Rawls (1971), 
Beer (1981, 1985) and Vester and Hestler (1980). 
When it comes to communicative action, however, Ulrich 
(1988) follows Jackson (1982) in warning the reader not 
to think that the formation of consensus merely 
requires hermeneutic methods. 
Ulrich declares the importance of revealing false 
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consciousness and dealing with types of coercion that 
prevent the formation of genuine consensus. As such he 
identifies his own critical systems heuristics (Ulrich, 
1983) as an appropriate method of communicative action, 
although he says we might still learn from writers in 
the hermeneutic tradition (such as Churchman, 1968b, 
1979; Checkland, 1981; and Mason and Mitroff, 1981) who 
have gone part of the way toward designing critical 
approaches. 
Although Ulrich's vision of pluralism obviously stands 
in opposition to the work of Jackson and Keys (1984) 
and Jackson (1987b), he never makes it clear why he has 
discarded the earlier framework. Certainly Ulrich's 
perspective has the advantage of moving beyond methods 
designed solely for intervention in human problematic 
situations, but it has the disadvantage of losing all 
but the most basic and obvious links between method and 
context. 
Let us move on now and consider the ontological and 
epistemological reflections of Flood and Keys (1989) 
and Flood (1990a): 
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6.2 Deeper Ontological and Epistemological Reflections 
While much of the epistemological work already 
presented has been inherited from the writings of 
Habermas, Flood and Keys (1989) have also considered 
the ontological position Critical Systems Thinking 
takes (ontology being our understanding of 'reality'). 
Flood and Keys identify only two ontological positions 
it is possible to hold (ontological realism and 
ontological nominalism), and two possible 
epistemological ones (epistemological positivism and 
ｾ･ｾｰｾｩｾｳｾｴｾ･ｾｭｾｯｾｬｾｯｾｧｾｩｾ｣ｾ｡ｾｬｾ｟｡ｾｮｾｴｾｩｾＭｾｰｾｯｾｾｳｩｾｴｾｩｾｶｾｩｾｳｾｭ］ＩＮ＠ Ultimately, they 
claim, all ontological and epistemological stances are 
based in these. 
By cross-referencing them they offer four categories of 
onto-epistemological understanding that are said to 
represent fundamentally different viewpoints of the 
world and knowledge of it: ontological realism & 
epistemological positivism (OREP), ontological realism 
& epistemological anti-positivism (OREAP), ontological 
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nominalism & epistemological positivism (ONEP) and 
ontological nominalism & epistemological anti 
positivism (ONEAP). 
These terms will obviously require some explanation. 
Flood and Keys offer elaborations of the above 
positions that are worth quoting verbatim: 
"OREP suggests that complexity is of a real social 
world; that we can know it, represent it 
accurately and disseminate concrete knowledge of 
it. All we need to do is to develop isomorphic 
systemic representations of the complex real-
world. We might alternatively choose to represent 
it (by varying resolution) with simpler models 
that maintain an identity, assessed through 
empirical observation, yet which are more 
manageable. In this case 'complexity' and 'system' 
are synonymous and the world is accepted as a 
complex of systems. 
OREAP suggests that complexity is formulated in 
our perceptions, i.e. we conceptualise a real-
world through systemic abstractions. The real-
world is therefore thought of in terms of 
complexity, however, these abstractions are only 
related to a world of reality, of real objects. 
This reality is, however, somewhat 'distant'. It 
is preferred not to think of complexity as if it 
were a real property of those 'distant objects', 
only that it might be useful to think about them 
in this subjective way. Objects are assumed to 
exist in a real-world independent of a human 
observer, but it is the human observer who owns 
the concepts 'complexity' and 'system'. In this 
sense 'complexity' and 'system' are synonymous in 
abstract terms only. 
ONEP suggests that complexity might be of a real-
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world, yet it is extremely difficult to know about 
that world, and impossible to know it as it is. 
Language structures, and labels and systemic 
representations can be used to describe the real-
world where complexity lies. With these reflective 
forms we can learn about the structure and 
function of the real-world, that exists 'beyond 
our horizons', and hence the complexities of it. 
Again, 'complexity' and 'system' are synonymous in 
abstract terms only. Therefore, real tangible 
immutable knowledge may be ascribed to a real-
world which, nevertheless, remains beyond our 
absolute knowing of it. 
ONEAP accepts that complexity is of our 
perceptions. A systemic structure may be used to 
organise perceptions, yet no direct reference is 
made to a real-world because it is accepted as 
unreal beyond our consciousness. Complexity is 
only partly explained through systemic structures, 
being also clearly associated with our 
psychological and cultural being. Complexity and 
system are therefore not synonymous at all, but 
are useful concepts nevertheless, i.e. there is 
systemic complexity and pluralistic ｣ｯｭｰｾ･ｸｩｴｹＮ＠
Thus our knowledge is subjective, it is not 
immutable but is up for negotiation and 
reappraisal with our social partners." 
Critical Systems Thinking, Flood and Keys (1989) claim, 
is based in this last position, ONEAP: i.e., it is 
ontologically nominalist and epistemologically anti-
positivist. 
This exploration complements the earlier ones, in that 
it reintroduces some of the original subtlety of the 
Habermasian position that, one could argue, got lost 
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during the necessary process of ,;. . preclslng Habermas's 
ideas to facilitate concise communication. Habermas 
(1972), for example, talks about the essential process 
of refusing to make assumptions, and ensuring that all 
possible efforts are made to subject knowledge and 
belief to recurrent critical appraisal. 
Habermas sees this as necessary precisely because we 
are unable to know the accuracy of our knowledge in any 
absolute terms (the anti-positivist assumption), and 
because 'reality' itself is constructed through 
communicative action (the nominalist assumption). 
Indeed, Habermas (1972) goes as far as to identify his 
position as a modern version of Hume's skepticism 
(1777). 
According to Flood (1990a), who built upon the Flood 
and Keys' framework (1989), acceptance of the ONEAP 
position has important practical implications, not only 
in the way that it brings the need to be critical to 
the forefront of our agenda, but also in terms of the 
methods of communication we adopt. 
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6.3 The Need for a Substantive Soft Systems Language 
Given the assumption that the 'real world', which is 
nominally assumed to exist, is nevertheless to be seen 
as a reflection of consciousness, it must be a priority 
for Critical Systems thinkers to develop a language 
that makes this ontological and epistemological 
position explicit. 
From the ONEAP perspective, both our everyday and 
scientific use of language encourages hypostatisation 
(treating concepts as real entities). For this reason 
Flood (1988, 1990a) calls for the continual use of 
qualifying sub-clauses in scientific writing that can 
serve to focus the reader's attention on the subjective 
and/or normative nature of what is being said. 
For example, instead of stating that "the work force 
went on strike because they were not satisfied with the 
wage offer", we can paraphrase the sentence to read "it 
can be said that the work force went on strike because 
they were not satisfied with the wage offer". Or, 
better still, "the Managing Director claimed, in my 
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view with some justification, that the workforce went 
on strike because they were not satisfied with the wage 
offer" . 
The first paraphrase makes it explicit that all we 
really know of the motivations of the work force are 
our assumptions about them. The second paraphrase, on 
the other hand, acknowledges both the writer's 
ownership of the assumptions and their source. 
In fact, from the ONEAP perspective, we must accept 
that the use of hypostatising language obstructs 
critical thinking. As soon as we have assumed a thing 
to be absolutely true, it can no longer be held up for 
critical re-appraisal. If our language is impoverished 
in making the normative and subjective explicit, then 
we are more likely to pass over such assumptions 
uncritically. When our language no longer hypostatises, 
our attention is drawn to human assumptions. 
6.4 Power and Ideology 
Let us now move on to the fourth major area of recent 
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theoretical exploration in Critical Systems Thinking: 
the critique of power and ideology. 
We have already described how: 
(i) the System of Systems Methodologies deals 
exclusively with methods used to intervene in 
organizational settings; 
(ii) Critical Systems theorists have been explicit 
in their demand that researchers working in these 
settings declare emancipatory goals; and 
(iii) the limitations of approaches which refuse 
to acknowledge the problems of coercion and false 
consciousness have been exposed. 
Clearly, understandings of power and ideology must be 
central to Critical Systems Thinking, although defining 
these two terms is highly problematic [see, for 
example, Lukes (1974), Larrain (1979) and Oliga (1990a) 
for reviews of some of the problems]. 
Oliga (1989a,b, 1990a) has taken it upon himself to 
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deal with these problematic concepts head-on. Rather 
than simply describe his own view of power and 
ideology, however, it might be instructive to review 
his commentary on the works of other key writers in 
this area. From such a review we will be able to tease 
out the key assumptions he makes in arriving at his own 
perspective. 
Oliga (1989a,b, 1990a) identifies a series of different 
perspectives on power and ideology. In his 1990a paper, 
he begins by outlining three views, each of which can 
be seen as a step on from the last. First of all there 
is Dahl's view (1958) that power can be defined .... 
"in terms of an individual's successful attempt to 
secure a desired outcome through processes 
entailing the making of decisions on issues over 
which there is an observable conflict of 
subjective interests" (Oliga, 1990a). 
Then there is the extension of this view, offered by 
Bachrach and Baratz (1963), that we have to include in 
our definition of power an understanding that one party 
may exercise power by preventing decisions from being 
taken on potential issues. 
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Thirdly there is the v.l.°ew of Lukes (1974) ho on w , .1. 
criticising both of the above authors for focusing 
solely upon the individual, introduces the Marxist 
notion of false consciousness, saying that we must also 
include .... 
"(a) social forces and institutional practices as 
sources of bias mobilisation, (b) control over 
political agenda through ideological processes of 
preferences shaping and selective perception and 
articulation of what counts as social problems and 
conflicts, and (c) latent conflicts representing a 
contradiction between the interests of those 
exercising power and the 'real' interests of those 
they exclude" (Oliga, 1990a). 
By presenting these three views as a neat progression 
of ideas (a review of the literature on power indicates 
that these three positions have actually competed for 
intellectual credibili ty) , Oliga (1990a) ｣ｾ･｡ｲｬｹ＠
identifies himself with a perspective which refuses to 
see power as lying solely in the hands of individual 
human manipulators, but is essentially systemic in 
nature, having roots in human consciousness. 
Oliga then goes on to review the works of two theorists 
(Minson, 1980, and Hindess, 1982) which he sets against 
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the above. He starts with the work of Hindess (1982), 
who argues that considerations of power should not be 
separated from an analysis of the practical conditions 
through which power relations emerge. Thus, according 
to Hindess (1982), 
"arenas of actual or potential struggle would then 
have to be analysed not in terms of the 
differential possession of quantities of power but 
rather in terms of the differential conditions and 
means of action available to the contending 
forces, their strategies and objectives, and so 
on" . 
Oliga then proceeds to a discussion of Minson's work 
(1980), and thereby also tackles Nietzsche (1901; 
posthumous publication) and Foucault (1972, 1977) whose 
thoughts have influenced Minson. Minson recognises 
that, for both Nietzsche and Foucault, power and 
knowledge are intimately related. As Foucault (1980) 
says, 
"Now I have been trying to make visible the 
constant articulation I think there is of power on 
knowledge and knowledge on power. We should not be 
content to say that power has a need for such-and-
such a discovery, such-and-such a form of 
knowledge, but we should add that the exercise of 
power itself creates and causes to emerge new 
objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of 
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information .... The exercise of power perpetually 
creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge 
constantly induces effects of power.", Knowledge 
and power are integrated with one another, and 
there is no point in dreaming of a time when 
knowledge will cease to depend on power; this is 
just a way of reviving humanism in a utopian 
guise. It is not possible for power to be 
exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power", 
Minson takes this view of power and contrasts it with 
the Marxist perspective (exemplified here by the work 
of Lukes, 1974). In all, Minson identifies three major 
areas in which Foucault contests Marxist orthodoxy: 
"his [Foucault's] attack on global conceptions of 
social relations; his relocation of such 
categories in the limited field of 'social' 
strategies; and finally, his attack on 
'possessive' conceptions of power and 
concomitantly his emphasis on the determinants and 
effects of the 'technical' forms of implementing 
policies and strategic programs". 
However, rather than simply following Foucault in his 
belief that power should be seen as a partner to the 
many and diffuse forms of everyday knowledge (which 
contrasts with the Marxist view that power concentrates 
in the hands of the owners of the means of production), 
Minson declares the very notion of power to be null and 
void. In his own words, 
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"Nothing can be explained in terms of power 
because on any understanding, one thing (be it 
political subject, economic structure or whatever) 
ｭｵｳｾ＠ be attributed the unconditional capacity to 
domlnate the other .... To set conditions on a 
capacity to dominate is to deny that a thing has 
that capacity". 
Therefore Minson is reduced to talking in terms of 
differential advantages and disadvantages faced by 
social agents. 
Now, Oliga chooses to lump the works of all the above 
authors (Nietzsche, Foucault, Minson and Hindess) 
together on the grounds that they share what he calls 
"a number of untenable elements in their analysis of 
power". Let me quote Oliga (1990a) verbatim: 
"First, outcomes of struggle are seen as simply 
dependent on heterogeneous, interdependent, 
possible tactics and strategies, or on conditions 
and means of action available in specific 
situations of action. Second, their alternative 
explanatory categories are all simply taken as 
given (spring from nowhere). This naturalistic 
conception betrays an uncritical view of surface-
level appearances. The possibility that such 
parameters of struggle may be ideologically 
structured is ignored. Thus there is a danger of 
overconcentrating on the tactics and actual 
'playing out the game', to the exclusion of the 
ground rules of the game itself, which 
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circumscribe, 
outcomes". 
structure and bias potential 
Oliga claims that there is danger in such 'limited 
thinking', and cites the argument put forward by Warren 
(1984) against the work of Nietzsche. Warren claims 
that, by saying power pervades every aspect of 
knowledge, Nietzsche effectively makes all knowledge 
ideological, and therefore the notion of truth flies 
out of the window. 
Oliga maintains that the writings of Foucault, Hindess 
and Minson are also prone to such relativism. Following 
Haberrnas (1976b), Oliga asserts that, when all 
knowledge is seen as ideological, a critique of 
ideology becomes impossible - such a critique depends 
on the possibility of distinguishing truth from 
falsehood (at least in a critical, rather than an 
absolute, sense). 
Here, then, lies the crux of Oliga's argument. A 
credible understanding of power must allow a critique 
of ideology. Having attacked the works of Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Minson and Hindess on the basis of this 
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criterion, he places himself in a position to define 
ideology in a return to what, in his 1989a paper, he 
calls the "contingent relationist" view of power (i.e., 
similar to the one proposed by Lukes, 1974, based in a 
neo-Marxist analysis): 
Thus, 
"The relational nature of this [the contingent 
relationist] view derives from a focus upon both 
the self-understandings of the agents involved in 
a power relation, and the structural constraints 
and conjunctural opportunities they confront in a 
particular, concrete situation. And it is 
contingent in a dialectically critical sense; that 
is, coercion is not seen as immanent in power, yet 
power can be noxiously exercised; or looked at 
from the other side of the coin, power is not seen 
as inherently positive (for the good of all) yet 
it can be, in a distributive sense, a source of 
emancipatory potential, as much as a creative, 
transformative capacity in a synergistic sense". 
because power can be either oppressive or 
transformative, Oliga (1990a) can define ideology, 
following Marx (1887) and Larrain (1979), as "distorted 
knowledge which, in the interest of the dominant class, 
masks contradictions of capitalist social relations". 
For Oliga, then, ideology is always a negative, with 
critically accepted truth being its positive 'other'. 
Our task, according to him, is to expose coercive power 
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relations and use power in a trans forma tory manner to 
challenge ideology (which is always a symptom of false 
consciousness). 
Having fixed upon his definitions of power and 
ideology, Oliga (1990a) then proceeds to evolve an 
explicit theory about the relationship between the two 
that has profound implications for how we see the 
process of liberation (which is, of course, at the 
centre of Critical Systems Thinking): 
"The processes of ideological ｩｮｴ･ｲｰ･ｬｾ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠
[the act of addressing] .... of the ruled result in 
either their acceptance or their rejection of the 
(ruler's) dominant ideology. This, however, is at 
the discursive level. Obedience (or resistance and 
struggle) depends additionally on the power 
balance, that is, on the matrix of material 
affirmations and sanctions available to the rulers 
relative to the ruled. For analytical purposes, 
power can therefore be related to the non-
discursive (i.e., economic and ｰｯｾｩｴｩ｣｡ｬＩ＠
dimension of social relations. In these critical 
terms, power and ideology thus become dialectical 
notions. The idea of ideology is meaningless 
except in the context of organising, maintaining, 
and reproducing power through 'subjection-
qualification' processes [subjection refers to the 
force applied to an individual to make her or him 
conform, and qualification refers to the enabling 
of an individual to take up and perform the 
repertoire of roles given in society (including 
the role of agent of social change)]. This is the 
sense in which ideology reflects power. Obversely, 
all ideologies operate only in a material matrix 
of affirmations and sanctions (power). Thus power 
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in turn reflects ideologies". 
I would suggest that this is important for the Critical 
Systems understanding of pluralism because it helps us 
broaden our definitions of problem contexts beyond what 
Oliga (1990a) calls "structural aspects of system 
control" . 
Now we can begin to look at context more clos€ly in 
terms of power and ideology so that, when we wish to 
promote emancipatory change, we can determine whether 
the priority is intervention to challenge prevailing 
ideology, intervention to transform power structures, 
or intervention in both simultaneously. 
The critical use of soft systems methods (in situations 
of equal power relations) or emancipatory methods (in 
situations of unequal power relations) can h€lp us 
challenge ideology, and the critical use of hard 
systems methods can help us alter power relations 
through planned intervention in organizational 
structures. 
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6.5 Liberate and Critique 
Lastly, in this review of recent diverse contributions 
to Critical Systems Thinking, let us look at the theory 
of liberate and critique propounded by Flood 
(1990a,c,d). 
Central to this theory is a far-sighted integration of 
the very different perspectives championed by Habermas 
and Foucault (a union that would at first sight seem 
impossible to attain). Flood saw such an integration as 
an essential next step due to the powerful critique of 
modernism3 launched by the post-modern philosopher 
Michel Foucault. 
Because Critical Systems theorists have drawn so 
heavily upon the works of Habermas, and Habermas can be 
identified as one of the staunchest and most 
sophisticated defenders of modernism (see his 1985 work 
in particular), Flood was aware that Critical systems 
Thinking was running the risk of exposing itself to a 
similar critique. Indeed, wooliston (1990, 1991a,b,c) 
has already begun to engage in this. 
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Before detailing Foucault's position, let me just 
clarify the Habermasian understanding of power which 
Foucault criticises: 
The possibility of having an emancipatory interest 
which is seen as pivotal presupposes a neo-Marxist 
understanding of power. That is, as a function of the 
capitalist system, power concentrates in the hands of a 
minority of citizens, and the majority accept this 
situation through the internalisation of ideologies 
(false consciousnesses) supporting the status quo. 
Power is 
individuals 
seen as 'sovereign' (i.e., 'owned' 
and groups of people) and negative (it 
by 
is 
an oppressive force). Consequently a causal analysis is 
encouraged in which people are thought to be subject to 
the oppression of others both in terms of observable 
social relations and ideological rationalisations of 
these. There is therefore a need for emancipation both 
from the power relations themselves and the false 
consciousnesses that support them. 
Foucault's understanding of power is very different 
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however. As already touched upon in my earlier review 
of Oliga's work (in particular, 1990a), not only does 
Foucault see power as bound up with knowledge (Habermas 
prefers a knowledge-interest link that keeps the 
analysis of power separate), but he specifically states 
that power is not sovereign (i.e., it cannot be said to 
lie in anyone's hands), and oppressive power relations 
do not lead to the development of distorted knowledges. 
Indeed, the very idea of distorted 
presupposes that it is possible to have a 
notion of true knowledge, which Foucault 
knowledge 
(critical) 
does not 
accept. For him, knowledge and power are so intimately 
linked that there can be no acceptable criteria for the 
establishment of truths, and no "peculiarly unforced 
force of the better argument" (Habermas, 1974). For 
Foucault, any determination of what is true has to have 
its origins in the (non-sovereign) exercise of power. 
This viewpoint, then, stands in direct opposition to 
that of Habermas and, if accepted as it stands, raises 
the possibility of establishing a powerful counter-
paradigm to Critical Systems Thinking, and even 
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threatens to undermine the (Habermasian) Critical 
Systems perspective altogether. 
Now, Foucault's understanding of power is notoriously 
difficult to grasp, running, as it does, against all 
the 'common sense' notions we have held unquestioningly 
for so long. Let me detail the concept further, then, 
by quoting Flood's (1990a) ｰｲｾ｣ｩｳｾ＠ ｾｾ＠ interpretation) 
of it: 
"Power is rejected in the form of right, 
sovereignty, and obedience and as being like a 
commodity. The idea that power is descending and 
negative, as would be the sovereign case, is 
replaced by an idea of ascension and positiveness. 
Power is constructed and functions on the basis of 
particular micropowers and is productive in the 
way that it produces reality (i.e., domains of 
objects and rituals of thoughts). These are not 
autonomous or independent, being integral with a 
broad series of processes. 
Emergence of knowledge is explained as a 
consequence of domination at local discursivity 
levels [the everyday level at which discourses are 
developed], imposed by non-discursive subjugators. 
There are forces holding together discursive 
formations. A situation of conflict leads to the 
rising of some and the subjugation of other 
knowledges and thus to resistance and relations of 
power. Historical succession of discursive 
formations becomes a matter of contests and 
struggles over systems of rules". 
Rather than seeing power as a causal agent in social 
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processes, operating from the top down, Foucault sees 
it as a constituting agent, operating from the bottom 
up. 
Indeed, Foucault (1980) specifically claims that what 
we normally see as the sovereign exercise of power 
causing oppression (as in the Marxist case of the 
owners of the means of production dominating the lives 
of producers) is actually a 'coming together' (an 
emergent property perhaps?) of domination at the level 
of discursive micro-power relations by non-discursive 
forces. 
In other words, knowledge is shaped during everyday 
power relationships, yet these are themselves subject 
to the rules of a wider power/knowledge system that is 
constituted by the relationships between all our micro-
level interactions. 
Thus the whole conventional notion of the causal power 
relation is inverted. Foucault believes that happenings 
at the level of everyday discourse give rise to what we 
think of as sovereign power. 
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Now, I have said that Flood (1990a,d) has striven for 
an integration of the supposedly contradictory 
perspectives of Habermas and Foucault. He has 
approached this through consideration of two key 
aspects of Critical Systems Thinking: critical thinking 
and pluralism. 
To take critical thinking first, we must inevitably 
accept that to be critical we must hold onto the 
possibility of comparing and contrasting different 
knowledges. It is because some knowledges can become 
dominant, and others repressed, that Foucault 
identifies the liberation of suppressed knowledges as 
the essential antidote to the totalising power of a 
dominant discourse. 
In a wide-ranging review of Foucault's critique, Smart 
(1983) has drawn out five key critical-methodological 
principles that Foucault claims we need to hold onto if 
we are to liberate knowledges without being seduced by 
the sovereign view of power. Flood (1990a) summarises 
these as follows: 
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"(1) Avoid an analysis of power in terms of 
sovereignty and obedience. Rather than focusing on 
regulated, legitimate and centralised forms of 
power, be concerned with power at the extremities, 
with its regional and local forms, where it 
becomes less legal. 
(2) Rather than concentrating on conscious 
intention in the analysis of power, look for the 
point of application, where it is in direct 
relationship with its object. So questions like 
'Who has the power?' or 'What intentions or aims 
do power holders have?' would be replaced by 
interest in how things work at the level of 
ongoing subjugation, of continuous and 
uninterrupted processes that subject our bodies, 
govern our gestures, dictate our behaviour, etc. 
(Foucault, 1980). Attention should therefore be 
focused on the process by which subjects are 
constituted as effects of power rather than issues 
of motivated interest of particular groups, 
classes, or individuals in the exercise of 
domination, or on the constitution of an all-
powerful state or sovereign. 
(3) Power aught not to be conceptualised as being 
attributable to individuals or classes. It is not 
a commodity. Rather it is of a network which .... 
can grow and pervade and become strong. 
Individuals do not possess power, rather they 
constitute its effects. 
(4) Analysis of power should proceed up from a 
micro level and seek to reveal how mechanisms of 
power have been colonised by more general or macro 
forms of domination. This requires an examination 
of how the techniques and procedures of power that 
operate routinely at the level of everyday life 
have been engaged by more general powers of 
economic interest. It is not the other way around. 
This is, in other words, an analysis of the 
individual mechanisms, histories and trajectories 
of the micro-powers which then proceeds to a 
documentation of the manner and method of their 
colonisation. 
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(5) The exercise of power is 
paralleled by the production of 
knowledge". 
accompanied or 
apparatuses of 
Having identified (with Foucault) a need for the 
liberation of knowledges, Flood (1990a) goes on to 
examine the nature of critique in more detail through a 
consideration of the central tenets of pluralism. 
Rather than treat knowledge as having only a singular 
aspect (identified solely with truth in the analytic 
understanding of Popper and others, Habermas offers us 
the chance to critique liberated knowledges in more 
than one area of human interest. By holding onto the 
validity claims of both truth and rightness, relating 
to the technical and practical interests respectively, 
the totalising power of a dominant discourse distorting 
one interest can be challenged by growth of knowledge 
relating to the other. 
So, in contrasting the ideas of Habermas and Foucault, 
Flood demonstrates that each addresses the central 
themes identified by the other. Thus, in his 1990a 
writings, he can claim that .... 
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"Interpretive Analytics [the label given to 
Foucault's perspective by Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1982)] can release rationalities, thus helping to 
grow diversity. Habermas's critical theory accepts 
openness and conciliation and welcomes this 
diversity. Knowledge-constitutive interests then 
deals critically with the tensions between 
rationalities. 
On the one hand, with Foucault, we acknowledge and 
attempt to deal with forces of isolationism 
through a liberating rationale; on the other hand, 
with Habermas, we work against those forces by 
seeking epistemological and methodological 
legitimacies and limitations in order to deal with 
the complexities that ultimately must have given 
rise to such diversity". 
Although Foucault and Habermas obviously share much 
common ground (see Fay, 1975, and Smart, 1983, for 
earlier comparisons), Flood still faces the fundamental 
problem of reconciling their diametrically opposed 
views on the nature of power. 
Habermas maintains that an analysis of power (defined 
as sovereign) is dependent on the ability to make a 
(critical, non-absolute) claim to know truth, whereas 
Foucault says that truth itself is dependent on (non-
sovereign) power relations. Flood (1990a), however, 
believes that a reconciliation is achievable .... 
148 
"via the notion that truth is dependent on power 
and that there is need to liberate discourse. We 
then employ Habermas's ideal by looking for the 
truth of judgement according to our interest, 
explicit ideology and critical analysis. In this 
process, however, we drop the idea that truth 
comes about from the force of the better argument. 
Ideology, for example, can never be said to be 
absolutely right, although many may find a 
particular position desirable".4 
Here, then, we have the theory of liberate and critigue 
which Flood uses to underpin Critical Systems Thinking. 
6.6 Liberate, Critique, Empower and Transform 
Now, it is fairly obvious that the influence of 
Foucault makes Flood's perspective incompatible with 
Oliga's expressly sovereign view of power (1990a). 
However, Flood (1990d) is so impressed with Oliga 
(1990b), when he argues that an adequate theory of 
ideology and social control is essential, that he 
decides to establish the groundwork for a further 
expansion of liberate and critigue to include the words 
Empower and Transform: 
"The aim of this project is to undertake a 
critical study of the concepts control, power and 
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ideology with the purpose, not only of uncovering 
their potentially dominative and oppressive 
nature, but also of gaining a penetrative 
understanding of the way they contain their own 
seeds of transcendence. This means that, on the 
one hand, there is an equal need to tease out 
those aspects that contradict their oppressive 
consequences. In the latter case, the aim is to 
use such penetrative revelation to raise the 
consciousness and spur the will to self-
determination of those subjugated to domination, 
hence the project is called 'empower' and 
'transform' .... 
[Critical Systems Thinking] can be summarised in 
terms of a process that leads to progressive 
change in social order. This process 'starts' with 
the need to tackle the difficulty of the 
suppression of knowledges, for without such an 
attack we begin our scholarly efforts enjoying 
only diminished intellectual possibilities. 
Liberating knowledges demands of us that we also 
undertake an adequate critigue of these 
rationalities, so that their legitimacies and 
limitations are thoroughly explored. This builds a 
strong position from which empowerment of those 
oppressed can be promoted and hence transformative 
action can be pushed for. Complementarism 
[pluralism] thus extends to the methodological 
process 'liberate, critique, empower and 
transform' II • 
Here, then, we have the most comprehensive perspective 
worked out to date, although it is quite clear that 
there are many unresolved issues still hanging in the 
air. 
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6.7 A Summary of Emergent Themes 
In introducing Critical Systems Thinking to the reader 
in the previous chapter, I stressed the importance of 
being aware of the diversity of ideas that have been 
brought under its extremely broad mantle. No two 
authors are entirely in agreement with one another; but 
then, given the stated need for both the liberation of 
knowledges and continual critical thought about the 
nature of critique itself, this can be interpreted as a 
positive, healthy attribute of the 'movement'. 
I place the word "movement", above, in inverted commas 
because one might claim, quite justifiably perhaps, 
that there is no single, identifiable Critical Systems 
perspective. 
Nevertheless, it has been claimed that there is some 
common ground on which the theorists whose works have 
been reviewed stand. This has been described by Jackson 
(1991b), drawing upon the writings of Oliga (1989a) and 
Schecter (1990, 1991), as a set of five commitments all 
Critical systems thinkers make: 
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"[Critical Systems Thinking] seeks to demonstrate 
critical awareness; it shows social awareness; it 
is dedicated to human emancipation; it is 
committed to complementarity [pluralism] and 
informed development of all the different strands 
of systems thinking at the theoretical level; and 
to the complementary and informed use of systems 
methodologies". 
At this point, however, it is important to hold onto 
the image of diversity I have tried to conjour. For 
example, although there is a general acceptance of the 
idea of pluralism, we can observe that the difference 
between the 'pluralism' of Ulrich (1988) and that of 
Jackson (1987b) is quite marked. Also, the emerging, 
explicitly post-modern work of Wooliston (e.g. , 
1991a,b,c) challenges the meaningfulness of talking in 
terms of commitments. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter and the last we have tapped into some 
of the rapidly accumulating and divergent literature on 
Critical Systems Thinking. 
Later in the thesis, as my own perspective begins to 
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evolve, I will be exploring a few of these divergences 
and differences in more detail (only a few, because of 
the necessity of imposing boundaries on this thesis). I 
hope to tackle some of the others in future work. 
Notes 
1. Indeed we might trace the origins of the paradigm of 
communicative action back to Wittgenstein's 
posthumously published "Philosophical Investigations" 
(1958), in which many 'private' experiences of 
individual consciousness, such as pain, are shown to 
have their roots in socially shared meaning, thus 
inverting the Cartesian assumption that individual 
consciousness provides the ultimate reference point for 
knowledge about Being. 
2. Unfortunately it is not within the remit of this 
thesis to critique Ulrich's work. However, I hope to 
pursue this line in my post-doctoral research (see 
Chapter 16 for details). 
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3. Modernism, post-modernism and anti-modernism (the 
latter is a category introduced by Habermas, 1984a,b) 
are by no means easy terms to define. If, however, I 
had to summarise the meaning of the term modernism into 
one sentence, I would say that it is an assumption 
underlying any area of theory, practice or aesthetics 
that human beings are progressing toward a better way 
of living. As such, the modernist assumption underlies 
the thinking, not only of those in the analytical camp 
(e.g., Albert, 1971; Popper, 1972; and Spinner, 1974) 
who champion the progressive-technological bias of 
positivistic science, but also the dialectical thinkers 
(e.g., Horkheimer, 1937; Adorno, 1957; Habermas, 1971, 
1972, 1974, 1976a, 1984a,b) who seek progress through 
liberation from oppressive power relationships. Post-
modernists (e.g., Foucault, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1976, 
1977, 1980, 1984a,b; Derrida, 1973, 1976, 1978; 
Lyotard, 1984; Rorty, 1989) hold onto rational thought, 
although they acknowledge the irony of inevitably 
conflicting rational arguments based in contrasting 
vocabularies. Indeed, the post-modern reduction of 
debate to "language games" undermines the very notion 
of rationality (Rorty, 1989). Rationality is the 
central tool with which modernists pursue progress, but 
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in post-modernism the notion of 'progress' itself is 
abandoned in favour of a perpetual shifting of 
knowledges through which human beings live their lives. 
In even starker contrast, anti-modernists (e.g., 
Campbell, 1988; Panikkar, 1989; Ash, 1989; McBurney, 
1990; Wilber, 1990) not only reject the idea that we 
are currently progressing toward a better state of 
being, but claim that over-concentration on critical 
rationality is a central cause of alienation. For them, 
real progress entails the development of a more 
aestheticised, mythologised or spiritual way of living 
in which we are prepared to contextualise much of our 
critical thinking within a wider spirituality so as to 
move toward the ideal of a deeply beautiful, socially 
and ecologically harmonious existence. 
4 . Flood (1990a) 
'reconciliation' sets 
personal communications 
freely admits 
up new tensions, 
with me he has 
that his 
but in many 
consistently 
maintained that, when engaged in the creative process, 
we must be prepared to ride with such tensions in order 
to expand the possibilities of thought. Thus, the fact 
that a major integrative work (such as, in this case, 
155 
bringing together the ideas of Habermas and 
might contain areas of unresolved conflict 
important in the longer term. Such conflicts 
the need for continued change through 
Foucault) 
is only 
indicate 
critical 
reflection, rather than abandonment of a project 
is seen to be vital. As Connerton (1976) so 
that 
aptly 
notes, even the ways in which we understand the term 
'critical reflection' itself (a central concern of both 
Habermas and Foucault) are open to critical reflection 
and change! 
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CHAPTER 7: THE 'PROBLEM' OF PLURALISM 
As mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, both Flood (1990b) 
and Jackson 
possibility 
(1990, 1991b) have considered the 
that Critical Systems Thinking might be 
in outlook. The contents of this chapter 
my first attempts to get to grips with this 
pluralist 
represent 
notion of pluralism. 
Flood (1989a) has argued that Critical Systems Thinking 
is "meta-paradigmatic". We might ask what this could 
mean. In order to answer such a question, we first of 
all need to define our terms. 
7.1 What is a Paradigm? 
The main concept we need to clarify is that of 
"paradigm". Kuhn (1970) describes a paradigm as a view 
of something that contains certain assumptions that are 
incompatible with the assumptions of another view of 
the same thing. We therefore say that paradigms are 
incommensurable with one another. 
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Of course this is not to say that there can be no 
communication between people supporting different 
paradigmatic positions. There will generally be enough 
common ground to allow dialogue, and hence the 
emergence of new paradigms becomes possible as people 
struggle to deal with the differences they find between 
their own paradigms and others. 
The idea that paradigm incommensurability is based on 
partial incompatibility only, and that dialogue does 
actually result in change, is very often passed over 
when people talk about Kuhn's view of paradigms 
(Bernstein, 1983) . It is a very important point, 
however, because it means that paradigms only represent 
"moments" of commitment to theory in a wider process 
of discourse (even if, in some instances, a "moment" 
may last most of a human being's life-time).l 
7.2 The Idea of "Meta-Paradigm" 
What, then, does Flood (1989a) mean when he says that 
Critical Systems Thinking is meta-paradigmatic? Does he 
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mean a paradigm encompassing views absorbed from other 
paradigms, or does he mean a perspective that lies 
above (outside) all paradigms and contextualises them? 
It seems to me that he means a perspective that lies 
above all paradigms. This interpretation can be 
supported by two pieces of evidence: 
First, Flood (1989a) argues that pluralism offers 
theoretical commensurability between paradigms. It is 
the pluralist meta-theory that provides this 
theoretical commensurability: "the pluralist view 
insists that we have methodologies and paradigms as 
they are, using the language unaltered". Furthermore, 
this view is repeated in Flood's updated work (1990a). 
Second, Flood (1989a) suggests that Critical Systems 
marks a departure from Kuhn's "world view" 
(1970), and the associated idea of 
approach 
paradigm 
incommensurability. Paradigms become commensurable 
through the development of an adequate epistemological 
theory that becomes part of the pluralist meta-theory. 
Flood (1990a) follows Jackson (1985b) in identifying 
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Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests 
as providing just such an adequate epistemology. 
This is a departure from Kuhn's "world view" approach 
because Kuhn would say that such a meta-theory, 
together with what it contextualises, must stand in 
opposition to the old paradigms. Flood insists that it 
actually makes them commensurate with one another. 
Now, when I started this line of research I was 
horrified by this. I felt strongly that it would be 
impossible to have a fully formed theoretical 
perspective that sat outside paradigms. I believed that 
it would be important, right from the outset, to guard 
against this 'misinterpretation' of pluralism because 
it would mean that Critical Systems would be setting 
itself up as an absolute truth that everybody would 
simply accept. 
This would mean it would be setting itself up to fail. 
As far as I am aware, no theory has yet been advanced 
that 
with 
has united every single human being in 
it. My first task therefore had to be 
against this notion of "meta-paradigm". 
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agreement 
to argue 
As the argument in this chapter unfolds, I will 
demonstrate that a meta-paradigmatic position is 
impossible to sustain because every pluralist meta-
theory must contain assumptions that are unacceptable 
to isolationists. Yet isolationist theoretical 
perspectives 
Tenability is 
remain tenable in their 
granted by the use of 
own terms. 
a restricted 
vocabulary that provides internal, logical consistency. 
Thus pluralist perspectives must indeed be paradigmatic 
rather than meta-paradigmatic. 
7.3 The Problem 
The argument will be pursued through consideration of a 
central 'problem' that pluralism, as Flood (1989a) 
describes it, might be seen to present: 
If pluralism was indeed meta-paradigmatic, and this was 
perceived to be the vital stuff of Critical Systems, 
it's validity would have to depend on there being a 
real, basic distinction between pluralism and the other 
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approaches. It must be said that there is some doubt 
about whether this distinction does actually exist. 
7.4 Is Pluralism a Genuinely Distinct Approach? 
The problem comes in trying to show that pluralism, as 
I have interpreted Flood's description of it, is 
sufficiently different from imperialism by subsumption. 
This is revealed in Flood's discussion (1989a) of the 
theories of Kuhn (1970). 
7.4.1 The Subsumptive Nature of Pluralism 
Kuhn's central thesis is that knowledge does not accrue 
in an additive or cumulative fashion. Faced with 
anomalies, people search for a new theory that explains 
both the anomalies and whatever the previously existing 
theory satisfactorily explained. The new theory does 
not offer the old view plus a little bit extra, it 
actually offers a different view of the world. In other 
words a new world view is created. 
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Flood gives an example of how this process has worked 
in systems science. He cites Checkland's claim (1981) 
that hard methods can be seen as part of the soft 
approach because they can be applied in special cases 
when there is no disagreement between participants on 
the nature of the problematic situation. In his 1985 
writings Checkland demonstrated that he viewed the 
integration of hard thinking into the soft approach in 
a Kuhnian fashion. 
However, Flood recognises that Checkland actually 
approaches the task of integration in an imperialist 
manner (by subsumption). This, he says, raises 
"questions that will have to be aired elsewhere". 
By deferring consideration of this issue, Flood has 
left an important anomaly in pluralist theory 
unaddressed. If Checkland can be said to have operated 
imperialistically, perhaps pluralists are doing exactly 
the same in claiming theoretical commensurability 
between positivistic and interpretive ideas. 
Maybe, in order to differentiate pluralism from 
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imperialism by subsumption, pluralists would have to 
claim that they do not need to alter the world views of 
the paradigms encompassed in order to provide 
commensurability. Indeed, this is what Flood (1989a, 
1990a) suggests. It is the subjugation of the 
perspective of the subsumed paradigm that defines both 
imperialism by subsumption and Kuhn's theory of the 
advance of knowledge. 
Only if pluralism does not require the modification of 
constituent perspectives would it be more than another 
perspective itself: only then would we be able to claim 
that it is meta-paradigmatic - of equal acceptability 
to all. 
Now, as already mentioned, it is quite easy to 
demonstrate that the epistemological world views of the 
isolationist hard (positivistic) and soft 
(interpretive) paradigms contain assumptions that make 
them incompatible within a single meta-theory. 
To give an example, let us take a scientist steeped in 
the positivistic tradition who believes that each new 
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theory represents a closer approximation to the 'truth' 
than its predecessor, and who does not subscribe to the 
view that the researcher cannot help but influence the 
researched (either through interpretation, direct 
action or indirect influence). 
Such a person will be unable to accept the practice of 
interpretive 
these involve 
methods (however context-linked) 
intervention in the situation 
because 
under 
analysis. To a positivistic thinker, such methods will 
always be viewed as an obstacle to discovery of the 
'truth' rather than part of it. 
Similarly, an isolationist interpretive thinker will 
never be able to accept the notion of a single 'truth' 
that must be worked towards. This is because the 
interpretive paradigm assumes the real world to be 
unknowable, and hence perceptions of it become the 
stuff of analysis. 
For either paradigm to accept the practice of the 
other, the assumptions of both would have to be 
harrnonised. To achieve harmony, pluralists must require 
the adherents of the approaches subsumed to alter their 
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epistemological perspectives. For example, Jackson 
(1985b) asks readers to accept Habermas's (1972) theory 
of knowledge-constitutive interests. If they do so, and 
thereby embrace pluralism, they will have gone through 
an epistemological paradigm shift. Hence pluralism (and 
also Critical Systems Thinking) must be subsumptive, 
and cannot be seen as meta-paradigmatic. 
Of course it might be argued that the power of the new 
paradigm will eradicate the old subsumed ones so that 
it will in effect become meta-paradigmatic. However, 
the acid test of the likelihood of this happening is 
whether people holding the older perspectives can 
object to pluralism in their own terms. If they can, 
then there should be no claim that the meta theory is 
meta-paradigmatic. 
From both the isolationist positivistic and 
interpretive viewpoints there is a central anomaly in 
pluralism: it requires one to believe that there are 
different "moments" in inquiry where different ideals 
are pursued (this will be a central theme of the latter 
half of the thesis, so will not be expanded upon here). 
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Since neither paradigm could ever accept this, the only 
possible conclusion we can reach is that pluralism, 
rather than being meta-paradigmatic, must be an aspect 
of an entirely new paradigm. 
We have seen that, while pluralists claim theoretical 
commensurability is possible, in practice this can only 
be attained at the expense of the epistemologies of the 
subsumed paradigms. Thus the practice of pluralism 
cannot help but turn out to be an advanced form of 
imperialism 
shown by 
in the same way that imperialism has been 
Flood (1989a) to be an advanced form of 
isolationism. 
7.4.2 From Subsumption to Isolationism 
This brings us to the difficulty Flood (1989a) expected 
readers to have with pluralism: that people could 
confuse it with theoretical isolationism. Going back to 
the definition of theoretical isolationism presented in 
Chapter 4, Flood (1989b) maintains that within this 
approach the uses of different methodological 
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techniques according to context are dominated by a 
single isolated world view. 
It has already been demonstrated that this is also the 
case within pluralism, its claim to meta-paradigmatic 
status falling on the grounds that it can only be seen 
as a meta-theory from within a paradigm, and thus no 
basic differences can be identified between theoretical 
isolationism, imperialism by subsumption and pluralism. 
7.5 Critical Systems Thinking as a Paradigm 
The logical consequence of the above argument is that 
we should accept Critical Systems Thinking, not as 
meta-paradigmatic, but as a new paradigm differing from 
both the positivistic and interpretive viewpoints in 
its assertion that methods should be related to context 
and that research should be emancipatory. It is the 
explicit focus on ideology in determining methodology 
design and influencing outcome that appears to define 
Critical Systems Thinking. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
Having established the paradigmatic nature of Critical 
Systems, we are now in a position to review its 
commitment to pluralism once again in the 
chapter. 
next 
Notes 
1. Wendy 
bringing 
neglect 
peril. 
Gregory should get some credit here 
Bernstein's argument to my attention. 
the communicative nature of science at 
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for 
We 
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CHAPTER 8: PLURALISM AND CRITICAL SYSTEMS REVISITED 
When I first read Flood (1989a, 1990b), and conducted 
the critique presented in the previous chapter, I wrote 
it up for publication in the journal Cybernetics and 
Systems (Midgley, 1989b). In that paper I went a step 
further than the argument in Chapter 7 and suggested 
that, because we cannot say pluralism is meta-
paradigmatic, we should abandon the term. The words I 
used were: 
"Given that the pluralist ideal is not actually 
attainable, and therefore pluralism cannot be seen 
as distinctly separate from imperialism by 
subsumption and theoretical isolationism, it is 
prudent to abandon the classification. In 
rejecting pluralism, we must not try to rescue the 
rest of Jackson's terminology (1987a). It would be 
easy to redefine Critical Systems as isolationist 
or imperialist (subsumptive), but the terms 
isolationism and imperialism have negative 
connotations that have served to highlight the 
supposed benefits of pluralism. Redefining it in 
these negative terms would be self-defeating". 
This is a position that has since been supported by 
others (e.g., Fuenmayor, 1989). However, during the time 
between submission and publication, I began to realise 
the usefulness of distinguishing between pluralism, 
imperialism by subsumption and isolationism - even if 
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we do acknowledge that all three are paradigmatic. 
8.1 Denaturing and Reconstructing 
Pluralism involves the use of a meta-theory which 
reconstructs some of the assumptions of the paradigms 
in order to maintain theoretical coherence, but still 
preserves and contextualises the most important 
elements of them within the new paradigm. Such a meta-
theory also gives equal respect to the validity of 
different working methods by aligning them with 
categories of situational context (none of which are 
capable of being marginalised or described as "special 
cases" ) . 
An isolationist theoretical perspective, in contrast, 
denatures other paradigms. It does so by refusing to 
accept the possibility of contextualisation within a 
paradigm. Instead, a theory is used which is single-
rather than multi-faceted. More than one working method 
may be used, but these are all seen to operate in the 
same basic way. 
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Alternatively, in the case of imperialism by 
subsumption (advanced isolationism), working methods 
may be drawn into a paradigm from others, but they are 
ascribed only marginal validity. It is still maintained 
that a single approach is applicable in most 
circumstances. The ascription of marginal validity is 
generally justified on the grounds that there are a few 
"special cases" in which the new method might be 
required. 
An example of theoretical isolationism can be found in 
the work of Brewer and Hunter (1989). These authors 
explore possible complementarities between fieldwork, 
surveys, experimentation and non-reactive research 
(i.e., use of documentation and archival materials). We 
have to recognise, however, that each of these methods 
is orientated toward 'hard' data-gathering only. 
Methods that are orientated toward value clarification 
and change are excluded. Presumably these would not fit 
with the authors' over-arching, single-faceted "world 
view". Furthermore, there is no attempt to align these 
methods with situational contexts in the form of a 
meta-theory. For a more detailed analysis of Brewer and 
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Hunters' work see Midgley (1990b). 
In a sense, explaining the precise difference between 
reconstruction and denaturing is the task of this whole 
thesis, but for now let us just say that, to avoid 
denaturing a perspective, not only the working method 
itself has to be preserved, but also key aspects of 
ontology and epistemology (i.e., those aspects that are 
not specifically isolationist in character). A vision 
of ontology that can achieve this pluralist 
reconstruction for the paradigm of Critical Systems 
Thinking will be discussed in Chapter 14. 
8.2 Rethinking Critical Systems Thinking as a Paradigm 
I wrote to Cybernetics and Systems when it came to 
editing the page proofs of that first paper (mentioned 
above) in order to ask them to remove the section on 
abandoning pluralism. Unfortunately they replied that 
they could not do so. 
The onus, therefore, was on me to set the record 
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straight and look more closely at the Critical Systems 
claim to pluralism in order to set the views expressed 
in that paper against those of Flood (1989a, 1990b), 
and reconcile both into a new viewpoint. This chapter 
documents that task. 
8.2.1 Summarising the Problem 
Flood (1989a) maintains that methods drawn 
different backgrounds are incommensurate at 
from 
the 
methodological level but commensurate at the level of 
theory. 
In essence, what I was arguing in Chapter 7 was that 
this assumption of theoretical commensurability is 
problematic in the terms Flood sets. This is because 
pluralism cannot be seen as meta-paradigmatic: such a 
position is untenable because isolationists will 
always be able to object to pluralism in their own 
terms. We have to face the fact that any 
reconciliation of isolationist positions has to 
involve reconstruction at the theoretical level. 
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8.2.2 The Emergence of a Paradigm 
In order to begin to address the above difficulty and 
find an adequate paradigmatic conception of pluralism 
for Critical Systems Thinking, we can set out the 
relationships between Critical Systems, the System of 
Systems Methodologies, its methodological options, and 
existing isolationist perspectives and methods. Such a 
set of relationships is presented diagrammatically in 
Figure 8.1. 
Figure 8.1: The Relationship between Critical Systems 
Thinking, it's Metatheory, it's Methodological Options 
and Existing Isolationist Perspectives 
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Within the Critical Systems perspective we see that the 
various methods (level 1) can be drawn upon according 
to definitions of research context clarified by the 
meta-theory (level 2: the System of Systems 
Methodologies), which itself is part of Critical 
Systems Thinking (level 3). 
Critical Systems Thinking stands in opposition to the 
isolationist theories of classical positivism and 
interpretivism (level 3). The meta-theory (the System 
of Systems Methodologies) is operated critically, and 
the various methods it encompasses have their ideal 
domains of legitimacy and their limitations defined by 
it. 
If we focus now upon this meta-theory (level 2 in 
figure 8.1), we can see quite clearly that Flood 
(1989a) was right to claim theoretical commensurability 
and methodological 
commensurability is 
Thinking (level 3), 
incommensurability. Theoretical 
provided by Critical Systems 
and yet the various methods remain 
incommensurate because each can only be used to their 
best advantage in separate contexts. 
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However, if we focus upon the relationship Critical 
Systems Thinking has with the various isolationist 
perspectives (level 3), then we see that each justifies 
calling itself comprehensive. This is because each is 
based on a set of fundamentally different ontological 
and epistemological assumptions, and all are internally 
consistent. 
It is clear that if, in drawing upon the System of 
Systems Methodologies within Critical Systems Thinking, 
we elect to use working methods derived from either the 
positivistic or interpretive camps, the underlying 
assumptions will not reflect the original isolationist 
thinking (although other aspects of ontology and 
epistemology will be preserved - see later in the 
thesis). 
Techniques drawn from positivistic sources will be 
transformed in that their use will, in the ideal 
situation, reflect a perception of agreement on 
problematic areas between all those perceived as being 
involved or affected. 
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Techniques of interpersonal exploration drawn from 
interpretive sources will, in the ideal situation, 
likewise be transformed in that their use will reflect 
a perception of disagreement between people who are 
also perceived to have power relationships with each 
other that will not obstruct this exploration. 
Here, then, we see the emergence of Critical Systems 
Thinking as a new paradigm which is pluralist in 
outlook. It's particular vision of pluralism is granted 
by a multi-faceted epistemological theory (Habermas's 
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests, 1972) and a 
meta-theory aligning methods with ideal-type contexts 
of application. 
8.3 Conclusion 
At this point we have a vision of 
Thinking, 
System of 
including its pluralist 
Systems Methodologies, 
least provisionally) be able (at 
Critical Systems 
meta-theory the 
which we should 
to describe as 
internally consistent. As such, this is a convenient 
point to start a new line of argument and enter into a 
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wider critical reflection upon the contexts of our 
debate about pluralism. 
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SECTION 2 
CONTEXTS OF THE DEBATE ABOUT PLURALISM 
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CHAPTER 9: UNITY AND PLURALISM 
So far the analysis I have conducted has been confined 
to the exploration of Critical Systems Thinking as 
presented in the work of others, and the promotion of 
internal coherence with regard to the idea of 
pluralism. 
In particular, Chapter 4 dealt with Jackson's (1987a) 
and Flood's (1989a) reasons for accepting pluralism: 
i.e., we need a research practice that is capable of 
promoting openness and conciliation between supporters 
of the different methodological paradigms. 
However, in this chapter, I want to dig a little 
deeper. My intention is to propose that pluralism is an 
essential pre-requisite for an adequate pursuit of the 
ideal of the unity of science. 
9.1 The Ideal of the Unity of Science 
It generally seems to be 'taken as read' that all 
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scientists accept an ideal of the unity of science: a 
belief that, while disciplinary boundaries might be 
useful for some, we should, in principle, try not to 
let them stop us from exploring issues we feel are 
relevant to our particular interests. Thus the subject 
areas covered by the various disciplines are seen to be 
complementary and, to an extent, overlapping l . 
It is important to make it clear that, by talking about 
an ideal of the unity of science, I am not suggesting 
that scientists want everybody to share a single vision 
of the world, or even that we want unification of 
scientific institutions. Diversity is vitally important 
as a stimulant to debate and change, and the vast 
majority of people recognise this. 
However, most people also realise that, by arbitrarily 
restricting oneself, it becomes possible to remain 
unaware of knowledges that might substantially affect 
ones approach to a research issue. 
Implicit in this is an understanding that knowledges 
and interests are intimately linked, in that our 
interests direct the search for knowledge and yet these 
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interests arise out of the knowledges we already have. 
Thus, if an area of study is limited so that only 
certain knowledges emerge (leaving other knowledges 
marginalised or isolated within a "separate" practice), 
the only questions that will arise are those based on 
the restricted knowledges. We therefore cannot help but 
see that our critical faculties are being limited. 2 
This is why pursuit of the ideal of unification is 
important. There 1S a need to oppose restrictive 
fragmentation and, at the same time, preserve a 
diversity of theories and practices. 
However, despite recognition by most disciplinary 
scientists of complementarity between subject areas, 
systems scientists still maintain that traditional 
divisions of subject from subject tend to prevent the 
effective development of many important knowledges that 
do not sit comfortably within anyone particular set of 
disciplinary boundaries. 
Most systems scientists think of systems scientific 
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inquiry as being an approach in which study areas are 
not differentiated through reference to conventions of 
disciplinary boundaries, but develop and change through 
the on-going practice of defining and redefining 
systems. 
The argument between the holistic (systems sCientific) 
and complementarity (disciplinary scientific) positions 
is not actually over the basic ideal of the unity of 
science, but over its expression. 
Systems scientists maintain that the acceptance of 
disciplinary boundaries may still promote unwitting 
restrictions of knowledges and interests, while 
disciplinary scientists recognise that it is impossible 
for anyone individual to investigate every area. As a 
consequence, some guidance or directed learning is 
necessary to prevent the scientist becoming swamped or 
engaged in holistic, but superficial, analysis only. 
There appears to be some validity in both these 
viewpoints. Direction and specialisation are obviously 
necessary, which is why, in practice, specialisations 
have evolved within systems science itself. 
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To give some examples, people tend to work on answering 
and raising questions in the fields of organizational 
management, ecology, cosmology, education, philosophy, 
etc. While the potential to move between these areas is 
always there, and some movement will take place, I 
cannot think of anyone who is equally proficient and 
active in all these fields simultaneously - which one 
would have to be if one were genuinely to claim to have 
stepped beyond specialisation. 
Equally valid, however, is the view that problems have 
been encountered as a result of the acceptance of 
disciplinary boundaries. 
Lovelock (1988) gives a good example when he cites the 
separation between biology and geology which for a long 
time obstructed the emergence of knowledge about the 
co-evolution of biological and geological forms as a 
total system. As a result both geological and 
biological theories of evolution have been 
impoverished. In this case our understanding has 
clearly been obstructed by disciplinary boundaries. 
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It appears that the balance between specialisation and 
pursuit of the ideal of the unity of science is 
different for disciplinary and systems scientists. 
While both groups pursue both functions, disciplinary 
scientists favour specialisation in their balancing 
act, and are therefore prepared to take on board 
socially accepted boundaries that serve the function of 
focusing their inquiries. Systems scientists, on the 
other hand, favour pursuing the ideal of unity in 
trying to maintain this balance; they therefore resist 
the 'imposition' of disciplinary boundaries. 
My purpose in writing the current chapter is to argue 
that the basic ideal of the unity of science, which we 
all accept whether we opt for the holistic approach or 
disciplinary complementarity, should be extended to 
embrace theoretical complementarity between methods of 
inquiry as well as subject areas. 
Indeed, I hope to demonstrate that subject and method 
are so intimately connected that failure to embrace the 
fullest possible range of working methods (for use in 
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against appropriate 
the common 
scientists 
contexts) will actually militate 
desire of disciplinary and 
alike to pursue the ideal of 
systems 
developing 
unrestricted knowledges. 
This is particularly important for systems scientists, 
however, because isolationism becomes more problematic 
the wider the research remit is. 
9.2 Manifestations of Isolationism 
My intention is to begin the analysis with a 'surface' 
examination of how methodological and theoretical 
isolationism manifests itself in various disciplines. 
This survey is not intended to be comprehensive: I have 
simply selected a few disciplines that have very 
different histories and which make use of different and 
contrasting working methods. 
In doing this, it should become apparent that 
isolationism takes different forms, and indeed whether 
isolationism is even seen to be an issue worthy of 
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discussion crucially depends on how the discipline's 
subject area is defined. 
I have chosen to look at the disciplinary sciences 
because their relatively separate development has made 
the links between subject specialisation, epistemology 
and methodology particularly obvious. After discussing 
a number of disciplines I will return to systems 
science in order to demonstrate that isolationism only 
becomes a major problem when pursuit of the ideal of 
the unity of science is prioritised over disciplinary 
specialisation. 
In tackling an issue as broad as this, it would be easy 
to get tangled in a complex web of arguments. We could 
note, for instance, that some scientists hold to a 
realist position (in which there is said to be a real 
world which our knowledge reflects, albeit 
imperfectly), while others take an idealist line (in 
which it is assumed that knowledge constructs 
'reality'). 
As different approaches to methodology assume either 
realism or idealism, whichever is adhered to will 
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affect how the isolationist decides which working 
methods s/he will proscribe. 
Similarly we could focus upon the issue of 
reductionism, the belief that events can best be 
explained through analysis of relationships between the 
smallest identifiable parts of phenomena, versus 
holism, an understanding that the whole phenomenon is 
often different from the sum of its parts. 
The relationships between these and other issues can 
all be seen to have affected the development of a 
variety of subtly differentiated isolationist 
positions. However, for the sake of clarity, I want to 
focus on just one central issue here. I intend to 
concentrate on how assumptions about the relationships 
between values, knowledges and methods of inquiry 
affect understandings of methodology. 
I have chosen this path for two reasons. The first is 
that the reductionist/holist debate has been discussed 
by Critical Systems thinkers quite comprehensively 
elsewhere (see Flood, 1990a, for example), and I intend 
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to deal with the realist/idealist debate myself in 
Chapter 14. 
The second is that it is through an exploration of 
views on the relationship between values and inquiry 
that we will best be able to see how the form of 
isolationism a particular scientist takes is so often 
intimately linked with his or her subject 
specialisation. 
9.3 Terminology 
In order to conduct this analysis in as simple and 
straight forward a manner as possible, I want to 
establish some basic terminology before we start. 
Throughout the corning chapter I will be talking about 
value-neutral epistemologists and value-explicit 
epistemologists. If epistemology is the study of 
knowledge, then those who believe that knowledge must 
be regarded as independent from normative, ideological 
or subjective positions can be called value-neutral 
epistemologists. 
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This inevitably means that I will be treating 
positivists, neo-positivists, logical positivists and 
critical falliblists as a group. However, I do not wish 
to diminish our awareness of the transition that has 
been made from classical positivism, in which it was 
seen to be possible to have absolute proof for a 
theory, to neo-positivism where only falsifiability was 
seen to be possible, to the more refined position of 
critical falliblism proposed by Popper (1972). 
Popper, while always insisting that objectivity is 
inter-subjective, still shares a central belief with 
positivists and neo-positivists that objective 
knowledge is neutral in terms of belief and ideology. 
In his own words (1972): 
"Knowledge in this objective sense is totally 
independent of anybody's claim to know; also it is 
independent of anybody's belief, or disposition to 
assent; or to assert or to act. Knowledge in the 
objective sense is knowledge without a knowing 
subject" . 
Thus we can make a clear distinction between value-
neutral epistemologists (those who take an 'analytical' 
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line) and value-explicit epistemologists (e.g., 
interpretivists and critical thinkers) who say that 
neutrality is impossible and that knowledge and the 
knower must always be viewed as walking hand in hand. 
Having clarified the terminology to be used, let us 
move on to look at epistemological theory and research 
practice in our selected disciplines. 
9.4 Isolationism in Biology 
Starting with biology, we can observe that it has 
clearly been dominated by 
epistemologists. Biologists have tended to 
on structure and function (seen to be 
rather than meaning in social context 
normative and/or subjective). 
The value-neutral epistemologists, 
value-neutral 
concentrate 
objective), 
(seen to be 
with their 
methodological emphasis on experiment and observation 
within the functionalist and structuralist paradigms 3 , 
have clearly served the majority of research biologists 
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well. To date, biologists have had so little use for 
other forms of inquiry (e.g., heuristic and 
emancipatory methods) that the question of isolationism 
has, as far as I am aware, never had to be considered. 
In general, the debates from the philosophy of science 
that have been seen as most relevant to biologists are 
those that have revolved around the importance of 
metaphysics (ideas that cannot be directly validated by 
empirical means), and the related issue of the meaning 
of empirical support for a theory (see, for example, 
Northrop, 1967). 
Although an understanding of metaphysics challenges the 
view that human beings have no input into theories 
other than through assembling empirical information 
into patterns, it does not affect the dominant 
perspective of epistemological value-neutrality. 
Indeed, the appreciation of metaphysics in biology is 
so recent that its implications have not yet been fully 
felt in methodological discussions (in contrast to 
those occuring in physics, which will be dealt with 
later). 
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The possibility 
working methods 
of using heuristic and 
that focus on inquiry 
emancipatory 
into, and 
intervention in, the social applications of biological 
knowledges (these methods involve acceptance of the 
idea of value-linked knowledge) has not become an issue 
in mainstream biology at all as far as I am aware. 
Of course values are of as much concern to biologists 
as to any other human being, but they tend to be 
removed from mainstream practice and marginalised into 
the realm of ethics, which is not considered a branch 
of science in the same sense as biology. 
9.5 Isolationism in Physics 
If we transfer our attention to the discipline of 
physics, we find that thinking about metaphysics has 
matured over a longer period of time, and this has had 
an impact on methodological practice, albeit only a 
limited one. 
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Questions about non-empirical human input began to 
emerge ln modern physics along with Einstein's theory 
of relativity. Einstein (1934) said that: 
"The belief in an external world independent of 
the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural 
science. Since, however, sense perception only 
gives information of this external world or of 
'physical reality' indirectly, we can only grasp 
the latter by speculative means. It follows from 
this that our notions of physical reality can 
never be final. We must always be ready to change 
these notions - that is to say, the axiomatic sub-
structure of physics - in order to do justice to 
perceived facts in the most logically perfect 
way" . 
For Einstein, then, our inability to know the world 'as 
it really is' (a split between the worlds of perception 
and physical reality that can be seen to have roots in 
the idealist philosophy of Kant, 1787) meant that 
human, non-empirical "speculation" had to be an 
integral part of physics. 
These ideas took even more concrete form through the 
development of quantum theory, which challenged the 
conventional separation of the observer from the 
observed by noting that the former cannot help but 
influence the latter. 
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Thus Einstein's assumption (1934) that "the belief in 
an external world independent of the perceiving subject 
is the basis of all natural science" was challenged, 
and the worlds of physical and metaphysical reality 
were seen, not only to meet, but to be inseparable 
(see, for example, Prigogine, 1989). 
Quantum theory consolidated the inevitable role of 
metaphysics in that it involved theorising about the 
existence of sub-atomic particles that are simply not 
directly observable. Thus we have witnessed the 
acknowledgement of a complementarity between physics 
and philosophy which has been expressed most forcefully 
in the seminal works of Bohr (1963), Bohrn (1980) and 
Capra (1983). 
Philosophical inquiry is of course very different, 
methodologically speaking, from that traditionally 
practised by physicists. An understanding that physics 
and philosophy can be complementary has led to the 
conduct of non-empirical analyses into issues that bear 
heavily on the subject matter of physics but are seen 
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as metaphysical. An example, in the work of Bohm 
(1980), is the ontological relationship consciousness 
and memory have to the physical world. Previously, 
empirical experimentation was considered to be the only 
valid form of inquiry in physics. 
We see that over half a century of exploring 
metaphysics has led to a move away from traditional 
isolationism. However, as noted before in the 
discussion of biology, although an understanding of 
metaphysics challenges the view that human beings have 
no input into theories other than through assembling 
empirical information into patterns, it does not affect 
the dominant perspective of epistemological value-
neutrality. 
Therefore the possibility of using heuristic and 
emancipatory working methods that recognise the value-
laden contexts of knowledge, and focus on inquiry into, 
and intervention in, the social applications of 
physical knowledges, has not, as far as I am aware, 
become an issue in mainstream physics. 
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9.6 Isolationism in Sociology 
The discipline of sociology is very different however. 
When it comes to the study of social phenomena, 
knowledge is often seen to have normative, ideological 
and/or subjective contexts. 
For example, while some explorations of 
can be conducted as if they were purely 
gathering exercises (e.g., finding 
registered as unemployed, how long 
unemployment 
information-
out who is 
they remain 
registered, etc.), this information is often only seen 
as meaningful in relation to questions about the 
nature of work, the social distribution of wealth, the 
choice of indices of unemployment, etc. All of these 
questions involve overtly normative, often ideological, 
sometimes subjective understandings and choices. 
Because of this, the debate about methodology and 
associated philosophy has been conducted at a very 
sophisticated level in sociology, with many theoretical 
and methodological variations emerging. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) offer an interesting 
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framework within which all these approaches can be 
viewed in relation to each other. They identify four 
broad themes: functionalism (characterised as objective 
and regulative), interpretivism (seen as subjective and 
regulative), radical structuralism (viewed as objective 
but concerned with radical change) and radical humanism 
(seen as subjective and concerned with radical change). 
Perhaps because the meanings of sociological knowledges 
are more likely to be viewed as having an explicitly 
normative or subjective component than biological ones, 
the non-neutral epistemological positions have assumed 
as much mainstream credibility as those with roots in 
value-neutral epistemology. 
On first sight, then, there would 
isolationism in sociology. However, 
seem to be no 
a closer look 
reveals that, just because credibility is 
the various approaches, this does not 
pluralism is embraced. 
granted to 
mean that 
For some there is simply a 
atheoretical) acceptance that 
'pragmatic' (i.e., 
people work from 
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different perspectives, and that they can all produce 
equally 
validity. 
convincing arguments 
These people do not 
for epistemological 
cross traditional 
paradigmatic boundaries, but simply 'live and let 
live' . 
For others there are both theoretical and ideological 
reasons for resisting pluralism. Let us look at the 
argument put forward by Jackson and Carter (1990a,b), 
who follow Foucault (1971) and Cooper and Burrell 
(1988) in emphasising that the development of knowledge 
cannot be separated from the development of power 
structures as evolved through both personal 
relationships and institutions. 
Jackson and Carter fix upon an early 
pluralism advanced by Reed (1985) in 
conception 
which it 
of 
is 
suggested that we should reunify science. This, Jackson 
and Carter argue, would be a dangerous move because, as 
things currently stand, scientists who defy 
epistemological convention can still practice in their 
own (largely independent) research communities. In this 
way they can generate alternative viewpoints. If 
science were reunified, they claim, there would be no 
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independent institutions to resist domination by a 
single viewpoint. 
For Jackson and Carter, pluralism merely masks 
repression under a veneer of democracy. A summary of my 
thoughts about this view can be found in the notes at 
the end of this chapter. These largely concentrate on 
the observation that Jackson and Carter identify a 
relatively immature conception of pluralism to attack, 
and that a more advanced understanding takes account of 
their argument 4 . 
Suffice it to say that, for one reason or another, most 
sociologists have not embraced pluralism. It is perhaps 
appropriate to observe that the various approaches 
outlined by Burrell and Morgan (1979) are generally 
thought of as incommensurable paradigms, none of which 
embrace a multi-faceted epistemology that could allow a 
contextualisation of different working methods. Thus 
isolationism does still exist in the practice of most 
individual sociologists. 
While there is an anti-isolationist strand of opinion 
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in sociology (e.g., in the work of Bruscaglioni, 1982, 
and De Masi, 1987), this is largely a pragmatic 
movement in which the necessity of developing an 
adequate vision of ontology and/or epistemology to 
underpin pluralism has, as far as I am aware, not been 
addressed in any great detail. Until it is, their work 
will inevitably appear theoretically contradictory. 
9.7 Isolationism in Psychology 
The discipline of psychology offers a contrasting 
picture to biology, physics and sociology, as it 
embraces diverse areas of inquiry ranging from neuro-
chemistry to the understanding of problem solving, from 
psycho-social development to the promotion of 
organizational change! Anybody who is not aware of the 
history of psychology might be forgiven for expecting 
there to be a correspondingly large variety of 
methodological approaches within the mainstream. 
However, this is not the case. When mainstream 
psychology moved away from introspection and toward 
the experimental method, researchers were struggling to 
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have the discipline recognised as a science. Given the 
dominance of physics, chemistry and biology, which were 
promising to deliver great advances in technology and 
living standards, it is hardly surprising that the 
concepts of validity and empirical, 
science were closely associated. 
value-neutral 
Of course those areas most amenable to the traditional 
experimental method were precisely those which were not 
obviously dependent on ideological, normative or 
subjective contexts for their meanings. Thus, for most 
of the 20th Century, value-neutral epistemologists have 
dominated psychology, and areas of inquiry which were 
seen as interventionary or ideological were ruled as 
scientifically invalid. 
Major theories and practices, such as psychoanalysis, 
were marginalised. Despite the fact that important 
thinkers like Freud, Jung and Klein have had a 
considerable influence on the way many people 
understand individual and group dynamics, they have had 
little credibility in much mainstream psychology. 
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Even when methods based on self-report questionnaires 
have been developed, the authors have rarely recognised 
that they are actually creating tools to help us build 
pictures of the internal worlds of individuals. 
It is usually said that questionnaire scores are 
objective measures of some personal characteristic 
(introversion, extroversion, neurosis, etc.). If we 
think about it, however, they are perhaps more 
appropriately seen as quantifications of aspects of the 
subjective, internal worlds of individuals which can be 
used to make a well-founded claim about a 
characteristic thought of as objective. By seeing the 
method as through-and-through objective, the subjective 
element is denied and therefore placed beyond possible 
critical appraisal. 
It is no wonder, then, that the research mentioned in 
Chapter 3, which showed that no supposedly objective 
measure can distinguish between a rating of high self-
esteem and a rating of the wish to be seen to have high 
self-esteem (Kenny, 1956; Cowan and Tongas, 1959; Cowan 
et aI, 1960) was 'buried' in the literature, unrefuted 
but largely unread. To have tackled the issue raised 
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by these authors would have seriously threatened the 
dominant thinking about how knowledge should always be 
seen as remaining independent of the knowing subject. 
Recently, however, occupational psychologists in 
particular have become increasingly interested in 
issues of organizational change, not just as 
'observers' but as agents of that change. They have 
therefore had problems with experimental working 
methods that do not explicitly recognise the 
subjective, normative and ideological meanings of 
intervention by the researcher. 
However, marginalisation of these modern concerns is 
not so easy. Occupational psychologists are addressing 
problems faced in industry that have a real impact on 
production, the environment and quality of life, so 
they now have some powerful allies with access to 
financial resources. For the first time calls to move 
away from a value-neutral epistemology (see Hollway, 
1989, for a strong recent example) are receiving 
serious attention in mainstream psychology. 
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Even if authors do not always explicitly link the 
epistemological/methodological issue to the industrial 
and environmental contexts within which much of their 
research takes place, it is a plausible possibility 
that the seriousness with which the issue is now being 
taken is connected with the demands of these powerful 
research partners (it is difficult to call industrial 
organisations "subjects"!). 
It may be that value-neutral epistemologists, who still 
constitute the majority in psychology, will head off 
the interpretive/humanist challenge, but it is also a 
possibility that psychology is heading for a similar 
epistemological/methodological debate to that which has 
already been conducted in sociology, and which has 
recently dominated thinking about methodology in 
systems science (the focus of attention in the next 
section) . 
That this possibility is real is evidenced by the fact 
that the anti-isolationist, sociological works of 
Bruscaglioni (1982) and De Masi (1987) have begun to 
influence some occupational psychologists, most notably 
Francescato (1989, 1991, 1992). 
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As mentioned in the discussion of sociology, this 
movement has not yet explored the full ramifications of 
pluralism, but the very fact that the issue of 
isolationism has surfaced amongst psychologists at all 
suggests that value-explicit working methods are 
already becoming established alongside those 
traditionally seen as value-neutral. 
9.8 Isolationism in Systems Science 
As both Jackson (1982) and Flood (1989a) have pointed 
out, in systems science the main philosophical and 
methodological debate that has dominated the last 
decade has been this conflict between authors sticking 
to value-neutral epistemological positions (in 
terms these can be seen to underpin the 
systems 
hard 
methodologies), and those taking an interpretive, non-
neutral (soft) lineS. 
In addition there has been a recent growing interest in 
the development of an explicitly emancipatory 
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(humanist, non-neutral) approach, typified by Ulrich's 
development of critical systems heuristics (1983). 
As in psychology, those of a neutral epistemological 
persuasion are still in the ascendancy. However, unlike 
psychologists as yet, many systems scientists have 
found themselves deeply entrenched in one or other side 
of the philosophical debate between hard and soft 
thinkers. In other words endemic isolationism has 
become deeply problematic in systems science. 
Flood (1989a) claims, in my view rightly, that the 
tendency for most people to characterise their own 
position as the only valid one has caused a degree of 
stagnation and disillusion in systems thinking which it 
is essential to overcome if researchers are to continue 
to aim for a flexible and responsive research practice 
that still acknowledges the value of theory. 
While sociologists, for example, have also had to enter 
this debate in a serious way, room has been made in the 
mainstream for all the principle positions, with 
proponents of each agreeing to disagree. However, 
within systems thinking, the degree to which the debate 
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has become bogged down in a particularly defensive form 
of isolationism has become extremely worrying to some 
(e.g., Flood, 1989a, as well as myself). 
Unfortunately there is so little connection between 
both the theories and practices of the hard and soft 
thinkers that they can almost be seen as working in 
separate disciplines. 
Perhaps, then, this is the nub of the problem: in 
systems science the ideal of the unity of science is 
expressed holistically - systems scientists tend to 
maintain that the disciplinary boundaries that divide 
the traditional sciences from one another prevent the 
effective development of knowledges, many of which do 
not sit comfortably within any single discipline. As a 
result of accepting such a broad vision of inquiry, the 
need to seek objective knowledge inevitably rubs 
against the need to deal with knowledges which are seen 
as normative or subjective. 
Not one of the traditional paradigms in systems science 
can deal with this friction without coming up against 
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anomalies (Flood, 1990a). 
9.9 Isolationism and Subject Matter 
So, as suggested at the beginning of the chapter, a 
theme of this overview begins to emerge. We cannot help 
but observe that the form isolationism takes in each 
discipline is related to its subject matter. 
When disciplines restrict the scope of their inquiries 
to the search for what are seen as objective knowledges 
of the physical world, experimental methods that assume 
value-neutrality are considered the only legitimate 
forms of scientific practice. 
The prime example of this is biology. A second example 
is psychology, in which psychologists have been able to 
defend the value-neutral epistemological position 
against challenges until fairly recently when the 
disciplinary boundaries began to change to include 
inquiries that have a quite obvious social context. 
In other disciplines, such as sociology, where 
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knowledges are regularly seen as normative, ideological 
or subjective, interpretive and emancipatory methods 
that assume epistemological non-neutrality begin to 
emerge to sit alongside the traditional value-neutral 
ones. 
In these cases, because the approaches are regarded as 
constituting separate paradigms which can all claim 
validity but are viewed as incommensurable, scientists 
still engage in isolationist practice. There has only 
been a limited movement towards pluralism. 
However, when the inevitability of metaphysics becomes 
an important issue, as in the case of physics, 
isolationism does, to a limited extent, become 
problematic, and a complementarity between empirical 
and non-empirical working methods is sought. However, 
value-neutral isolationism (the proscribing of value-
explicit methods) is not challenged in these 
circumstances. 
Now we can make a very broad observation. It seems 
that, when the subject of investigation is what we see 
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as the natural world, epistemological value-neutrality 
is largely taken for granted, but when the subject 
matter is seen to derive its meaning from social 
context, then both value-neutral and value-explicit 
epistemologies (and associated methods) are seen to 
have validity6. 
9.10 The Trouble with Isolationism 
At this point the central argument of the chapter 
begins to take shape. Given the intimate link between 
subject areas and working methods, if we wish to hold 
to the ideal of the unity of science in which, for the 
traditional scientist, disciplinary specialisations are 
regarded as complementary, we must accept the use of a 
full range of working methods. 
Similarly, if we wish to follow the holistic road to 
the unity of science, we cannot do this by 
marginalising or invalidating areas of study by 
adherence to a limited methodology. A whole range of 
potential knowledges simply become unavailable for 
development if we limit ourselves in such a way. 
212 
To give an 
hypothetical 
subject area 
example, we can consider the case 
biologist who wishes to venture into 
of sociology, but believes that 
of a 
the 
only 
methods assuming value-neutrality can be considered as 
valid. 
In these circumstances the sociological knowledges s/he 
can obtain will necessarily be restricted to those that 
can be gained through experimental, 'non-
interventionary' work alone. This represents a 
restriction of both knowledges and interests that, in 
my view, has to be seen as unacceptable to scientists 
in the light of our wish to pursue the ideal of the 
unity of science7 . 
Of course a sociologist who isolates him or herself 
within the functionalist paradigm could argue, quite 
legitimately, that his or her practice is not at odds 
with that of our hypothetical biologist, and that the 
other sociological paradigms should simply be 
disregarded. We must recognise that, in the terms set 
by isolationist functionalists, this is a valid 
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counter-argument. 
However, I do not see my task as the invalidation of 
isolationism. As I argued in Chapters 7 and 8, 
isolationists of any persuasion can object to pluralism 
in their own terms. Rather, I want to press home the 
point that all isolationist positions are impoverished, 
or lack legitimacy, given our current need for a 
flexible and responsive research practice. What this 
"current need" is will be fleshed out in coming 
chapters. 
There is a difference between saying that something is 
impoverished, or lacks legitimacy, and saying that it 
is untenable. My view is that isolationist practices 
can be maintained without internal contradiction, but 
that they are all severely limited given our present 
needs. 
9.11 Reflection on the Disciplinary and Systems Views 
We have already seen how method and subject area are 
intimately linked, yet isolationism has only rarely 
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been considered problematic in the disciplinary 
sciences. Even when it has, central questions such as 
how we might develop an adequate vision of ontology 
and/or epistemology to underpin pluralism have not been 
addressed [except, in a very limited sense, by Bohr 
(1963) in the discipline of physics]. 
From this we have to reach the unfortunate conclusion 
that most disciplinary scientists are unaware of, or 
put aside any concern they might have about, the ways 
that mutually supportive method- and subject-
isolationism restrict their knowledges and interests. 
On the other hand, isolationism has been considered 
extremely problematic in systems science, which refuses 
to recognise disciplinary boundaries defined by subject 
matter. In systems science, knowledges of the physical 
world, seen as value-neutral, often rub against those 
with an obvious social context, seen as value-laden. 
For many systems scientists isolationism has become 
deeply divisive, with people becoming entrenched in one 
of the hard/soft/emancipatory positions and ending up 
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sniping at each other. This destructive effect raises 
some quite disturbing questions: 
Is this divisive isolationism in systems science an 
inevitable consequence of trying to take on too broad a 
range of interests? 
Is pursuit of the ideal of the unity of science, 
however laudable in theory, necessarily doomed to be 
counter-productive in systems science because it is not 
possible to develop a set of ontological and/or 
epistemological ideas that are capable of dealing with 
all the anomalies that arise when different kinds of 
inquiry rub against each other? 
The answer 
refuse to 
to these questions is only "yes" if we 
accept the possibility of pluralism. 
Pluralism actually legitimises both systems science and 
pursuit of the ideal of the unity of science (through 
either the holistic or complementarity routes). 
The only qualification I feel we must make at this 
stage is that, in my view (which will be explained 
later), the ontological and epistemological back-bone 
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of pluralism (Q philosophy that is capable of dealing 
with all the anomalies that arise when different kinds 
of inquiry rub against each other) is not yet 
sufficiently well developed. 
It is the purpose of the latter half of this thesis to 
begin to address what I see as this need for 
ontological and epistemological development. 
9.12 Conclusion 
Now we begin to see why both this chapter, and the 
whole thesis, has been titled Unity and Pluralism. One 
of my central contentions is that unity, in terms of 
the ideal of the unity of science, and pluralism, in 
terms of recognising the legitimacies and limitations 
of all working methods, have to be appreciated as 
interdependent. 
Not only this, but the pursuit of both is dependent on 
the establishment of a credible ontology and/or 
epistemology that is capable of dealing with all the 
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anomalies that arise when different kinds of inquiry 
rub against each other. 
We say we are committed to pursuit of the ideal of the 
unity of science, but this could only be a vague 
generalisation with little practical meaning if it did 
not take into account the legitimate uses of a wide 
range of methodologies (pluralism). 
However, pluralism would mean nothing more than 
accepting that different isolationist positions exist 
in parallel if we could not build a theoretically 
coherent, unified but multi-faceted, vision of ontology 
and/or epistemology. 
In this chapter we have begun to answer the question, 
"why pluralism?" in terms of pursuing the ideal of a 
unified science. In the next chapter I intend to ask 
why we should be interested in either. This will 
inevitably mean expanding upon my claim that 
isolationism prevents us pursuing the ideal of 
unrestricted knowledges and interests. 
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Notes 
1. The only authors I have come across who have argued 
against pursuing the ideal of the unity of science are 
Jackson and Carter (1990a,b). However, they mak€ the 
assumption that such a vision of unity is necessarily 
positivistic in character (i.e., the sole task of 
science is to pursue a single Grand Truth). I hope that 
this chapter makes it clear that I believe such a 
positivistic 'unification' of science to be a 
contradiction in terms. 
2. It would be a mistake to assume that this argument 
relies upon being able to know in absolute terms when 
knowledges and interests are being restricted. In order 
to have such absolute knowledge we would have to "know 
everything and know that it is valid" (Flood, 1990a) in 
advance of thinking about the restrictions. If we did 
indeed "know everything", then there would be no 
restrictions in the first place! 
3. Following Flood (1990a), I believe it is important 
to be aware that the move from an explicitly 
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reductionist to a more holistic science does not 
reflect a shift away from the paradigms of 
functionalism and structuralism in the thinking of most 
scientists. While most people now recognise that some 
phenomena can only be understood as emergent properties 
of whole systems, it is still the structure and 
function of these systems that is considered to be 
important. That this is the case within biology is 
highlighted by Sheldrake's observation (1985) that the 
research practices of reductionist and holistic 
biologists is, for all intents and purposes, identical. 
4. This is a powerful argument but, as I have 
suggested, it is one that sets up an early, rather 
limited conception of pluralism as a straw doll to 
knock down. You will notice that in this thesis I talk 
about pursuing the ideal of a unification of science, 
rather than full unification in terms of institutions. 
I would argue that, while pluralism demands an open and 
conciliatory attitude to other people, it also demands 
personal commitment to critically developed beliefs. 
Respect for others, the generation of diversity, and 
commitment to critically appraised beliefs do not 
necessarily work in opposition to each other within a 
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wider systemic picture of a pluralist research process. 
5. Although Checkland (1981) and other interpretive 
systems thinkers talk about the researcher remaining 
neutral when facilitating debate, they are not using 
the term "neutral" in the same sense as I am here. Soft 
systems thinkers take a non-neutral line in the sense 
that they see knowledge as being the 'property' of 
groups and individuals. It is not, to use Popper's 
words (1972), "knowledge without a knowing subject". 
6. In talking about explorations of the natural world 
and explorations of knowledges that are seen to have 
obvious social contexts, I am explicitly trying avoid 
the classic distinction between the natural and social 
sciences because it appears to me that this division is 
an artificial one that is epistemologically 
impoverished. For example, it is quite possible to 
study social relationships as 'natural' phenomena, and 
conversely, because we can only discuss 'natural' 
phenomena as human beings perceive them, these can also 
be seen as 'social constructs'. That this is 
problematic for all the traditional epistemological 
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positions becomes apparent when we examine a discipline 
like sociology where both phenomena seen to be 
objectively factual and phenomena with an obvious 
social context are studied. In order to maintain 
theoretical coherence, sociologists working from these 
traditional perspectives have to content themselves 
with separation from others in isolationist paradigms. 
7. Of course this argument against isolationism already 
presupposes that it is possible to achieve an adequate 
ontology and/or epistemology to support pluralism. If 
this were not possible, far from restricting knowledges 
and interests, isolationism (of one kind or another) 
would have to be seen as essential in order to avoid 
the acceptance of knowledges that cannot be validated 
by whatever criterion is considered appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 10: ONTOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 
Having established the need for pluralism in terms of 
pursuing the ideal of the unity of sCience, which is 
generally seen as a cornerstone of both the 
disciplinary and systems sciences, it might be useful 
to take a further step back and ask, not only "why 
pluralism?", but also "why the ideal of the unity of 
science?". 
10.1 Interdependence 
In the coming chapter I want to argue that there has 
been a recent revolution in our thinking about the 
nature of the global problems that we are facing. It is 
revolutionary, not so much because new problems are 
emerging, but because concepts that have previollsly 
been seen as separate have now come to be viewed as 
essentially dependent upon one another. 
Take, for example, the concepts of ecological harmony, 
social justice and individual freedom. Traditionally, 
ecological harmony has been seen in terms of balanced 
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ecosystems. Social justice has usually been seen in 
terms of social power and money relationships, 
encompassing issues like the distribution of wealth 
between various social groups and individuals, the 
explicit reward and prohibition of peoples' ideas and 
actions, and inclusion and exclusion from social 
activities. Individual freedom, on the other hand, has 
normally been thought of as maximisation of choice. 
These concepts are now coming to be seen as 
interdependent rather than as conflicting ideals which 
have to be played off one against the other. 
It is clear that a world of interdependent problems 
cannot be dealt with effectively by a fragmentary 
science. Over the coming pages I want to demonstrate 
this interdependence by taking these three concepts 
(ecological harmony, social justice and personal 
freedom) and showing how they come together in the new 
analysis. 
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10.2 Linking Social Justice and Ecological Harmony 
Let us look first at what is now widely seen as an 
ecological crisis that we have brought upon the planet. 
A plethora of ecological problems seem to be facing us: 
the "greenhouse effect", atmospheric ozone depletion, 
"acid rain", industrial pollution affecting the food 
chain, the increasingly rapid consumption of non-
renewable resources, etc. 
We can say that those who participate in mainstream 
production and consumption within the industrialised 
areas of the world, and those whose production systems 
have been conditioned by the demands of people ｾｮ＠ these 
areas, have been treating natural resources as if they 
were infinite, and as if their consumption has no other 
effect than improving human life-styles. 
All our traditional models of economic growth hav€ been 
based on what we are now seeing as an essentially 
erroneous set of assumptions. We are beginning to 
appreciate that many of the resources that we have 
taken for granted are not going to run out in some 
future mythical age when technology will have advanced 
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so far that people will have evolved alternatives, but 
that the development of much modern technology is 
itself part of the ecological problem. 
Broadly speaking, in industrial economies, 
technological innovation tends to increase the energy-
intensiveness of an enterprise and reduces its labour-
intensiveness. People are supposedly freed for new 
activities but, because of pressure for further 
innovation and economic growth, this 'spare time' is 
eaten up by new work initiatives which perpetuate the 
cycle of increasing consumption. 
Furthermore, the traditional view of economic growth 
has proven to be very short-sighted. While industry 
grows in the present through consumption of non-
renewable resources, this not only prevents future 
industry from using those resources, but polluting 
industrial by-products can often cause unpredictable 
environmental and economic harm. For a far-sighted 
review of these issues, see McBurney (1990). 
To turn to the theme of social justice, we can identify 
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a number of issues which have a close relationship with 
these ecological problems and our potential capacity to 
solve them. 
For example, many Third World countries are still 
pursuing the goal of traditional economic growth in 
order to improve the living standards of their 
Several writers (e.g., Vittachi, 1990 and Shiva, 
have pointed out the hypocrisy of First 
people. 
1990) 
World 
commentators who refuse to look at the issue of justice 
and simply say that Third World countries must limit 
their growth for fear of worsening the ecological 
crisis. 
These First World commentators seek to deny material 
wealth to others while retaining their own, and the 
ecological argument is used to perpetuate injustice. 
Shiva (1990) is almost certainly right when she points 
out that Third World countries like India and China 
will simply not accept any restriction on non-
sustainable growth while this hypocrisy continues. 
Both Shiva and Vittachi argue that it is the 
responsibility of the industrialised world, which is 
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still by far the greatest polluter and consumer of non-
renewable resources, to redistribute wealth and adjust 
to ecologically harmonious life-styles first. Only 
then will countries that have continually suffered 
economic injustice be willing to develop in a 
sustainable manner. 
Clearly, on a global scale, justice and ecology are 
intimately linked. The rich and powerful can no longer 
turn to the poor and powerless and say, like a parent 
to a child, "don't worry, you'll grow out of it". Nor 
can the First World say "we can't afford to let you 
grow" . 
The Third World is only being treated like a dependent 
child because of the economic power of the First, and 
people in the Third World will not suffer such 
injustice for long. In this new era, only by addressing 
injustice can both First and Third Worlds stay healthy. 
This example shows how the achievement of ecological 
harmony may well depend upon dealing with injustice, 
but the link operates both ways. The very relevance of 
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the concept of justice may depend, in many instances, 
on appreciating the need for ecological harmony. 
After all, if justice within the sphere of industrial 
relations is only seen in terms of the power and money 
relationships between employees and their employers, 
then this completely ignores the long-term potential 
for some industries to obliterate the power structures 
and material wealth of both groups (perhaps, in some 
industries, along with the people themselves!). 
10.3 Linking in Personal Freedom 
Also intimately linked with these themes is the concept 
of personal freedom. Freedom, that is, from the 
repression and mis-direction of emotion and the 
acceptance of ideologies that prevent critical 
thinking. In short, freedom from restrictions of 
creativity. 
This is, of course, an expanded definition of personal 
freedom that goes beyond thinking about the simple 
maximisation of choice to encompass the necessary 
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conditions for choice (freedom from ignorance and 
emotional repression). 
Clearly, the very life and livelihood of the individual 
is dependent on him or her successfully living within a 
sustainable ecology and a just society. However, we 
also find that personal freedom, as defined above, is a 
prerequisite for the achievement of ecological harmony 
and social justice. 
Over the coming pages, it might be useful to draw 
loosely upon the philosophy of Foucault (e.g., 1980) 
and the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud (e.g., 1915) 
in order to understand this better. 
The knowledge that is held and valued by groups and 
individuals must playa key part in supporting unjust 
and ecologically unsustainable social systems. Let us 
consider just three discourses which are dominant 
today and help support our unsustainable course into 
the future: 
There is the mainstream discourse of automation, which 
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assumes the replacement of labour with increased energy 
consumption to be beneficial; there is "economic 
growth", which assumes near infinite resources; and 
then there is international debt, which assumes that 
repayment to financial institutions of all loans is an 
inviolable right, thus ensuring that the net 
international redistribution of wealth runs, on 
average, from the poor to the rich. These are just 
three of many discourses which allow destructive 
aspects of the social system to perpetuate themselves. 
When knowledges that inform counter-discourses and 
encourage liberation are suppressed, what is the 
position of the individual? The individual must 
inevitably contribute her or his energies to the 
continuing perpetuation of the system. There must be 
alternative knowledges and discourses available before 
problems can be recognised and change effectively 
enacted. 
This is a similar argument to that proposed by Foucault 
(1980), whose central thesis is that knowledge and 
power are intimately linked, and that discourses can be 
marginalised and suppressed by "non-discursive 
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subjugators" (see my review of Foucault's theory of 
power and knowledge in Chapter 6). Because of this 
marginalisation of discourses, Foucault sees the 
liberation of suppressed knowledges as the primary tool 
for change. 
However, while the word "discourse" implies shared 
knowledge assumptions and rules for communication, 
there is a sense in which knowledge can be said to 
belong to individuals. We all have a strong, conscious 
sense of "my knowledge" and "his or her knowledge" 
which, maybe because it is centred in the individual 
(either the self or another), is differentiated from 
knowledge that is thought of as generally shared. Kelly 
(1970) puts this in strong terms: 
"Persons differ from each other in their 
constructions of events. Having assumed that 
construction is a personal affair, it seems 
unlikely that any two persons would ever happen to 
concoct identical systems. I would go further ... 
and suggest that even particular constructions are 
never identical events. And I would extend it the 
other way too, and say that I doubt that two 
persons ever put their construction systems 
together in terms of the same logical 
relationships". 
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While I would follow Holland (1970) in arguing that it 
is important not to over-emphasise individual knowledge 
to the detriment of understanding shared knowledges, it 
is worth pointing out the value of an awareness of the 
individual. 
Not only does each individual have a unique position as 
a nexus for the meeting and critique of different 
discourses, but we also each have a unique relationship 
with the natural world. While this is informed, and our 
knowledge of it is defined, by socially learned 
meanings, it nevertheless shapes the individual 
perception of shared knowledge. 
Thus an individual's creativity, born out of his or her 
unique position in the natural world, can, through 
communication, eventually transform the shared meanings 
themselves, and thereby initiate action to change the 
social system. 
So, when Foucault talks about fighting against the 
subjugation of knowledges, he has identified an 
essential prerequisite for the achievement of both 
social justice and ecological harmony. The personal 
233 
freedom to be creative, and individual freedom to pick 
up new (or old and buried) knowledges, are both 
essential for the initiation of change. 
Within the individual, understandings that stymie 
creativity and the search for knowledge (such as 
adherence to a view of science that proscribes all but 
one or two methods of inquiry) represent a lack of 
personal freedom (often imposed internally, but having 
roots in the wider system) that must be recognised and 
dealt with. 
But this is by no means the end of the story. We can 
turn to Freud (e.g., 1915) for another perspective on 
individual freedom. As well as challenging the 
subjugation of knowledges, perhaps there is also a need 
for freedom from the repression, mis-representation and 
mis-direction of emotions. Freud describes the mis-
direction of affect (emotion) as follows: 
"It may happen that an affective or emotional 
impulse is perceived but misconstrued. Owing to 
the repression of its proper representative it has 
been forced to become connected with another idea, 
and is now regarded by consciousness as the 
manifestation of that idea". 
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Freud also identifies three other possibilities for the 
existence and awareness of affect: 
"Either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as 
ｩｾ＠ is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively 
dlfferent quota of affect, above all into anxiety; 
or it is suppressed, i.e. it is prevented from 
developing at all... We know, too, that to 
suppress the development of affect is the true aim 
of repression and that its work is incomplete if 
this aim is not achieved". 
By "repression", Freud means the unconscious self-
subjugation of ideas and feelings that, because of 
previous life experiences, are felt as threatening. 
Just as discourses that restrict creativity and 
exploration can become installed in the individual, so 
can destructive patterns of emotion. 
Emotion has been seriously neglected by many thinkers. 
Habermas (1972), for example, makes a persuasive 
argument for the inextricable binding together of the 
concepts of knowledge and human interests (as touched 
upon in Chapter 5). This involves an understanding that 
our basic human interests direct the search for 
knowledges, and yet the relationships we maintain 
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between these interests are based upon the knowledges 
we already have. 
However, emotions help us to prioritise our interests, 
not only in the long-term when passionate feelings 
sustain our stamina for lengthy, drawn out campaigns, 
but in the short-term when there is no time for 
rational self-reflection and an instant reaction is 
called for. 
Emotion must surely be seen as having an essential two-
way relationship with knowledges and human interests. 
Feelings help to prioritise our interests, and 
knowledges, both conscious and unconscious, inform our 
ways of feeling. 
We see that a prerequisite for the promotion of 
personal freedom is movement towards ecological harmony 
and social justice, both of which, if ignored limit 
life and freedom. 
Similarly, the promotion of personal freedom is a 
prerequisite for the creation of new social ways of 
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(generally seen to be the province of biologists) be 
related to social justice (normally the province of 
sociologists) in any informed and satisfactory manner? 
10.5 Systems Science and Complexity 
Now, it has been suggested that the very purpose of 
systems science is to deal with complexity (see, for 
example, Flood and Carson, 1988). One could also argue 
that a set of disciplinary sciences embracing the ideal 
of unification through complementarity have a similar 
purpose. 
However, I would like to suggest that the 
interdependence of concepts like ecological harmony, 
social justice and personal freedom implies a 
qualitatively different kind of complexity than that 
which systems science is normally seen to address. In 
order to point up the differences between my own view 
and the traditional systems scientific understanding, 
it might be productive to offer a brief review of the 
latter. Much of this review has been developed from the 
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being that are ecologically sustainable and just. The 
three ideas (ecological harmony, social justice and 
personal freedom) are essentially linked and, while 
they can be appreciated as independent concepts, 
concentration on one to the complete exclusion of the 
other two must inevitably lead to us painting an 
impoverished picture of the world. 
10.4 Complexity and the Ideal of the Unity of Science 
Given the complexity of the problems we and future 
generations seem to be facing (so that 
discrete issues such as the promotion of 
previously 
ecological 
harmony, social justice and personal freedom now come 
to be seen as intimately linked), any research practice 
that we propose to adopt must be capable of addressing 
all our concerns and interrelating them when nec€ssary. 
As so many systems scientists have argued over the 
years, it is quite clear that a fragmentary science 
would simply be incapable of doing this. If 
disciplinary separation were to be regarded as 
absolute, how, for example, could ecological harmony 
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arguments of Flood (1987) and Flood and Carson (1988). 
10.5.1 The II People II Aspect of Complexity 
It is generally accepted that complexity must be more 
than lithe quantity of relationships between things". 
One potential, alternative definition might be "the 
quantity of relationships between things in relation to 
the human capacity to handle an amount of information". 
Thus a system is called "simple" if all perceived 
relationships can be appreciated by the observer, and 
"complex" if they cannot. 
That complexity is as much about "people" as "things" 
has long been recognised. Indeed, Ashby (1973) gives a 
wonderful illustration of this, which is summed up 
neatly by Klir (1985): 
"To the neurophysiologist the brain, as a feltwork 
of fibres and a soup of enzymes, is certainly 
complex; and equally the transmission of a 
detailed description of it would require much 
time. To a butcher the brain is simple, for he has 
to distinguish it from only about thirty other 
meats" . 
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10.5.2 The "Things" Aspect of Complexity 
Nevertheless, because relationships between "people" 
and "things" have generally been thought about in a 
manner that assumes ontological realism, the main focus 
of systems science has been on "things", and the 
"people" aspect has been subsumed within this. 
What I mean by this is that both "people" and "things" 
are considered to have an objective reality "out 
there": it is therefore considered legitimate to talk 
about "our understanding of relationships between 
things" rather than "our understanding of different 
aspects of our understanding", which would be our focus 
if we were to assume ontological idealism. In the 
latter case, "things" are a property of "people", but, 
in the former (ontologically realist) case, we talk 
about relationships between "people" and "things" as if 
both were "things".l 
This ontologically realist language of complexity is 
common in systems science. Weaver (1948), for example, 
differentiated between three "ranges" of complexity: 
240 
organised simplicity, organised complexity, and 
disorganised complexity. 
Organised simplicity is when investigation reveals 
simple 
perhaps 
organisation behind a 'facade' of compl€xity; 
the complexity can be reduced to a few dyadic 
relationships. Disorganised complexity is when one has 
to deal with a high degree of randomness. In contrast 
with both of these, organised complexity refers to 
situations where things follow an identifiable pattern, 
but the information cannot be reduced very far without 
a significant impoverishment of understanding. 
Here, then, we have "things as objective reality" that 
are linguistically separated from the understanding of 
the observer: "the complexity can be reduced 
to .... dyadic relationships"; "one has to deal 
with .... randomness"; "things follow .... a pattern, but 
the information cannot be reduced". 
Such language has been developed to the point where the 
"people" aspect of complexity receives only nominal 
recognition. Yates (1978), for example, sees complexity 
arising when one or more of the following are found: 
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significant interactions; high numbers of parts, 
degrees of freedom or interactions; nonlinearity; 
broken symmetry; nonholonomic constraints. Only the 
word "significant" in the first of these betrays the 
presence of the "people" aspect of complexity. 
10.6 A New Understanding of Complexity 
Now, I have suggested that the interdependence of 
concepts like ecological harmony, social justice and 
personal freedom (discussed in the previous chapter) 
implies a qualitatively different kind of complexity 
than that which systems science is normally seen to 
address. 
We might call the concept of complexity usually used by 
systems scientists natural world complexity. That is, 
as defined earlier, complexity is thought of as the 
quantity of relationships between things in relation to 
the human capacity to handle an amount of information. 
Traditionally, ecosystems can be seen in these "natural 
world" complexity terms. 
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However, given our new understanding of 
interdependence, we really have to ask whether this 
"natural world" vision of complexity is adequate. My 
own view is that it is not. Let me illustrate why with 
reference to our earlier example of interdependence 
between the concepts of ecological harmony, social 
justice and personal freedom. 
If these notions come to be seen as interdependent, 
then the introduction of social justice brings values 
(ideas of what is right and wrong) into the picture. It 
is not enough merely to describe a view of social 
justice in relation to a notion of ecological harmony 
(i.e., make a truth claim about the relationship that 
exists between them in the "natural world"). Such a 
description might be useful, but ultimately human 
beings participate in, rather than just observe, 
reality [see the work of Vickers (e.g. , 1965) for a 
further discussion of this] . We therefore have to 
choose between the different values we might be able to 
hold. We have to make value judgments. How can our 
traditional view of complexity cope with these? 
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Furthermore, if these concepts corne to be seen as 
inseparable from the knowledges and emotional states of 
individuals who have the capacity to change the shape 
of more widely held truth and value judgments, this 
forces us to paint subjectivity into the picture. Thus 
the traditional view of complexity looks even further 
impoverished. 
Yes we can have natural world complexity, in which a 
complex system is seen as one in which the 
relationships between things are beyond adequate human 
comprehension. However we can also have social world 
complexity, which describes the level of our 
understanding 
judgments, and 
of the relationships between value 
the ways in which these have been 
normatively constructed. Furthermore we can have 
internal world complexity, in which the clarity of our 
understanding of an individual's own unique perspective 
(his, hers, yours or mine) is considered. 
Interestingly, 
should look 
Flood (1987) has also proposed that we 
at more than just "natural world" 
complexity. He suggests that complexity in the realm of 
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"people" is qualitatively different from complexity in 
the realm of "things". This is because "people" can see 
"things" in very different ways. However, Flood does 
not separate subjectivity from normative forces as I do 
here. One could perhaps see my own argument as a 
development of Flood's. 
Now, taking the natural, social and internal worlds 
together provides us with a new vision of 
that is more than the sum of the three 
relationships between the three "worlds" 
complexity 
parts. The 
(natural, 
social and internal) can themselves be seen in terms of 
simplicity or complexity, and so we can justifiably 
call this new understanding ontological complexity. 
I would contend that it is the explicit 
ontological complexity that is the 
facing us. 
emergence of 
real challenge 
Later in this thesis I will offer more detailed support 
for describing this meta-level complexity as 
"ontological". In the meantime, however, let us take 
the term as given. 
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10.6 Conclusion 
Now we can complete this chapter with deeper, although 
not final, answers to the questions "why pluralism?" 
and "why the unity of science?" 
Only pluralism, in the way it brings together, on an 
equal footing, methods previously seen as 
incommensurate, can address ontological complexity. The 
different "worlds" require different methods of 
intervention, so pluralism is essential if inquiries 
and interventions in all three worlds are to be drawn 
upon and interrelated as necessary. 
Also, only by pursuing the ideal of the unity of 
science can we explore an extended realm of subject 
matter in which the interrelation of understandings 
drawn from different worlds becomes unproblematic. 
It is these answers that will be deepened further over 
the coming chapters. 
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Notes 
1. I 
about 
am not suggesting here that we shouldn't talk 
people and things as separated, and as if both 
were things. However, I will go on later to argue that 
there is more to complexity. This development will 
necessarily entail a movement away from traditional 
ontological realism (see Chapter 14). 
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CHAPTER 11: ECOLOGY AND THE POVERTY OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE 
The purpose of this chapter is to continue the argument 
started in Chapter 10 and go a little further in 
revealing the possible contexts of our debate about 
pluralism and the unity of science. 
I have already demonstrated how pluralism might be seen 
as a response to a change in the way in which we view 
complexity. I believe we need to move from thinking 
about natural world complexity alone to an 
understanding of a meta-level ontological complexity 
that is more than the sum of the parts of natural world 
complexity, social world complexity and internal world 
complexity. 
In order to conduct that analysis I used an example of 
justice 
closely 
how the concepts of ecological harmony, social 
and individual freedom can be seen as 
interrelated. Each of these concepts brings 
"world" into play, yet to deny validity to 
a new 
the 
discussion of any of them would seriously impoverish 
our understanding. 
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11.1 A History of Western Ideas of Holism 
So, if we are going to deepen the debate furth€r, 
us move beyond the relatively simple questions 
pluralism?" and "why the unity of science?", and 
"why now?". Why has ontological complexity come to 
fore in the latter half of the 20th Century? 
let 
"why 
ask 
the 
In order to answer this question I will need to engage 
in a historical reconstruction of the history of 
systems science. 
Specifically, I want to challenge the assumption that 
systems science is solely a 20th Century phenomenon. 
This 'fact' has rarely been subjected to any deep 
analysis. Van Gigch and Stolliday (1980), for example, 
suggest that the emergence of systems science was a 
result of practitioners of the 'human' sciences 
experiencing difficulties with the methodologies they 
imported from the 'natural' sciences. Like most 
accounts this takes a point of origin for systems 
science in the 20th Century for granted. 
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Even Flood and Carson (1988) devote a paragraph to the 
historical roots of systems science, acknowledging that 
the idea of holism has been around for much longer than 
we might at first think, but do not discuss the 
possible implications of a reconstruction of the 
history of the holistic idea. 
Through an analysis of the history of systems science I 
hope to demonstrate, not only that its key tenets can 
be traced back thousands of years, but that the 
suppression of holism in the 17th Century, and its re-
emergence now, has an ecological context. 
Furthermore, by broadening the boundaries of what we 
consider to be systems science to take in philosophy 
that is usually labelled "pre-scientific", I want to 
demonstrate that the pluralist vision is closely 
attuned to some of the earliest known manifestations of 
Western holism. 
Indeed, it is much more closely attuned to these than 
the work of the systems pioneers of the early and 
middle 20th Century (e.g., Cannon, 1932; Angyal, 1941; 
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Feibleman and Friend, 1945; Wiener, 1948; Bertalanffy, 
1950). We will come to see that these thinkers were 
heavily influenced by the dominant epistemological 
paradigm of their day. 
11.2 Assumptions about History 
Before engaging in this historical reconstruction, I 
need to make clear what assumptions I am making about 
the nature of historical reconstructive activities 
themselves. We should note, for example, that there are 
several possible approaches to history, and each of 
these makes different assumptions. Flood and Gregory 
(1988) identify four such approaches to thinking about 
the history of systems science: 
"(1) Linear sequential - ideas develop linearly, 
that is, history is linear and knowledge is 
cumulative; typically chronological expositions. 
(2) Structuralism - the use of scientific models 
to explain (via their behavioural characteristics 
and so on ... ) the structure and processes of 
history, and the cumulativity of knowledge. 
(3) World-Viewism - the notion of normal science, 
the stress of anomalies and revolutions through 
extraordinary science, and the non-cumulativity of 
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I 
knowledge, that is, it is the world-view that 
changes, and not necessarily incrementally. 
(4) Genealogy - the notion of discursive 
formations, or statements, in the form of networks 
that cut across sentences and other written 
discourses. These discursive formations are 
dynamic, and shaped by power relations extant 
outside of discourse (that is, institutions and 
other bodies) and thus the use of critique in 
seeking truth is important". 
cannot honestly say that my own approach to 
historical reconstruction fits neatly into any of these 
categories. Let me use the language of complexity 
introduced in the last chapter to explain what I mean. 
For me, a history has to be constructed out of truth 
statements. That is, it is a narrative about the 
'natural world'; a description of "what has been" that 
we advance in the spirit of critical thinking. In other 
words, we do not think of it as absolutely true, but it 
aims toward the ideal of truth. 
However, this is not to say that there is no normative 
or subjective construction involved in the production 
of a history. All histories have their social contexts, 
and competing visions of history may emerge. Not only 
this, but the moral stance adopted by an individual or 
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group may well integrate with the vision of history to 
produce a coherent whole. 
Thus, for example, the history of Capitalism offered by 
Marx (1887) differs substantially from any history that 
capitalists 
commitment 
themselves could ever accept. 
to communism is consistent with 
Marx's 
his 
historical analysis as well as the personal 
understandings of all those who have trodden the path 
of socialism. 
We see then that histories are constructed out of truth 
statements about the 'natural world'. Nevertheless, 
each version of history has its particular social 
context, and its unique meaning to individuals. 
In taking this view, the distinctions made by Flood and 
Gregory (1988) between different approaches to history 
become less important than they might at first appear. 
Whether our history is one of cumulative development 
(linear or structural), competition between world 
views, or discursive constitution of truths, it is 
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still told through a narrative of truth statements. 
Like all truth statements, these can be challenged. It 
may be that the author's limited life experiences can 
be shown to have 'distorted' his or her vision of 
history. Similarly, it could be that certain discursive 
(normative) assumptions about the 'right' way history 
should be viewed can be shown to have permeated the 
vision, and that an alternative 'right' way to look at 
things ｾｯｵｬ､＠ provide a different narrative about truth. 
In reconstructing the history of systems science over 
the coming pages I will be producing a narrative 
version of truth myself. However, I must make an open 
declaration of its social meaning in terms of one 
particular contemporary vision of rightness: 
Just as I believe we can show that the characterisation 
of systems science as a 20th Century phenomenon has an 
ecological context, so might the development of this 
historical reconstruction. Perhaps we need it so that 
we can reveal the 'restriction' of early systems 
thinking by a continued acceptance of some of the 
assumptions of traditional scientific discourse. In my 
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view these assumptions now need to be challenged so 
that we can begin to deal more effectively with the 
ontological complexity presented by many of the most 
important issues, especially global issu€s, we 
currently face. 
I believe that it is right to challenge restrictive, 
scientific practices, and right to challenge uncritical 
humanist assumptions in our ways of thinking (see 
Chapter 13 for more details). The historical narrative 
developed in this chapter 'fits' with these views of 
rightness: there is no unilinear 'path' running from 
this vision of truth to this view of rightness, nor is 
there a unilinear path running from rightness to truth 
- the two are in a mutually supportive systemic 
relationship. 
11.3 Assumptions about Science 
There is also a second assumption that needs to be 
declared before I start this historical reconstruction. 
In saying that systems science has roots stretching 
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back beyond the 20th Century, and that it is not 
productive to boundary our understanding of the history 
of systems thinking at the point that the word 
"science" was explicitly added, I am not using the 
traditional view of what science is. 
Scientific and other practices are virtually impossible 
to separate through any rational process of 
argumentation (Weimer, 1979), so it makes sense to 
challenge definitions of "science" whenever we feel 
they impose unacceptable limitations. 
Indeed, application of the word "science" (in the more 
limited, conventional sense) to ideas of holism will 
come to be seen as part of the mechanism by which 
earlier holistic viewpoints could be buried and the 
claim to a new start in the 20th Century justified. 
This is not to say that we should abandon the term 
"science": it makes more sense to liberate it from it's 
association with unacceptable assumptions. 1 
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11.4 The History of Holism 
The holistic enterprise can be seen to have roots in 
Western thought that go back well beyond those of the 
traditional sciences, which are said to have their 
seeds in Aristotle's explicit demarcation of the object 
from the subject. These seeds led to the first 
understandings of "objectivity" that were to be 
nurtured into flower by Descartes in the 17th Century. 
Of earlier Greek thinkers, Heraclitus 
particular has been 
(approximately 
singled out by 600-500 
Heidegger 
BC) in 
(1956) as of central importance because of 
formulation of the logos - the 
all things which the rational 
his sophisticated 
essential unity of 
classificatory part of us prevents us from genuinely 
experiencing. 
Similarly, Popper (1962) identifies Heraclitus as an 
influential figure, primarily because he was the first 
to concentrate on the phenomenon of change, proposing 
that the material Universe is an ordered process rather 
than a collection of static things. 
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Of course the shift away from this early identification 
of holism did not happen overnight. While Aristotle's 
thinking might have been formative in the move toward 
scientific reductionism, it was not until the 17th 
Century, and most obviously through the writings of 
Bacon, Galileo, Descartes and Newton, that modern 
scientific thinking began to develop from the seeds 
planted centuries earlier. 
Pre-Cartesian mediaeval Christian thinking, according 
to Sherrard (1987), was still implicitly holistic and 
mystical. In his own words: 
"This Christian society was an organically 
integrated society. It was a kind of sacred order 
established by God in which everything, not only 
Man and Man's artifacts, but every living form of 
plant, bird or animal, the sun, moon and stars, 
the waters and the mountains, were seen as signs 
of things sacred, ... expressions of a divine 
cosmology, symbols linking the visible and the 
invisible, earth and heaven". 
Furthermore, Sherrard notes that scientific techniques, 
in embryonic form, were available to mediaeval 
Christians, 
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"But these techniques deliberately were not 
employed or developed beyond a certain point - the 
point at which they would begin to impede or 
prevent what was far more important: the 
realization of the overriding imaginative view of 
life. Here the primary concern was religious, not 
technical, and technical processes that upset the 
overriding conceptions of harmony, beauty and 
balance were, quite simply, rejected". 
Thus it was Descartes writings, which mathematicised 
the world and separated its workings from those of God, 
that Sherrard sees as having the most profound and 
decisive influence in the development of modern 
science. 
However, it was actually not until the 18th and 19th 
Centuries that scientific thought led to the beginnings 
of the massive industrial and technological 
explorations that have since been intensified and now 
characterise the modern picture. 
When reductionist science began to emerge and dominate, 
what happened to holism? Did it simply evaporate, not 
to be seen again until the 20th Century? The answer, 
interestingly, is "no". 
A few writers were still bringing forth holistic ideas, 
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some of which would not look out of place in today's 
systems movement. For example, Hutton (1795) stated 
that: 
"the explanation, which is given of the different 
phenomena of the Earth, must be consistent with 
the actual constitution of this Earth as a living 
world, that is, a world maintaining a system of 
living animals and plants". 
Unsurprisingly, however, Hutton's work did not become 
part of the mainstream history of science. Perhaps we 
only speak of it now because people like Grinevald 
(1988) have excavated it in the light of modern 
planetary systems theories (such as that proposed by 
Lovelock, 1979, 1988). So, holism was well and truly 
suppressed in mainstream science. But did it still have 
any influence? 
Interestingly, if we examine the romantic art theories 
that emerged during the 17th and 18th Centuries, we see 
that holism was alive and well. Wiedmann (1986) 
describes the holistic nature of these theories, and 
the importance of a systemic vision of science to them: 
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"If Newton incurred the wrath of the Romantics, 
some sciences falling outside the mechanistic mode 
of explanation, found their rapturous approval, 
none more so than the sciences of Electricity, 
Galvanism and Magnetism .... For the Romantics the 
very success of these sciences was glorious proof 
at last that matter as such was not the ultimate 
reality. Something existed within and between 
matter, something far more original and 
fundamental, a dynamic interplay of forces and 
polarities, a ceaseless 'productive activity' as 
Schelling loved to call it, which held the whole 
Universe together .... This vision of a 'productive 
activity' .... brought about a radical and 
irreversible shift .... which replaced the limited 
notions of atomism and mechanism with the more 
creative and flexible models of organicism and 
universal dynamism. The Romantics ushered in Man's 
preoccupation with change rather than with 
permanence, with process rather than products, 
with force and flux rather than with finished 
forms and seemingly unchanging timeless 
substances. There is no Being, they proclaimed, 
only Becoming". 
Furthermore, he goes on to show how this holism 
manifested itself in the works of writers and artists 
of the time: 
"This fascination with eternal flux and 
transformation expressed itself in the artists' 
attraction to nature's fierce primeval forces as 
manifest in raging storms, gigantic seas or lava-
hurling mountains. It also expressed itself in the 
painters' exclusive concentration on whirling, 
shifting clouds, for clouds in particular were 
seen as repositories of electricity and, Ｎ｢ｾｹｯｾ､＠
that, as manifestations of the 'energy dlvlne . 
Romantic literature and art are inseparable from 
this passion for energy and force, a passion which 
profoundly affected their respective matter and 
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form, their substance and style". 
Now, the sciences of electricity, galvanism and 
magnetism came to be integrated into the mechanistic 
world view within the reductionist scientific 
discourse, and it was left to artists to realise their 
holistic significance. So, it seems that reductionist 
science merely marginalised holistic concerns into the 
arts, where they could be valued by a different 
audience. In characteristic, atomist style, scientists 
even had to separate science itself from other creative 
activities. 
11.5 The Present Day 
Interestingly, despite the remarkable similarity 
between the Universe as conceptualised by Heraclitus in 
ancient Greece and the Universe as thought of today by 
holistic physicists such as Bohm (1980), we still tend 
to labour under this assumption that the emergence of 
systems scientific thinking in the West is a 20th 
Century phenomenon. 
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The historical short-sightedness that seems to prevail 
with regard to holistic thinking, even within systems 
science (the only approach which places holism at the 
centre of its agenda), might itself be a symptom of the 
dominance of traditional science which has long 
emphasised the values of logic, 
testability. 
rationality and 
The original belief of holists that rational thought 
actually provides an insurmountable barrier to complete 
insight is certainly not 'testable' in the conventional 
sense of the word, and early thinkers like Heraclitus 
were philosophers who did not equate testability with 
validity. Therefore no need was seen to challenge this 
belief through empirical study. 
However, mid-20th Century systems scientists have 
phrased their concerns in language that has clearly 
been influenced by traditional science. In particular 
General Systems Theory (e.g., Bertalanffy, 1950) arose 
out of the discipline of biology, and its focus on 
mathematical descriptions of the workings of real-world 
systems had a resonance across all the 'natural' 
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sciences. 
Given Heidegger's powerful argument (1956) that a 
general acceptance of Aristotle's split between the 
object and the subject created such a fundamental shift 
in our method of questioning that the possible validity 
of other ways of thinking has become almost 
inconceivable, it is hardly surprising that pre-
Aristotelian holism (i.e., that of Heraclitus and 
others of his time) is not considered of the same kind 
as that which has recently emerged. 
From this point on, then, let us work with the new 
historical vision which assumes that systems thinking 
does indeed stretch back beyond the 20th Century, and 
that it was the influence of the cannons of traditional 
science that has caused us to differentiate ancient and 
modern holism so sharply. 
11.6 Marqinalisation of Early Holistic Ideas 
Given that we are now assuming it is valid to bring 
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early holism into the history of systems science, we 
have to ask why this form of thinking was marginalised 
so comprehensively by the growth of reductionist 
science. 
The answer, according to Heidegger (1956), is quite 
simple. 
sharp 
Science has been shown to "work". That is, the 
demarcation of the subject from the object that 
led to a separation of truth (the observed) from values 
(properties of the observer), cultivated a form of 
'uninhibited' inquiry, in the sense that relatively 
little moral restraint was placed on it. 
This led to discoveries which had a profound effect on 
the material conditions of nearly everybody in the 
West. People were seen to live longer as medical 
science advanced, and the proliferation of labour-
saving devices were seen to improve the quality of 
peoples' lives dramatically. Increasingly the shift was 
toward an energy intensive society in which production 
and consumption per individual rose steadily, 
was largely attributed to the success of 
innovation. 
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and this 
scientific 
Small wonder, then, that the old holism which operated 
from completely different epistemological premises, 
which refused to let the search for truth be separated 
from human values, was spurned. 
inhibited as a form of inquiry. 
'deliver the goods'. 
11.7 The Re-&mergence of Holism 
It was inevitably 
It simply could not 
Now, Heidegger's analysis is considered uncontroversial 
these days, and few people would seek to refute it. 
Yet, if we delve more deeply into the assumptions of 
his argument and relate them critically to a recent 
holistic understanding of evolution that has been 
proposed within the discipline of biology, we might be 
able to create some insights that will provide a clue 
as to why, in the 20th Century, we have experienced the 
re-emergence of holism. 
When we say that science has "worked", we can ask 
"worked in what sense?". For example, what does the 
accumulation of material benefits for human beings mean 
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in ecological and evolutionary terms? 
The holistic perspective we can use to answer these 
questions emerged as a reaction against neo-Darwinian 
evolutionary theory (Darwin's natural selection 
combined with Mendel's genetics), which has remained 
dominant in the discipline of biology until relatively 
recently. 
At the risk of over-simplification, we can say that 
neo-darwinian theory proposes that organisms need to 
adapt to their environment. Furthermore, the organisms 
which adapt most successfully will survive and have the 
chance to pass on their characteristics, via their 
genetic codes, to the next generation. 
One of several problems with this, pointed out by 
a number of holistic thinkers (e.g., Lovelock, 1988; 
Ho, 1989), is that "neo-Darwinism .... pre-supposes the 
separation between organism and environment - the one 
varying independently and the other selecting" (Ho, 
1989). 
Thus, physical maternal influences (Ho et aI, 1983; Ho, 
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1984), the environment of the previous generation 
(Oyama, 1985; Ho, 1986) and cultural, social and 
behavioural learning from peers are relegated to either 
non-existent or secondary roles in evolution (genetic 
factors being seen as primary). 
More importantly, however, the possibility of organisms 
helping to create their environments is not really 
considered. The idea of organisms as active elements of 
a wider system presents us with a conceptual key with 
which to unlock an answer to the question of what we 
mean by saying that science has "worked". 
It is possible to claim, when we observe science 
"working", that it has given us the capacity to shape 
our environment more radically, to change the ecosystem 
within which we evolve so that we can both increase our 
numbers and improve the quality of human life. Why, 
then, are some people now saying that traditional 
science is no longer "working"? 
It appears that the relative freedom of traditional 
science from moral constraint has given rise to rapid, 
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and it now seems inadequately understood, developments 
in technology. As McBurney (1990) and others have 
argued so persuasively, while in the short term our 
technological ability to shape our environment has 
proven very successful for human beings, we have come 
to see that we are creating a habitat that will not 
sustain us in the longer term. Thus isolationist, 
'objective' 
problem. 
science is itself part of our ecological 
It could be that holism has re-emerged because of the 
need to reintegrate understandings of the objective, 
normative and subjective into a more comprehensive 
whole which will have the ecological function of 
helping us restore a degree of life-enhancing harmony 
to the world. 
What I am suggesting, then, is that the emergence of 
our understanding of ontological complexity is 
happening now because we have reached the point where 
the unfettered technological expansion that justified 
both traditional science and a reductionist 
understanding of complexity is coming to an end. 
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11.8 Reinterpreting Holism 
Widening our historical picture of systems science 
helps us to see that the understanding of ontological 
complexity I have evolved has some connection with pre-
17th Century, and in particular pre-Aristotelian, 
thoughts on the problem of holism. 
Of course they are by no means identical, and I am 
certainly not suggesting that we are retreating to a 
pre-industrial age of philosophy. However, the key 
similarity is that the way we have started to 
conceptualise our problems embraces the natural world, 
social values and what goes on in the internal "worlds" 
of individuals. 
Similarly, much pre-Cartesian thinking deals with all 
three, although a key difference is that mediaeval 
Christian thought, for example, was mystical in its 
holism. There was no attempt to make an ontological or 
epistemological analysis of the three "worlds" 
(natural, social and internal) that could be used to 
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understand inquiry and intervention. 
It is quite clear that mid-20th Century systems 
science, and the isolationist hard tradition that has 
grown out of it, fails to achieve this reintegration 
between the objective, normative and subjective because 
it tries to marginalise the latter two. 
Our reconstructed history of systems science helps us 
to realise that the understanding of complexity evolved 
by the supposed 'Founding Fathers' owes much to 
reductionism. Ontological complexity is reduced to 
natural world complexity. Furthermore, their 
philosophical and methodological response to this 
reduced conception of complexity shares the value-
neutral epistemological roots of the natural, 
disciplinary sciences. 
In this sense, then, the 'Founding Fathers' can be 
said, through no fault of their own, to have been 
subject to the 'false consciousness' (if I may be 
permitted to use the term in a broader sense than the 
original Marxist one) of a dominant understanding which 
we can no longer regard as adequate. 
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Partly because of the depths to which older 
understandings have been suppressed, we 
responded adequately or quickly enough to 
have not 
ecological 
necessity, and it is only now that a deeper vision is 
evolving. 
All this has profound implications for our 
understanding of the word "holism" itself. Far from 
being holistic, hard isolationist systems science has 
been shown to reduce everything down to an impoverished 
"natural world" holism. I would argue, then, that the 
word "holistic" itself should be 'liberated', and only 
used to describe approaches to inquiry and intervention 
that embrace the legitimacy of considering all three of 
the objective, normative and subjective realms. 
11.9 Conclusion 
Here, then, we have not only answered the question "why 
pluralism?" (in terms of pursuit of the unity of 
science and a need to address ontological complexity), 
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but we have also made a start on answering the question 
"why now?". 
I have argued that many of the contemporary issues we 
are dealing with, especially issues of global ecology, 
present a high degree of ontological complexity. This 
can only be addressed using a truly holistic approach: 
i.e., one that reintegrates the objective, normative 
and subjective. Such an approach must inevitably 
involve prioritising pursuit of the ideal of the 
of science, and must therefore also 
methodological pluralism. 
unity 
allow 
"Why now?". We can say that reductionist science, which 
has even spread it's influence into the supposedly 
"holistic" work of the 'Founding Fathers' of systems 
science, is no longer "working". It is not "working" in 
the sense of helping us to create sustainable systems 
in which we can live harmoniously. Perhaps our new 
vision of unity and pluralism will equip us more 
adequately to do this. 
We are now at a point where we should have a reasonable 
understanding of what Critical Systems Thinking and 
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it's associated idea of pluralism, as they have been 
､･ｶｾｬｯｰ･､＠ to date, are all about. We should also have 
some understanding of why these notions might be 
important at the present time; in other words, what it 
is that legitimates them. 
At the end of Chapter 9 I suggested that my only 
reservation was that the philosophical underpinnings of 
the perspective were insufficiently developed. In 
Section 3 of this thesis I will move on to issues of 
ontology and epistemology in order to begin to address 
this problem. 
We will also find that the issue of ecology discussed 
here will need to be reintroduced and deepened when we 
start to deal with the question of the legitimacy of 
alternative visions of ontology and epistemology. 
Notes 
1. Addition of the word "science" to a discourse is 
essentially a means of legitimising it, while at the 
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same time controlling its content and expression 
through the imposition of a set of discursive 
assumptions (Foucault, 1970). There is nothing wrong 
with this - we cannot escape legitimising things in 
this way - but a realization that this is what we are 
doing does impose a duty upon us to be critical of our 
assumptions in using a term like "science". We might 
not have to abandon a word in order to free ourselves 
from discursive assumptions we are not happy with. 
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SECTION 3 
EPISTEMOLOGY, ONTOLOGY AND PLURALISM 
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CHAPTER 12: META-METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
In Section 1 of this thesis I described the Critical 
Systems vision of pluralism as it has been evolved to 
date. This involved discussing the differences between 
pluralism, pragmatism, isolationism and imperialism. It 
also involved presenting the System of Systems 
Methodologies: the Critical Systems meta-framework 
aligning systems methods with ideal-type contexts of 
application. 
Furthermore, I clarified a central problem: that the 
notion of paradigm incommensurability could be seen to 
sweep our fledgling notion of pluralism off its feet if 
we are not rigorous in our thinking. 
Paradigms can quite obviously be incommensurate with 
one another because they represent "moments" of 
concretised theory in a wider developing discourse. 
Even the assumptions of pluralism can be challenged by 
isolationists in their own terms. 
It is therefore necessary to declare the paradigmatic 
277 
nature of Critical Systems Thinking. If we accept the 
possibility of pluralism, then we must also be 
ac7epting ontological and/or epistemological 
assumptions that people working in other paradigms 
could not agree with. We therefore have to ask what 
these assumptions might be. 1 
12.1 Habermas's Three Interests Revisited 
The majority of Critical Systems thinkers have sought 
to underpin the notion of pluralism with Habermas's 
epistemological framework of knowledge-constitutive 
interests. Let us just refresh our memories, as the 
last time this was mentioned was in Chapter 5. 
Habermas's central concern (1972) is that traditional 
scientific inquiry, hermeneutic science and self-
reflective critique should all be seen as having their 
place in addressing different human interests 
interests embedded in the need for environmental 
control, common social understanding and emancipation 
from false consciousness respectively. 
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According to Habermas, these are not specific interests 
arising out of local context. They are general 
interests that all human beings share: l.e., they are 
an essential part of human nature. Haberrnas supports 
his belief that these are general interests with 
reference to what he describes as the basic human 
activities of "work" and "interaction". 
All human beings need to "work": i.e., they need to 
exercise instrumental control over their environments. 
Therefore we have a technical interest in achieving 
this control. 
Also, human beings need to interact and communicate 
with one another. We therefore have a practical 
interest in achieving mutual understanding. 
The pursuit of both of these interests can be 
frustrated, however, by the noxious exercise of power 
which establishes false consciousnesses in groups and 
individuals. We therefore also have an emancipatory 
interest in freeing ourselves from the constraints of 
false consciousness. 
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We should note here that Habermas talks in terms of 
knowledge-constitutive interests. This is because, when 
it comes to the specific interests we pursue, 
knowledges shape our interests, and our interests 
direct the search for knowledges. 
Of these 
Habermas 
interest, 
that is 
three 
(1978) 
pursued 
pivotal. 
knowledge-constitutive interests, 
says that it is the emancipatory 
through self-reflective critique, 
Ultimately we pursue the ideal of 
undistorted communication. This is a postulated ideal 
speech situation in which no false consciousness is 
manifest, and in which arguments can be won or lost by 
"the peculiarly unforced force of the better argument" 
(Habermas, 1974). 
In pursuing the ideal of undistorted communication we 
can draw upon traditional science and hermeneutics to 
provide support for our self-reflective activity, which 
in turn helps us to conduct our traditional scientific 
and hermeneutic inquiries in a non-oppressive fashion. 
Habermas (1972) claims that we need to continually 
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pursue all three interests. However, we find that the 
forces of power (specifically forces of "late 
Capitalism" in Habermas's analysis) cause the technical 
interest to dominate and the practical and emancipatory 
interests to be marginalised. 
This is why, traditionally, scientists have described 
their activities as value-neutral. By neglecting the 
need for mutual understanding and self-reflection, 
scientists end up extending instrumental control of the 
environment in the service of forces of power. 
Our task in both this chapter and the next is to 
reflect upon Habermas's framework of knowledge-
constitutive interests in order to consider whether it 
is adequate as an underpinning for our notion of 
pluralism. 
This chapter will deal with its adequacy at the levels 
of methodology and meta-methodology, Chapter 13 will 
assess its 
ecological 
legitimacy in terms of our current 
concerns, and Chapter 14 will explore the 
territory of ontology. 
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In discussing methodology and meta-methodology in this 
chapter we will have to deal, first and foremost, with 
various authors' uses of Habermasian theory to underpin 
the System of Systems Methodologies. This lS, of 
course, the most widely accepted pluralist meta-theory 
within the discourse of Critical Systems Thinking. 
12.2 The Question of Alignment 
Let us begin, 
identified 
then, by addressing the problem, 
in Chapter 5, of aligning the 
first 
three 
interests with the two dimensions of the System of 
Systems Methodologies. To refresh our memories, in 
Chapter 5 I presented my interpretation of what 
appeared to me to be two very different alignments. 
Let us detail these once again. First of all, Jackson 
(1985b, 1988) aligns the "System" dimension with the 
technical interest, and the "Participants" dimension 
with the practical interest. The emancipatory interest 
is seen as an extension of the practical interest, 
it is aligned with coercive contexts in the System 
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and 
of 
Systems Methodologies. 
However, if I have understood their argument correctly, 
Flood and Jackson (1991) appear to align all three 
interests with the various elements of the 
"Participants" dimension. The technical interest is 
aligned with the unitary contexts, the practical 
interest is aligned with the conflictual contexts and 
the emancipatory interest is aligned with the coercive 
contexts. 
Over the coming pages I want to look more closely at 
these alignments in terms of Habermasian theory. Before 
doing so, however, I need to acknowledge that I will be 
using a different interpretation of Habermas's theory 
of knowledge-constitutive interests than the one used 
by both Jackson (1985b, 1988) and Flood and Jackson 
(1991). 
All three of 
(1972) work, 
the above papers draw 
in which he describes 
upon Habermas's 
the emancipatory 
interest as an extension of the practical interest. 
Given this assumption, both Jackson's and Flood & 
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Jackson's positions, as I have interpreted them, are 
perfectly logical. 
However, in updating his 1972 work, Haberrnas (1978) 
shifted his view somewhat and declared that the 
emancipatory interest is pivotal between the technical 
and practical interests. This means that the desire 
human beings have to free themselves from false 
consciousness comes to mean more than being self-
reflective in order to improve our pursuit of the 
practical interest. It also means using self-reflection 
to change structures in the world through pursuit of 
the technical interest. 
In fact, in his 1978 vision, Haberrnas's three interests 
are systemically interrelated so that the results of 
our pursuit of the technical and practical interests 
also feed back into emancipatory self-reflection. 2 
I wish to use this later version of Haberrnas's theory 
because, to me (as well as others like Tsivacou, 1992), 
it makes sense for emancipatory self-reflection to be 
seen as both following, and giving rise to, physical 
changes in the world as well as ideological changes in 
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discourse. 
Indeed, this is entirely consistent with my own 
division of complexity into three realms: complexity in 
the natural world (which we have a technical interest 
in mastering), complexity in the social world of 
normative judgments (which we have a practical interest 
in coming to grips with), and complexity in our 
understandings of the subjective internal worlds of 
individuals including our own subjective 
understanding (which we have an emancipatory interest 
in grasping). 
Clearly, because I am drawing upon a later version of 
Habermasian theory, the following critiques of 
Jackson's (l985b, 1988) and Flood and Jackson's (1991) 
alignments of the three interests with the System of 
Systems Methodologies do not undermine their original 
arguments which are entirely consistent with Habermas's 
1972 work. 
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12.2.1 Alignment with the "Participants" Dimension 
I would contend that alignment of the three interests 
with the "Participants" dimension of the System of 
Systems Methodologies is problematic in terms of 
Haberrnas's 1978 work. 
If self-reflective critique is pivotal, as Habermas 
(1978) claims, then it cannot be an element within the 
System of Systems Methodologies. If we are going to be 
faithful to Haberrnas's vision, we cannot say that we 
are sometimes faced with situations of false 
consciousness and sometimes not. The ideal speech 
situation is always just out of reach, meaning that 
false consciousness is always a problem. We therefore 
need to be able to engage in self-reflective critique 
at any time - not just when we have defined a context 
as explicitly coercive. 
12.2.2 The Two Dimensional Alignment 
Unfortunately, Jackson's (1985b, 1988) alternative 
alignment of the technical interest with the "System" 
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dimension, and the practical interest with the 
"Participants" dimension, exhibits the same alignment 
of the emancipatory interest with just one aspect of 
the System of Systems Methodologies - the coercive 
contexts. Again there is the suggestion that we are not 
dealing with false consciousness all of the time. This 
is, of course, in conflict with Habermas's (1978) 
theory (but not his 1972 work, which Jackson used). 
Unfortunately, if we wish to use Habermas's 1978 work, 
the above alignments made by Jackson, and Jackson and 
Flood, may need to be developed further before we can 
say that we have an entirely adequate set of 
epistemological assumptions to support the System of 
Systems Methodologies. 
12.3 Further Avenues of Exploration 
Over the coming pages I will discuss 
avenues for this development. However, 
will be seen to be equally problematic. 
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two possible 
each of them 
The purpose of this discussion is, if you like, to 
serve as a warning of unfruitful avenues of exploration 
that may initially seem seductive. Following these 
three problematic 'developments', I intend to discuss a 
third that appears to avoid any problems of 
contradiction with Haberrnas's (1978) work. 
12.3.1 Self-Reflective Reductionism 
The first of these potential solutions is to take 
Jackson's alignment (1985b, 1988) and move the 
emancipatory interest outside the System of Systems 
Methodologies. 
The technical interest is still seen to lie behind the 
"System" dimension, and the practical interest behind 
the "Participants" dimension. The ernancipatory 
interest, however, comes to lie behind the need for 
explicit reflection upon the reasons for conducting 
problem-solving research and designing appropriate 
methodologies (i.e., in Kantian terms, the need to 
engage in practical reason). 
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At first this sounds like an ideal development because 
the emancipatory interest becomes pivotal, as in 
Haberrnas's vision (1978). The suggestion is that 
reflection upon complexity and the relationships 
between participants in a problematic situation is what 
constitutes pursuit of the technical and practical 
interests respectively. 
A problem arises, however, when we realise that, if 
this is just reflection, the researcher must still be 
pursuing the emancipatory interest. He or she is simply 
reflecting upon his or her perceptions of the 
situation. 
Pursuit of the technical interest must actually involve 
prediction and control of the environment. Pursuit of 
the practical interest must involve communicating 
other people in order to facilitate 
with 
mutual 
understanding. Simple reflection by itself achieves 
neither of these things. 
This potential development appears, then, to be 
reducing the technical and practical interests to the 
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emancipatory interest. It therefore creates 
problem - one of self-reflective reductionism. 
12.3.2 Methodological Inflexibility 
a new 
If we must avoid treating the technical and practical 
interests as purely reflective (thereby subsuming them 
within the emancipatory interest), what other options 
might there be for aligning Habermas's three interests 
(1978) with the System of Systems Methodologies? 
We can look toward the work of Gregory (1990) for the 
inspiration to lay a second path. She maintains that 
the problem with trying to align the three interests 
with different aspects of the System of Systems 
Methodologies is that you end up selecting between 
interests. Of course, this conflicts with Habermas's 
(1978) view that the three interests are interrelated 
and the emancipatory interest is pivotal. Gregory's 
solution is to insist that all of the interests should 
be pursued explicitly every time research is conducted. 
At least two possible stances arise from this argument. 
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First, it could be suggested that we should dispense 
with the notion of contextualising existing methods. 
Perhaps our priority should be to develop a new method, 
or set of methods, that focuses explicitly upon the 
three interests. Indeed, this has been suggested as a 
serious possibility by Flood et al (1992). 
Alternatively it could be argued that we would be able 
to preserve our contextualisation of existing methods 
through the System of Systems Methodologies if we could 
demonstrate that, by drawing upon several different 
methods in each research project, all three interests 
could be explicitly addressed. Theoretically, it should 
be possible to achieve this through the practice of 
methodological partitioning. 
Indeed, Gregory (1990) does point to methodological 
partitioning, suggesting that this is her preferred 
option. On balance it would probably be mine, as open 
communication with other authors who have already 
designed systems methodologies can only really be 
maintained if we take their ideas seriously. 
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Given Gregory's assumption that truly critical research 
involves explicit consideration of all three interests , 
both hard and soft systems thinking would need to be 
drawn upon, as would explicit self- reflective 
critique, for a particular research project to be 
considered adequate. 
Here, methodological partitioning would have to play a 
central role in determining when hard and soft methods 
should be employed, and the whole process would have to 
be guided in a critically self-reflective manner. 
This is certainly an effective way out of our 
epistemological dilemma. It allows for the System of 
Systems Methodologies and Habermas's (1978) work to co-
exist without internal contradiction. 
However, while Gregory's position is coherent 
philosophically, it does present methodological 
problems. If one always has to draw upon both hard and 
soft methods for the research to be considered 
adequate, then we are inevitably going to be restricted 
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in the research that we will be able to conduct. 
Gregory's solution involves the imposition of a meta-
methodological rule upon systems practice that limits 
our ability to compromise methodologically in order to 
achieve desired ends. 
To provide a hypothetical example, we may be approached 
by a hospital manager who tells us that his or her 
organization is experiencing major conflicts between a 
number of doctors and their nursing staff. As a result, 
morale is low and nursing staff turn-over lS high. 
There are worries that this in-fighting may indirectly 
be putting patients' lives at risk. We have been asked 
to intervene, and intervene quickly. 
Using the System of Systems Methodologies in the usual 
way we might decide that the context is, say, 
conflictual. Strategic Assumption Surfacing and Testing 
or Soft Systems Methodology might therefore be 
appropriate responses. Alternatively we might decide 
that the power doctors have over nurses makes the 
context coercive. Critical Systems Heuristics would 
therefore be appropriate. In each case the methodology 
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would be directed at the presenting problem, and could 
be enacted promptly. 
However, if we were also required to employ a hard 
method in conjunction with one of the above, two 
immediate issues arise. The first is one of time: 
methods like Systems Dynamics cannot be implemented 
speedily. If we really believe we are faced with a life 
or death situation, can we afford the time to set up a 
computer programme? The second issue is one of 
relevance: no hard method will address the presenting 
problem of inter-staff conflict directly. 
When there is sufficient time, it is a positive 
advantage to go beyond the presenting problem and see 
if there are other unmentioned problems that are 
systemically related to the presenting one. In the long 
term, a more effective solution might be achieved by 
doing this. However, in the short term, a "quick fix" 
using a single method might sometimes be necessary in 
order to achieve an ethically sound result: i.e., in 
the case of our hypothetical hospital, to minimise the 
risk to patients. 
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Gregory's suggestion of explicitly pursuing all three 
interests through the use of several different systems 
methods in conjunction with one another solves our 
epistemological problem of reconciling Habermas's 
(1978) work with the System of Systems Methodologies. 
However, it inevitably saddles us with a degree of 
methodological inflexibility that may well put the 
legitimacy of Critical Systems Thinking at risk when we 
are faced with important decisions that have to be 
taken at speed. 
12.3.3 Beyond Alignment 
So, all alignments of the three interests with the 
System of Systems Methodologies have their problems. 
Where, then, can we go from here? Even if Habermas's 
later theory of knowledge-constitutive interests (1978) 
cannot be used to underpin the System of Systems 
Methodologies directly, maybe it can still be used to 
support the wider notion of pluralism. 
Perhaps, rather than aligning the three interests with 
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aspects of the System of Systems Methodologies, they 
can be seen in relation to the specific methods within 
it. There need not be any one-to-one pairing of 
elements of the System of Systems Methodologies with 
the interests: maybe each method can be said to involve 
pursuit of all three interests at some stage, if only 
implicitly. 
How could this be possible? The answer is that each 
method might be said to prioritise one interest over 
the others. Hard systems methods might make the 
technical interest dominant and soft methods might do 
the same for the practical interest. Pursuit of the 
emancipatory interest through self-reflection would, in 
any research, be pivotal. 
However, this would not be a return to the positivistic 
notion of the supposedly autonomous researcher bearing 
full responsibility for deciding research parameters. 
Habermas (1972, 1985) rightly criticises this 
conception on the grounds that researchers must be 
subject to some social constraints if their work 
impacts on the lives of other people. 
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One could only claim that this represents a return to 
the notion of the morally autonomous researcher if 
self-reflective activity (pursuit of the emancipatory 
interest) was seen as lying beyond the influence of our 
actual actions and communications (pursuit of the 
technical and practical interests). 
No, in Habermas's understanding (1978), the three 
interests are intimately tied together: self-reflection 
may inform the ways in which we pursue both 
instrumental action and mutual understanding, but the 
link actually operates both ways. Our self-reflective 
activity may be influenced by the outcomes of our 
instrumental actions and the mutual understandings we 
pursue. 
We are now saying that use of a hard systems method 
makes the technical interest dominant, and use of a 
soft method brings the practical interest to the fore. 
However, in the wider process of thinking about 
methodology, self-reflective activity is needed to 
determine which interest should be made dominant at any 
particular moment in time. 
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Here we have effectively 'split' our understanding of 
pluralism from the System of Systems Methodologies. The 
former can be founded upon Habermas's (1978) theory 
with no internal contradiction. However, the latter now 
comes to be seen as just one of many possible meta-
methodological frameworks. All such frameworks gain 
their legitimacy from their perceived usefulness in a 
particular set of practical contexts. They are tools to 
aid emancipatory self-reflection. 3 
12.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that, purely in terms of 
internal consistency, the Critical Systems notion of 
pluralism can be underpinned by Habermas's theory of 
knowledge-constitutive interests (1978). However, in 
order to achieve this internal consistency, I have had 
to make a clear demarcation between the wider theory of 
pluralism and the System of Systems Methodologies 
(which can now be seen as one of many possible meta-
methodological frameworks). 
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Having 
notion 
discuss 
established its logical congruence 
of pluralism, in Chapter 13 I will 
the legitimacy of the theory of 
with our 
proceed to 
knowledge-
constitutive interests in terms of the discourse of 
global ecology introduced in Section 2 of this thesis. 
Notes 
1. This is not to say, of course, that when pluralists 
contextualise ideas drawn from other perspectives they 
are merely masking their imperialist intent. 
Imperialists denature other perspectives, while 
pluralists reconstruct their essential elements within 
a multi-faceted meta-theory. Imperialists strip 
perspectives of their most important defining features, 
clothing them in a uniform of their own design. 
Pluralists, on the other hand, take care to preserve 
all of their most important aspects other than those 
which are intrinsically isolationist. 
2. Habermas's 1978 work is the second edition of his 
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1972 book. This updated version deals with what he 
claims is a misunderstanding of his 
Habermas says that he always meant 
original intent. 
to portray the 
emancipatory interest as pivotal, and that people have 
wrongly understood the emancipatory interest as being 
an extension of the practical. However, this 
'misinterpreted' understanding is actually credible in 
its own terms, and is widely accepted (witness its use 
in Critical Systems Thinking for example), so it is 
perhaps appropriate to describe Habermas's 1972 and 
1978 positions as different. 
3. Interestingly, it would appear that Jackson (1991a) 
has reached a similar conclusion: he discusses a whole 
range of possible ways in which methods might be 
divided, suggesting that he too prefers to separate the 
wider notion of pluralism from anyone specific meta-
theory aligning methods with ideal-type contexts of 
application. 
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CHAPTER 13: ECOLOGY AND THE POVERTY OF HUMANISM 
We have established that Habermas's theory of 
knowledge-constitutive interests (1972) provid€s an 
effective epistemological underpinning for the Critical 
Systems notion of pluralism. Effective, that is, in 
terms of the internal consistency of the arguments. 
However, we must ask whether this is the right 
underpinning: i.e., whether it is legitimate given our 
current concerns. 
In Chapter 10 I introduced the concept of ontological 
complexity. That is, I suggested that our research 
practice needs to be able to address complexities of 
the objective natural world, the normative social 
world, and the subjective inner world of the 
individual. Ontological complexity is the meta-level 
complexity of possible relationships between these 
"worlds" . 
Ontological complexity has become an issue now because 
of the interdependencies we are beginning to experience 
between concepts like ecological harmony, social 
justice and personal freedom. It is my contention that 
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our realisation of these interdependencies signals a 
major shift away from humanism toward an ecological 
perspective in many of today's most important 
discourses. 
In the current chapter I intend to explore what we 
might mean 
perspective" . 
uncritical 
by "humanism" and "the ecological 
I will argue that humanism represents an 
acceptance of system boundaries that 
privilege the individual human being, and/or human 
society, in analyses. The ecological 
refuses such uncritical privileging. 
perspective 
Having defined what I mean by an ecological perspective 
I will be in a position to argue that this, rather than 
humanism, is the most legitimate perspective to take 
given our current concerns. 
We will then be in a position to take another look at 
Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests. 
We will discover that this does, in fact, make major 
humanistic assumptions that renders it inappropriate as 
an underpinning for the Critical systems notion of 
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pluralism. 
13.1 From Humanism to the Ecological Perspective 
There is a vast literature on the pros and cons of 
humanism, and the merits of an ecological perspective. 
It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive 
review of this literature - such a task would fill a 
thesis on its own, and many and varied works have 
already been written on the subject. 
There is much involved in such a shift in 
understanding. There are important implications for 
epistemology (e.g., Bateson, 1979; Abram, 1988; Ash, 
1989), scientific practice (e.g., Capra, 1982; Ravetz, 
1988; Finger, 1988; Ho, 1989; Birch, 1990; Lovelock, 
1990; Metzner, 1991), economics (e.g., McBurney, 1990; 
Max-Neef, 1991), the role of human beings in relation 
to a planetary ecology (e.g., Lovelock, 1979, 1988; 
Berry, 1990; Dodson Gray, 1990), aesthetics (e.g., 
Goldsworthy, 1988; Hillman, 1989), our understanding 
of spirituality (e.g., Panikkar, 1989; Birch, 1990; 
Schwarz, 1990; Van de Weyer, 1991) and even our basic 
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model of the Universe (e.g., Bohrn, 1980). This is just 
scratching the surface: the shift from humanism to an 
ecological perspective must inevitably invade every 
aspect of understanding and action. 
However, let us focus down by defining our terms; by 
reducing the difference between humanism and the 
ecological perspective to its bare essentials. It is 
commonly said that, at root, the difference between 
them is that humanism places people at the centre of 
discourse, while the ecological perspective allows us 
to decentre ourselves. 
One can already see this ecological decentring in much 
of the work that has been done in the "natural" systems 
sciences, but it is perhaps most clearly evident in 
studies of planetary ecology, or "geophysiology" as 
Lovelock (e.g., 1988) calls it. 
In proposing that the earth is essentially a self-
regulating "organism,,1, which he calls Gaia, Lovelock 
shows how human beings are merely playing a part in the 
whole "geophysiological" process of global development. 
304 
While human beings might fight for personal survival, 
or the survival of their societies, Lovelock makes it 
clear that the elimination of our species would not be 
especially meaningful in terms of the larger "organism" 
of which we are a part. Human beings are therefore 
decentred in this analysis, and the Earth as a whole 
comes into central focus. 
The essence of such decentring is actually a shift from 
privileging a boundary placed around the human being, 
or the human species, to privileging a boundary placed 
around the wider system of which the human being is a 
part - in Lovelock's analysis, the planet. 
As Ulrich (1990b) makes clear ｾｮ＠ his discussion of an 
ethics of ecology, use of the human boundary does not 
become invalid in the ecological perspective. However, 
the issue of which boundary we should privilege in any 
given analysis needs to be thought about critically. 
The ecological perspective allows for a decentring of 
human beings; it does not prescribe it in every case. 
Obviously we have to ask, "what ecological and social 
consequences arise from carrying the assumption of the 
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permanently privileged human being into everyday life, 
and, more particularly (in the context of this thesis), 
into the research arena?" It is how we view these 
consequences that will determine the legitimacy, or 
otherwise, of humanism. 
My contention is that, if an uncritically 
boundary is always placed around the human 
privileged 
(whether 
individual human beings, human societies or human 
communicative systems), then that which is seen as 
lying beyond the human boundary (our "environment") 
will inevitably be marginalised. 2 
We might ask, "so what?". The answer to this question 
is actually quite complex. Let me present a one-
paragraph precise that can be fleshed out over corning 
pages. 
I would argue that boundaries and ethics are intimately 
interrelated. In order to preserve the credibility of 
the ethics that arise to support our privileging of the 
human boundary, everything that is marginalised by this 
boundary has to be made profane. Therefore our 
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environment is subject to abuse, much of which is 
ritualised. Because there is no real separation between 
"us" (human beings) and "it" (the environment), this is 
not 'just' environmental abuse - it is self-abuse. Our 
"selves" are wider than the uncritically privileged 
boundaries of our human bodies. 
To understand why uncritical privileging of the human 
boundary leads to the marginalisation of anything non-
human, and why everything non-human then comes to be 
regarded as profane and may therefore be subject to 
ritual desecration, we will have to pursue a new 
development in systems theory. 
Over the corning pages I will present an idealised model 
showing a relationship between the practice of drawing 
or assuming boundaries, making ethical judgments, 
marginalisation, and the imposition of a sacred or 
profane status on marginalised elements of systems. 
To maintain the flow of the wider argument this will, 
of necessity, be a brief exposition: for a much more 
detailed account, including practical examples that 
have been worked out more fully, see Midgley (1992a). 
307 
Having presented the model, we will be in a position to 
use it to explain why the philosophy of humanism 
inevitably results in ecological desecration. 
13.2 Boundaries, Marginalisation, Ethics and Value 
Our first task in constructing an idealised model to 
explain the relationship between boundaries, 
marginalisation, ethics and the imposition of value 
judgments will be to make clear what we mean by 
"marginalisation". This task can be approached through 
a couple of brief practical examples in the first 
instance. These should help illuminate the theoretical 
discussion to follow. 
13.2.1 Marginalisation 
To give an example of an obvious marginal element, we 
might look at the conventionally accepted 
organizational boundaries of a business. Customers, for 
instance, might not be seen as 'within' the 
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organization in the same sense as the workers, but 
organization could not function without them so 
cannot be placed wholly on the 'outside' either. 
the 
they 
While customers are fairly obviously marginal to the 
way businesses are traditionally defined, it is more 
difficult to identify 'hidden' marginalised elements. 
People who are unemployed are a typical example. Local 
unemployed people would be excluded from most 
conventional organizational analyses, but they actually 
have a stake in the company's recruitment policy, might 
have a potential place within the traditionally defined 
organization, and are an integral part of the wider 
system of which the organization is also a part. 
Those elements of the wider system (including people 
who are unemployed) which are tacitly recognised as 
being pertinent to the organization, but are not 
explicitly taken into the definition of the 
organisation's boundaries, can be described as marginal 
to them. 
It is essential to be clear that defining 
marginalised element involves recognising 
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a 
an 
alternative system boundary. To explain this, let me 
use the analogy of a piece of paper. On the one hand 
the margin defines the edge beyond which there is no 
writing. A margin on a piece of paper is not one-sided 
however: it is also defined by the boundary of the 
paper itself. 
Now, it is a commonplace notion that a system boundary 
is defined by what is included in the system and, 
implicitly, what is excluded. The marginal area at the 
boundary, however, can only be defined with respect to 
another boundary because, if there were no outside 
limits, then there would be no way to differentiate 
what is marginal (but possibly hidden at first) from 
what is excluded. 
What is excluded appears invisible - indeed, it is only 
seen to exist by implication given that we always 
acknowledge the theoretical presence of a wider system. 
For recognition of tangible and pertinent existence to 
take place, however, there must be boundaries defining 
a second system, and when there are, then we are no 
longer dealing with exclusion but with marginalisation. 
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See Figure 13.1 for a diagrammatic representation of 
this. 
Wider system--" 
NO[ seen as 
pertinent 
Secondary Boundary 
Marginalized Elements 
t Primary Boundary 
Figure 13.1 Marginaiisation 
Elements wllhm the 
pnmary boundary 
We can codify this analysis in the following way: 
(1) Marginalisation implies the use of more than 
one system boundary, even if one or more of these 
boundaries is being employed tacitly or 
unconsciously. 
(2) We are therefore able to develop a systems 
language of primary and secondary boundaries. The 
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primary boundary is that which is most obvious (it 
might be placed around a traditionally defined 
organization, a particular eco-system, a society, 
a planet, etc.), and the secondary boundary is 
that which allows recognition of the tangible and 
pertinent existence of elements outside the system 
being defined that nevertheless affect it. 
Elements seen to be lying between the two 
boundaries are marginal to the system. 
13.2.2 Values and Boundary Judgments 
The above is a reinterpretation of the systems idea 
that has, of necessity, been kept relatively simple in 
order to introduce a new language of boundary and 
marginalisation. Now it is time to use this new 
language to build our model of the relationship between 
boundaries, marginalisations, ethics and the imposition 
of value judgments upon marginalised elements. 
What I want to do is to start by looking at the tension 
between what I have described as the primary and 
secondary boundaries. To do this we will first have to 
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examine the relationships that exist between truth-
orientated knowledge and value judgments. 
There is, of course, a massive body of literature which 
challenges the assumption of the analytical 
philosophers that knowledge is value-free. In Critical 
Systems, the first writer to explore the idea that 
knowledge must be seen as value-laden was Ulrich (1983, 
1988), who claimed that where the boundaries of 
analysis are drawn effects the ethical stance taken and 
the values pursued. 
To use our example of an organizational analysis, and 
the question of whether people who are unemployed 
should be included within the boundaries of it, it is 
obvious that the issues that can emerge within the 
primary boundary (i.e., when people who are unemployed 
are ignored) will be different to those that can emerge 
if their concerns are able to be explicitly addressed. 
If people who are unemployed are ignored, then (to 
generalise) it is most likely that issues of efficiency 
and effectiveness will emerge that take the status-quo 
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value system for granted. If their concerns 
admitted 
system 
into the analysis, then the status-quo 
which allows the perpetuation of 
unemployment is likely to come into question. 
are 
value 
their 
In this sense, then, the boundaries of accepted 
knowledge define the values that can emerge. Similarly, 
the values adopted will direct the drawing of 
boundaries that define the knowledge accepted as 
pertinent. We are therefore equally justified ｾｮ＠
saying, on the one hand, that our moral choices have a 
basis in fact and, on the other, that the choices made 
between boundaries are essentially ethical or moral 
choices. 3 
13.2.3 Values and Marginalisation 
I began this section of the chapter with an attempt to 
bring out an understanding of marginalisation as the 
inevitable process of consigning elements into the 
region between the primary and secondary boundary. Now 
I want to take one more step and use this analysis to 
build upon Ulrich's notion of the relationship between 
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ethical reasoning and the making of boundary judgments. 
My essential concern is to show that value judgments 
are not only related to what is or is not contained 
within given boundaries, but that they are also related 
to what lies in the margins. Indeed, we might postulate 
that the imposition of a profane status upon some 
marginal elements might reinforce or bolster the 
supposed objective necessity of the primary boundary, 
while imposition of a sacred status might protect the 
secondary boundary from dissolution. 
The words "sacred" and "profane" might require a little 
explanation. Essentially these mean 'valued' and 
'devalued' respectively. This terminology has been 
borrowed from the tradition of anthropology, 
exemplified by the 
should be stressed 
work of Douglas (1966), and 
that they are not meant in 
it 
an 
exclusively religious sense but refer to the 
development of the 'special status' of a marginalised 
element, whether positive (sacred) or negative 
(profane) .4 
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Let us make it clear how a status of sacred or profane 
might be imposed on marginal elements by returning to 
Ulrich's understanding (1983, 1988) that choice between 
boundaries can also involve choice between different 
ethical concerns. I would like to suggest 
the primary and secondary boundaries carry 
ethical implications, a tension is set up. 
that, when 
different 
In our earlier example of an organizational analysis, 
for instance, we can see a tension between the 
for organizational effectiveness that is 
within the primary boundary of the business, 
concern 
generated 
and the 
concern surrounding employment rights that is generated 
by widening the analysis to the secondary boundary. At 
the risk of over-simplification, the two ethics in 
conflict might be characterised as "we should ensure 
our workers' survival in the market-place" versus "all 
people should have equal opportunities for employment". 
NOW, because most ethical issues and associated 
boundary judgments, both primary and secondary, can be 
said to have roots in culture (i.e., they are inter-
subjectively accepted at either a conscious or an 
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unconscious level), we are able to find evidence for 
cultural reactions to the ethical tensions that arise. 
These cultural reactions, I would argue, involve the 
imposition of value judgments on elements that are 
marginal to boundary definitions: l.e., marginal 
elements are characterised as either "sacred" or 
"profane". Profanity supports the primary boundary by 
denigrating those elements that are marginal to it. In 
contrast, sacredness in the margins supports the 
secondary boundary. 
It works like this because sacredness is the 'other' to 
profanity, and profanity the 'other' to sacredness. 
Therefore, when marginal elements are seen as profane, 
elements within the primary boundary become sacred by 
implication and the primary boundary, along with its 
associated ethics, are reinforced. When marginal 
elements are seen as sacred, however, what is defined 
solely by the primary boundary becomes profane by 
implication, and the secondary boundary, with its 
associated ethics, comes to the fore. 
This is not the end of the story however. Not only do 
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ethical tensions give rise to sacredness and profanity, 
but this whole process actually comes to be overlaid 
with social ritual (Douglas, 1966; Leach, 1976). Ritual 
can be defined as behaviour, in whatever context, that 
contains certain stereotypical elements that involve 
the symbolic expression of wider social concerns. 
An observation of the presence of ritual can give us a 
clue as to where sacredness and profanity might lie, 
and hence where ethical conflicts related to 
marginalisation might be found. 5 ,6 In order to make all 
this clearer, the whole process has been represented 
diagrammatically in Figure 13.2. 
SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION IN RITUAL 
ｾ＠ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ " 4' " ., _, Ｎｾ＠ t..... ,t- + t .,. ·t 
Ethic arising - .... -----+-
frum within secondary 
boundary 
\1 
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Figure 13.2 tvlargins. Ethics. Sacredness, Profanity 
and Ritual 
from '."I(flill 
pnmar'l 
bountJarl 
To explain, in figure 13.2 we see one ethic arising 
from within the primary boundary, and another from 
within the secondary. These come into conflict a 
conflict that can only be dealt with by making one or 
other of the two boundaries dominant. This dominance is 
achieved by making elements in the margin (between the 
primary and secondary boundaries) either sacred or 
profane. The whole process is symbolically expressed in 
ritual which, in turn, helps to support the total 
system. Here, then, we see some of the complexities of 
relationships between boundaries, ethics and value 
judgments. 7 
13.2.4 Dynamism and Complexity 
Although this is in itself not a simple set of 
relationships, there is a dynamism and complexity lying 
behind the relatively static model presented in figure 
1 3 • 2 . 
To begin with there is no absolute a priori 'starting 
point' for analysis. If, for instance, we were to try 
to treat the system boundaries as entirely static 
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starting 
then we 
elements 
points which give rise to ethical conflict, 
could have no notion as to whether marginal 
would actually become sacred or whether they 
would become profane. 
Sacredness and profanity, and the associated dominance 
and suppression of system boundaries, only have meaning 
in relation to a history of movements within the 
system, and in relation to interactions between the 
system and numerous others. This last point is crucial. 
As Douglas 
profanity 
(1966) has pointed out, sacredness and 
(and associated ritual) only make sense 
ultimately if seen in the context of the wider system: 
the single system with its discrete primary and 
secondary boundaries is an idealised, semi-dynamic 
model that helps us understand the principles involved 
in the relationship between boundary and value. In 
everyday life, however, we move from one 
representation 
overlap. 
to another, and these will 
system 
often 
We might gain insight into some phenomena by using this 
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model, but like all models it is a means of reducing 
complexity. We should always remain critically aware 
that we live within a dynamic web of boundaries, 
marginalisations, ethical conflicts and value 
judgments, and never be tempted to regard any systems 
representation as an absolute. 
13.3 The Profane Environment 
"Holding this warning in the back of our minds, it 
should nevertheless be helpful to use this model to 
clarify how and why "the environment" becomes 
marginalised, made profane, and then comes to be 
subject to (often ritual) abuse. 
Let us take as our primary boundary the one that is 
commonly placed around the human species. Let us also 
take as our secondary boundary the planet as a whole. 
This represents the common humanist division we find 
between "ourselves" and our "environment". We actually 
see this division reflected in all sorts of 
classifications, such as "natural" versus "man-made", 
and "natural science" versus "social science". 
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Now, the ethic that arises from the primary boundary is 
pursuit of human survival and well-being, regardless of 
"environmental consequences": i.e., consequences that 
are seen as arising 'outside' the primary boundary. In 
contrast, the ethic that arises from the secondary 
boundary is pursuit of planetary survival and well-
being. Of course the planetary boundary includes human 
beings. 
These two ethics clearly come into conflict. Human 
well-being, defined in a manner that excludes the non-
human world of which the human being is a part, allows, 
for instance, the indiscriminate plunder of the world's 
rainforests in a non-sustainable manner. Planetary 
well-being, on the other hand, is directly threatened 
by such activities: the global climate is altered and, 
perhaps more important in terms of planetary ecology 
(Lovelock, 
reduced. 
1988), species diversity is drastically 
We see quite clearly that it is the non-human 
"environment" that is marginalised between these two 
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boundaries. As the two ethics corne into conflict, it is 
this "environment" that is in danger of being made 
either sacred or profane. 
Now, humanism involves privileging the primary boundary 
and its associated ethic. Given ethical conflict, this 
is achieved through the social process of making the 
"environment" profane. To generalise, the non-human 
world comes to be regarded as either an untamed 
wilderness full of potential danger or as a "natural 
resource" for human control and consumption (or 
possibly both). 
Both interpretations invite desecration, and this is 
seen most publically in ritual form. We engage in 
rituals where human beings "conquer" nature: 
expeditions 
inhospitable 
exhibition 
examples. 
into unexplored regions, the 
mountain peaks, and the 
climbing of 
taming and 
of wild animals in circuses are all 
Similarly, use of the non-human "environment" as a 
"natural resource" also becomes most obvious when 
desecration takes ritual form: for example, when we 
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fence off land as "private property", carry out an LD50 
test8 for a new cosmetic using laboratory animals, 
watch a bullfight or prepare a lavish meal from the 
carcass of an animal, we are stating that we have the 
right to use the marginalised non-human "environment" 
as we see fit.9 
13.4 The Question of Legitimacy 
This attitude to the "environment" that emerges out of 
the systemic assumption of humanism pervades much 
mainstream Western thinking. 
Now, the question of the legitimacy of humanism arises 
because we cannot actually say that there is a real 
separation between "us" (human beings) and "it" (the 
environment). This is the inevitable conclusion that 
arises out of our discussion in Chapter 10 of the 
interdependencies we are now experiencing between 
notions like ecological harmony, social justice and 
individual freedom. 
324 
Indeed, in Chapter 10, we showed how the perpetuation 
of a number of discourses (for example, economic growth 
and automation) lead to the social destruction of 
ecological harmony. These discourses are essentially 
humanist in their boundary assumptions: for example, 
the economy is seen to "grow", but it is generally not 
appreciated that this growth can only happen if we suck 
"resources" in from outside the boundary of our human 
economy. 
If the separation humanism invokes can 
described as an artificial one, then we are 
justified in saying that the (often ritual) 
indeed be 
entirely 
abuse of 
the non-human is not merely "environmental" it is 
just as much self-abuse. Our "selves" are, of course, 
wider than the uncritically privileged boundaries of 
our human bodies. 
If the uncritical privileging of the human boundary is 
the defining feature of humanism, and this inevitably 
gives rise to abusive action, then, I would suggest, we 
must take a moral stand against its legitimacy. The 
alternative already identified - one that is consistent 
with our wish to promote, rather than destroy, 
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ecological harmony - is an ecological perspective 
allows us to centre or decentre ourselves 
appropriate. 
13.5 Knowledge-Constitutive Interests Revisited 
that 
as 
Having explored some of the problems of humanism, we 
are now in a position to return to Haberrnas's theory of 
knowledge-constitutive interests (1972). This is, I 
would argue, irredeemably humanist. In particular, we 
can identify a major assumption Haberrnas makes which 
indicates that he has indeed privileged the human 
boundary uncritically. 
Habermas's major assumption is that the three interests 
are indeed human interests. He is quite explicit about 
this, stating that his theory is "anthropological". The 
interests emerge from the need for human beings to work 
(to predict and control their environment), to co-
operate in working (to move toward consensus through 
communication), and to free themselves from oppressive 
power relationships (to reveal "distortions" in 
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communication that serve to perpetuate situations that 
are against our interests). 
If, however, we accept that the human boundary does not 
necessarily have to be seen as the origin of our 
interests, we can develop an alternative scenario. Yes, 
it would appear that human beings have to be present 
for there to be interests in the first place, but these 
interests may actually be seen as emerging from wider 
system boundaries that embrace more than the human. We 
could, for example, suggest that the planetary boundary 
is a more appropriate one to use. 
The implications of such a scenario are profound. 
Perhaps the most important is that the technical 
interest can no longer be seen as representing a human 
need to predict and control the environment. Moving to 
the planetary boundary would suggest that the technical 
interest - if it is still legitimate to use such a term 
is concerned with action to promote ecological 
harmony. 10 
Given that Habermas (1972) talks about specifically' 
human interests, and about human beings predicting and 
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controlling their "environment", we cannot help but 
conclude that his theory of knowledge-constitutive 
interests is indeed intrinsically humanist. 
As I have already argued, uncritically privileging the 
human boundary leads to a marginalisation of the 
"environment" and the attribution of a profane status 
to it. An abusive relationship with the non-human 
"environment", which is just as much self-abuse as 
abuse of the "other" given that human beings are most 
appropriately seen as part of wider systems, cannot 
help but ensue. 
If humanism lacks legitimacy given our current 
awareness of ecological interdependence, and Habermas's 
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests (1972) makes 
humanist assumptions, then I would suggest that it is 
inappropriate for use as an epistemological 
underpinning for the Critical Systems notion of 
pluralism. 
328 
13.6 Conclusion 
It would appear that we have no choice but to abandon 
the theory of knowledge-constitutive interests despite 
the fact that, on the surface, it would appear to be 
logically consistent with Critical Systems Thinking. 
Our task in the next chapter will therefore be movement 
toward the identification of a possible alternative. 
Notes 
1. In saying that our planet is an organism, Lovelock 
(1979, 1988) makes it clear that he is not suggesting 
the Earth is "alive" in the same sense as a human 
being, an anteater or a bacterium. Nevertheless, the 
Earth has similar organismic characteristics, such as 
the ability to self-regulate. The word "organism" is 
used, it would seem, as a metaphor. 
2. Throughout this chapter I have placed the word 
"environment" in inverted commas. This is because 
"environment" essentially means "that which surrounds". 
The term "environment" therefore already assumes a 
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boundary around something that is being surrounded; 
relation 
the human 
to our current discourse this 'something' 
species. The inverted commas signal 
that talking about the "environment" as 
entity betrays a humanist assumption 
recognition 
generalised 
language. 
in 
is 
a 
a 
in 
3. The relationship between boundary (an aspect of 
truth) and value (rightness) is an essentially systemic 
one. It would be a nonsense to say that either one 
should be seen as an absolute a priori. Nevertheless, 
while we may paint a meta-theoretical picture of the 
interdependence of boundary and value, in the actual 
process of thinking we move between "worlds" of truth, 
rightness and subjective understanding (See Chapter 14 
of this thesis as well as Midgley, 1990c, 1992b). In 
practice, then, we talk in terms of the origin of a 
particular value or ideology lying in 'the system', or 
a system boundary as having a particular ideological 
root: the notions of origins and roots in everyday 
thinking are essentially bound to the rationality of 
the moment and, following their emergence, should 
ideally become available for critique. When theories of 
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origin become ossified, whether these be theories of 
the natural world (e.g., evolution, creation, the 
'inalienable' laws of physics) or theories of ontology 
or epistemology (e.g., that any of the natural, social 
or subjective "worlds" has an absolute a priori status) 
then critical thinking inevitably becomes limited. 
4. The choice of the words "sacred" and "profane" is 
deliberate. Although I could have employed a more 
'neutral' or secular terminology such as 'valued' 
versus 'devalued', this would have left me open to the 
accusation of perpetuating an artificial Western 
distinction between the secular and religious (with 
language associated with the secular being better 
respected in academic circles). In terms of the 
relationships between boundary, value and ritual, I 
believe that the same processes operate whether they be 
classified as religious or secular. Also, the more 
emotive language of sacredness and profanity better 
conveys the urgency of addressing some of the problems 
that can be seen to arise through marginalisation. 
5. Of course sacredness and profanity, with their 
associated rituals, can also be seen to flow from other 
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sources not traditionally described in systems terms. 
For example, Douglas (1966) and Leach (1976) both offer 
interesting examples of danger that is seen to arise in 
the margins of categorisations: Douglas's analysis of 
the Abominations of Leviticus is particularly 
interesting for the way it explains the Biblical 
proscription of certain meats on the basis that the 
animals from which they are derived infringe the God-
given categorisation system which animals, birds and 
fish should conform to in order to be considered holy. 
Although we often refer to a series of related 
categorisations as a "categorisation system", this is 
not systemic in the same sense as I have used the term, 
and hence the analysis presented in this paper should 
be seen as complementary to anthropological analyses 
and not ln competition with them. Indeed, exploration 
of the mutual reinforcement of categorisation 
and boundary judgments will hopefully prove a 
further avenue for research. 
systems 
fruitful 
6. It must be emphasised that it is ethical conflict in 
relation to marginalisation that is the key to 
understanding sacredness and profanity here. Where 
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consideration of primary and secondary boundaries do 
not give rise to obvious issues of rightness, then 
sacredness and profanity will not come to the surface 
of consciousness, although they might nevertheless be 
acted out unconsciously. This is perhaps why so many 
'natural' scientists still claim that knowledge and 
boundaries can be regarded as value-free: they see no 
rightness implications in the choices they make between 
system boundaries in their areas of interest. There is 
both a validity and a legitimacy problem here. All 
choice involves judgments of right and wrong (Habermas, 
1976a), including choices between boundaries, so the 
argument for value-neutrality is invalid unless one 
dispenses with the notion of choice itself. Also, we 
have recently come to realise that the way we look at 
the ecology of the natural world has very definite 
implications for what we judge to be right and wrong 
socially (see, for instance, Chapter 10 of this 
thesis), so the continued legitimacy of the argument 
for value-neutrality in terms of being able to support 
a viable social system must also be brought into 
question. 
7. Flood (1990a) has introduced Foucault's theory of 
333 
power and knowledge into the discourse of Critical 
Systems Thinking. Foucault (e.g., 1980) s€es an 
intimate relationship between power and knowledge in 
that each is a meaningless concept without the other. 
Indeed, power is expressed in the rise of some 
knowledges into positions of dominance and the 
subjugation of others. In many ways, then, the 
processes identified in this part of the thesis 
complement Foucault's understanding by providing some 
further explanations of the 'mechanisms' by which some 
knowledges and ethics achieve dominance while others 
come to be suppressed. 
8. "LDSO II is short for "lethal dose, 50% ". All drugs 
and cosmetics using previously unutilised ingredients 
have, by law, to be force fed to animals (usually 
rabbits) until 50% of them have died. 
9. It is no wonder, then, that so many people in the 
Green movement write about the beauty of walking (e.g., 
Kumar, 1992), and so many others espouse vegetarianism. 
The value of the secondary boundary, and its associated 
ethic that promotes planetary well-being, is threatened 
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by marginalisation of the "environment" 
designation of everything non-human as 
natural defensive reaction is to 
and the 
profane. A 
make the 
"environment", or aspects of it such as land and non-
human animals, sacred. 
10. One could argue that part of the problem here is 
that Habermas has based his humanism on an implicit 
acceptance of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. In 
Chapter 11 I followed Ho (1989) in arguing that the 
idea of species in competition does not take on board 
the interdependent relationships we can find between 
"organisms" and their "environment". It is as valid to 
say that the organism helps to create the environment 
as it is to say that the environment establishes 
conditions which the organism must adapt to. 
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CHAPTER 14: TOWARDS AN ADEQUATE ONTOLOGY 
We have established that, for Critical Systems Thinking 
to be credible, we require some exploration of the 
philosophical assumptions that underpin the notion of 
pluralism. This is because the different methods we 
draw upon in pluralist research assume very different 
things about "reality" and our knowledge of it. In 
other words, we must discover a form of underpinning 
that will allow us to harmonise our use of the 
different methods so as to remove philosophical 
contradiction. 
We have also established that Habermas's theory of 
knowledge-constitutive interests (1972) is adequate to 
the task of underpinning the Critical Systems notion of 
pluralism. However, we must raise questions about its 
legitimacy in the light of our wish to promote 
ecological harmony. Such questions arise because of the 
fundamentally humanist assumptions Habermas makes. 
Our task in this chapter is to identify an alternative. 
Such an alternative must be discovered otherwise our 
understanding of pluralism will inevitably founder upon 
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the rock of contradiction. 
14.1 From Epistemology to Ontology 
Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests 
(1972) is an epistemological theory. It claims to tell 
us something about what we can know. It is interesting 
to note, however, that in the late 1970s and early 
1980s Habermas began to abandon his work on 
epistemology in order to focus upon ontology - the 
study of what is [see, for example, Habermas (1976a)]. 
Giddens (1985) notes that Habermas did not say why he 
changed his emphasis, and has never made any attempt to 
relate his epistemological and ontological theories 
together. 
In the absence of any clear explanation, it seems 
reasonable to suggest a possibility. We should note 
that all epistemological statements inevitably involve 
ontological assumptions. If we talk about knowledge, we 
should not try to avoid discussing the "reality" this 
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knowledge appears to be part of. 
As Fuenrnayor (1991a) points out, the relationship 
between ontology and epistemology is circular: even 
"reality" is only knowledge of reality, ｡ｬｾｨｯｵｧｨ＠ this 
knowledge always seems to be part of something "real" 
(which, of course, is itself only knowledge of what is 
real). Perhaps Habermas, already being of a mind to 
favour a theory of the communicative construction of 
reality (1972, 1976a), decided that epistemology might 
most usefully be seen as an aspect of ontological 
exploration. 
This is certainly my own feeling, which is why, in this 
Chapter, I intend to focus upon ontology rather than 
epistemology in order to try to develop an adequate 
philosophical underpinning for our notion of pluralism 
that can be considered legitimate, as well as logically 
consistent, given our current ecological concerns. 
It is important for me to acknowledge that I am only at 
the beginning stages of this ontological exploration. 
As such, the material presented here will no doubt 
undergo further clarification as my thinking develops. 
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Although I cannot say that these ideas are perfectly 
formed as yet, I do believe that the line of reasoning 
I have pursued here shows some promise. 
14.2 The Limits of Ontology 
Let us begin, then, by clarifying what we will not be 
doing in conducting an ontological exploration. We will 
not be stepping beyond discourse, even though we might 
recognise that there is more to reality than discourse 
alone. 
In order to understand why this is the case we need to 
follow Heraclitus (approximately 600-500 Be) who 
declared that the fundamentally interconnected nature 
of the Universe is simply not accessible to human 
rationality. It can only be accessed when language is 
by-passed: "when you have listened, not merely to me 
(the speaker), but when you maintain yourselves in 
hearkening attunement, then there is proper hearing"l. 
Heraclitus talked about the Logos. At the risk of 
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making a slip-shod translation into modern systems 
language, the term Logos can be said to refer to the 
ultimate reality of interrelation and change that binds 
absolutely everything together into a dynamic, 
unfolding process. When we see and think, Heraclitus 
felt, we can only ever be aware of a tiny part of the 
picture, and the image we have of reality is distorted 
by our static classifications and the bounded nature of 
our vision. 
The Logos, 
Consequently 
then, escapes adequate description. 
it also escapes any possibility of total 
rational justification. The everyday interconnectedness 
we have empirical knowledge of is not the ultimate 
interconnectedness of reality. As far as our everyday 
thinking goes, the Logos cannot be known; it can only 
represent an ideal that reminds us that no boundary is 
absolute. 
If the Logos escapes description, it might seem that 
the only adequate vision of ontology is one which 
dispenses with language and thought in the exploration 
of reality. Indeed, this is what some people writing 
from a spiritual tradition [e.g., McBurney (1990)] have 
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claimed. 
However, I would have to argue that ontology is, most 
basically, concerned with discourses about reality. It 
is not about "experiencing" reality through spiritual 
enlightenment. This is not to say that such experiences 
are invalid - just that ontology consists of statements 
and arguments about reality. Even the writings of 
spiritual visionaries like Krishnamurti (1991), 
beautiful though they are, are essentially discursive: 
they guide one down a spiritual path. 
Indeed, McBurney (1990) recognises the irony of trying 
to describe the indescribable. Perhaps, as wooliston 
(1992) argues, when McBurney advises the abandonment of 
conceptual thinking he is actually pointing to the gaps 
between the words - looking toward the "other" of 
language that defines, and is in turn defined by, its 
limits. If so, then McBurney's thinking is doubly 
ironic, if no less inspiring for that. 
It seems that an adequate ontology will inevitably be 
based in language. It will be a series of statements 
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about reality, crystallising elements that, in some 
sense, will appear to be useful in helping us to 
understand where we are. "Usefulness" can, of course, 
only be judged in terms of other discourses: in this 
case our discourses of interdependence, pluralism, and 
ontological complexity. 
Given that we will be making discursive claims about 
reality that we know are inadequate in the face of the 
Logos, but nevertheless seem to be useful, we need to 
ask which elements we should be focusing upon. 
14.3 Three Paradigms of Ontological Thought 
We can turn for inspiration to some of the ontological 
claims that have been made in the past. A review of the 
literature suggests that three broad paradigms of 
thought have been developed 2 . 
First, we have authors who take a realist line. 
Essentially, these thinkers claim that there is a world 
"out there", independent from the observer, that we 
make reference to even if our knowledge of it can never 
342 
be perfect. Realists maintain that all language and 
action is directed toward something or other, so 
refusing to talk about independent reality makes no 
sense. Realism is, in a way, a "common sense" view of 
the way things are, although a sophisticated 
philosophical tradition has been developed to support 
it. Recent writers in this tradition include Popper 
(1972) and Bhaskar (1978, 1979, 1986, 1989). 
Second, we have authors in the tradition of Berkeley 
(1710) and Kant (1787) who take an idealist position. 
These writers believe that reality is constituted by 
subjective knowledge. Kant, for example, talks in terms 
of the IItranscendental subject". Idealists point out 
that, were we not here, the very notion of "reality" 
would simply disappear. How, then, can we say that 
"reality" is independent of human knowledge? 
The third paradigm, although having roots in idealism, 
moves away from "subjective knowledge" to focus upon 
the normative construction of both "external" reality 
and II internal " understanding. Here, all our knowledge 
of what is, and what we are, is said to have its 
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origins in the social rules and forces that govern the 
production and reproduction of knowledge. 
A particularly fascinating writer in this tradition is 
Foucault (e.g., 1972). Foucault advances the thesis 
that power and knowledge come to be intimately related 
in the evolution of everyday discourse. According to 
him, it is in the process of conducting day to day 
human communications that knowledges rise and fall, 
come to dominate or come to be suppressed according to 
the patterns of existing power relationships. 
Furthermore, it is these knowledges that actually shape 
the patterns of power themselves. Therefore Foucault 
claims that the very concepts of power and knowledge 
are meaningless if considered independently from one 
another [Foucault (1980)]. For Foucault, there are no 
absolute truths and no essences of self - there is only 
power working through discourse to constitute "truths" 
and "subjectivities". 
Of course this is just one view of the 'mechanism' of 
normative construction. Another contrasting view can be 
found, for example, in Habermas's theory of 
communicative action (e.g., 1984a,b), touched upon in 
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Chapter 6. 
We can now try to bring the best of all three 
perspectives into a new, multi-faceted paradigm to 
arrive 
exclude 
them. 3 
at an adequate vision of ontology that will not 
the most important insights of anyone of 
At first sight this would seem to be an impossible task 
because of the supposedly "fundamental" differences 
between them. Realists, for example, tend to describe 
both normative forces and subjectivity as emergent 
properties of object relations. 
Idealists, 
relations 
on the other hand, view both object 
and normative forces as relative to 
subjectivity. This is the case with early idealists, 
although it could be argued that later idealists blur 
the 'boundary' between the normative and subjective. 
In contrast to both these positions, those who focus 
upon social rules and forces talk about both object 
relations and our understandings of self as normatively 
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constructed through a knowledge/power network, or a 
socially shared classificatory system. 
In order to construct a new, multi-faceted paradigm we 
will need to preserve the essential elements of the 
above positions. I would suggest that the first step 
toward achieving this can be taken by contextualising 
possible uses of these essential elements within a 
theory of the process of thinking. This will involve an 
"alignment" of the three ontological paradigms with 
three uses of their essential elements. 
By suggesting that these elements are complementary In 
some respect we will have removed them from their 
original paradigms which are, of course, incommensurate 
with one another; we will have moved them into our new 
paradigm. 
Such a theory of the process of thinking will have to 
acknowledge that thought has a time dimension. Thus the 
use of anyone of the essential elements of the three 
positions becomes a "moment" of thought. From there we 
will be able to take a further step toward a new vision 
of ontology by considering the implications of each 
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kind of "moment" for an adequate statement about 
"reality" . 
So, where can we look for inspiration to construct such 
a contextualisation? Possibly in the writings of 
Habermas (1976a) - although, for reasons to be touched 
upon later, his ideas might require a little reworking. 
14.4 Habermasian Thought 
Habermas (1976a) has developed a particularly 
interesting vision of ontology based upon an analysis 
of rational argumentation. He claims that there are 
four implicit validity statements inherent in any 
sentence intended for communication. Giddens (1985) 
summarises his position neatly: 
"When I say something to someone else, I 
implicitly make the following claims: that what I 
say is intelligible; that its propositional 
content is true; that I am justified in saying it; 
and that I speak sincerely, without intent to 
deceive" . 
The first of these implicit claims, that what I say is 
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intelligible, is simply a precondition for effective 
communication. However the other three, when made 
explicit, can all be questioned and justified through 
rational argumentation. 
It is these three claims that refer directly to three 
"worlds": the claim that my statement's propositional 
content is true relates to what is thought of as the 
external natural world; the claim that I am justified 
in making it relates to our social world; and the claim 
that I speak sincerely relates to my internal world 4 . 
Habermas makes it clear, however, that these three 
"worlds" are bound together intimately - they are 
actually only extricated from one another through the 
functioning of 'good' rational argumentationS. 
We are saying, then, that it is possible to make, and 
challenge, truth statements, rightness statements and 
statements about an individual's subjectivity. There 
are therefore three domains of rationality. The first 
is the world of object relations (where inquiry is 
primarily truth-orientated), the second is the world of 
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normative value judgments (where inquiry is primarily 
rightness-orientated), and the third is the internal 
world of the individual (where inquiry is primarily 
orientated toward understanding subjectivity)6. 
We are not, however, able to access all three domains 
of rationality at the same moment In time. We are 
limited to thinking about "reality" in terms of a 
series of issues, moving from one related issue to 
another. 
14.5 Implications for an Adequate Ontological Statement 
Haberrnas's ontology appears to bring the essential 
ingredients of our three paradigms of ontological 
thought (object relations, normative forces and 
subjectivity) together in one new paradigm. 
However, in grounding this vision in communication, 
Habermas gives language and argumentation an a priori 
status. In effect, language and argumentation represent 
his "reality", and the three "worlds" he identifies are 
merely extrapolations from it. To me this is rather 
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problematic because the existence of argumentation 
seems to presume, for example, the existence of beings 
who argue. 
In one sense I can see why Habermas hesitates in making 
an ontological leap from argumentation to the existence 
of beings who argue. It fits with his wider 
understanding of the "life-world". The life-world, 
according to Habermas (e.g., 1984a,b), is the totality 
of shared understandings that language refers to. It is 
the existence of the life-world that makes 
communication possible. 
This is a development of Wittgenstein's idea (1958) 
that language does not refer to external reality, yet 
is necessarily conditioned by it. Giddens (1991) offers 
a useful summary of Wittgenstein's position: 
"There is a universally experienced world of 
external reality, but it is not directly reflected 
in the meaningful components of the conventions in 
terms of which actors organise their behaviour. 
Meaning is not built up through descriptions of 
external reality, nor does it consist in semiotic 
codes ordered independently of our encounters with 
that reality. Rather, 'what cannot be put into 
words' - interchanges with persons and objects on 
the level of daily practice - forms the necessary 
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condition of what can be said and of the meanings 
involved in practical consciousness. 
To know the meaning of words is thus to be able to 
use them as an integral part of the routine 
enactment of day-to-day life. We come to know 
reality not from perceiving it as it is, but as a 
result of the differences formed in daily 
practice" . 
In the light of such a philosophy, Habermas's refusal 
to make an ontological statement that stretches beyond 
language and argumentation does make some sense. To 
move from argumentation to the existence of beings who 
argue would be to risk speaking about something we can 
have no knowledge of. That is, the external reality of 
those beings. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that such ontological 
statements are less problematic than they might at 
first appear. If we follow Wittgenstein in accepting 
that nothing we describe is a direct reflection of 
external reality, then this must include all 
descriptions contained within ontological statements. 
Whether we focus upon language and argumentation or 
something beyond this, we are still not talking about 
"ultimate" reality. 
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There is therefore no need to stop with the (surely 
counter-intuitive) position that language and 
argumentation represent an ontological a priori. The 
posited existence of argumentation is itself merely a 
truth claim that can be anchored with reference to a 
wider set of truth claims about "reality". 
So, let us make a statement about "reality" that has 
been extrapolated from Habermas's thinking: 
"Reality" 
("objects" , 
is constituted by 
"systems" and 
objective phenomena 
"relations"), many 
subjectivities, and power (expressed in the evolution 
and use of normative rules). All three (objective 
phenomena, power and subjectivity) are absolutely and 
inextricably interdependent. 
This requires a little explanation, especially with 
regard to the notion of an interdependence between 
objective phenomena, power and subjectivity. We can, in 
fact, show how each of these is dependent on the 
others. So, in all, six dependencies can be revealed 
(although to reveal them in the form of a linear 
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argument is inevitably rather artificial): 
First of all we have to acknowledge that "objective 
phenomena" rely for their recognition upon the presence 
of sentient beings. We must ask, then, "what are the 
conditions for recognising something as objective?". In 
order to be described as "objective" rather than 
"subjective", it must be assumed that these phenomena 
are appreciated by more than one sentient being - i.e., 
more than one subjectivity7. This is the case because 
"objective" is the other to "subjective", and 
"subjective lt presumes a single subject. The first 
dependency is therefore revealed: recognition of 
objective phenomena depends on the existence of 
multiple subjectivities. 
Furthermore, in order for these beings to realise that 
this is the case, they must be able to communicate. 
Communication presumes the evolution of a normatively 
accepted set of rules (a language), and it is just such 
rules that I have defined as constituting power. Here 
we see the second dependency: the recognition of 
objective phenomena depends upon the operation of 
power. 
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Now, we have noted that power presumes the evolution of 
normatively accepted rules. Evolution means change, and 
change can only come about if there are different 
perspectives (i.e., subjectivities) impacting upon 
these rules. If normative rules required no active 
development by their users, then no changes in shared 
knowledges could occur. Shared knowledges and normative 
rules (most especially rules for communication) are 
intimately linked because even the use of words to 
express knowledge requires the acceptance or evolution 
of rules to define what these words might mean. The 
fact that we can identify changes in shared knowledges, 
rules, and therefore power relations, shows us where 
the third dependency lies: the operation of power 
depends upon there being subjectivities impacting upon 
it. 
If there are indeed many subjectivities, then we have 
to ask "how can this be?" What conditions could give 
rise to differences between subjectivities? The answer, 
I would suggest, is that subjectivities are localised 
in time and space - in the domain of objective 
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phenomena - so that (inevitably limited) perspectives 
differ from one another8 . Here, then, we have the 
fourth dependency: the existence of 
subjectivities 
phenomena. 
depends on there being 
Now, in 
phenomena 
arguing 
depends 
that the existence of 
on the operation of 
multiple 
objective 
objective 
power, I 
suggested that in order for subjects to share the 
realisation that there are objective phenomena, they 
must be able to communicate. Communication relies upon 
a normatively accepted set of rules (a language), and 
it is just such rules that constitute power. However, 
we can also say that, in order for subjects to share 
the realisation that they are actually subjects (and 
that there is more than one subject), they must 
similarly be able to communicate. Therefore we are in a 
position to reveal the fifth dependency: the existence 
of multiple subjectivities also depends upon the 
operation of power. 
So, there is only one possible dependency left. Given 
that the operation of power depends upon the existence 
of multiple subjectivities impacting upon it, and the 
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existence of multiple subjectivities depends on there 
being a realm of objective phenomena, we have to say 
that the operation of power also depends on there being 
a realm of objective phenomena so that subjectivities 
can be separated across time and space in order for 
them to have their impact upon it. 
Here we see the intimate interdependence of objective 
phenomena, power and subjectivity, albeit described 
using a restrictive linear language. 
We need to reiterate, however, that we cannot deal with 
all of these simultaneously during the process of 
argumentation: we make and challenge statements 
orientated toward the ideals of truth (about objective 
phenomena), rightness (about what should be normatively 
accepted), and subjective understanding (about the 
orientation of a particular subjectivity) in a linear 
fashion. It therefore seems to me unsurprising that so 
many writers have sought to prioritise one of these 
aspects of "reality" and have then reduced the others 
down to emergent properties of it. 
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Hence we have the three seemingly opposed viewpoints 
(realism, 
reflecting 
idealism and normative constructivism), each 
the dominance of one particular facet of 
"reality". In consequence, as I shall argue in more 
detail soon, we also have the emergence of isolationist 
paradigms of scientific inquiry which try to make one 
of the three ideals (truth, rightness or subjective 
understanding) dominant. 
14.6 The Limits of Human Expression 
Before we reflect upon this vision of ontology in the 
our understanding of 
outlined in Chapter 13, 
the ecological 
let me reiterate 
light of 
perspective 
once again, in order to be absolutely clear, that the 
ontological statement I have made does not describe 
"ultimate" reality. It will be seen to have meaning, 
however, in terms of the discourses we are concerned 
with in this thesis. 
We have identified three broad paradigms that focus 
upon the constructive power of object relations, 
subjectivity and normative forces. This statement 
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brings the essential elements of all three into a 
description of "reality". 
By declaring that this ontological statement gains its 
meaning from its relationship with other discourses, 
rather than from "ultimate" reality in any direct 
sense, we are acknowledging that all statements (which 
are necessarily embedded in the conceptual realm) are 
inadequate to describe that reality.9 
14.8 Beyond Humanism, Toward an Ecological Perspective 
Let us stop for a moment and reflect once more upon the 
assumptions this vision of ontology makes in terms of 
the humanist/ecologi8al distinction outlined earlier. 
You will remember that the purpose of developing this 
ontology was to move us beyond the humanist perspective 
underpinning Habermas's theory of knowledge-
constitutive interests (1972). 
Haberrnas (1972) makes the assumption that interests 
flow from bounded human beings who need to predict and 
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control their "environment". In contrast, I am 
following Habermas's later work (1976a) which talks 
about making, and arguing over, truth statements, 
rightness statements and statements about subjective 
understanding. According to Habermas, these reflect 
three "worlds": the external natural "world", the 
normative social "world" and the internal "world" of 
the individual. 
This would appear to move beyond humanism because, in 
making truth statements, one can be critical about the 
boundaries one adopts. The human boundary need not 
be privileged automatically. 
However, as I noted earlier, Habermas's vision (1976a) 
is grounded in an a priori theory of language and 
argumentation which, I would suggest, has not been 
recognised for what it is - an ontological theory. The 
notion of argumentation as ultimate reality appears 
somewhat counter-intuitive to me. After all, who is 
doing the arguing? 
We have seen how, in Habermas's terms, refusing to 
specify who is doing the arguing does make some sense, 
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given that he 
Wittgensteinian 
is pursuing 
theory. However, 
a development 
if we accept 
of 
my 
earlier argument that Wittgenstein's position is not 
actually compromised by specifying elements of 
"reality", then we begin to wonder what is being passed 
over when Habermas fails to say who it is that argues. 
Could it be that it is always human beings who argue 
after all? In which case, the humanist assumption of a 
privileged human boundary might be there, lurking 
uncritically in an area which Habermas refuses to speak 
of. 
However, when we move out of the communicative paradigm 
by suggesting that "reality" is more than 
communicative, and is actually constituted by the 
trinity of objective phenomena, power (expressed in the 
evolution and use of normative rules) and subjectivity, 
we bypass this potential problem. 
It is possible to specify that a human being, or a 
group of human beings, gives rise to (or argues with) a 
statement. It is equally possible to suggest, however, 
360 
that 
human 
a statement or argument has a wider origin. Yes, 
beings need to be present, but the privileged 
boundary for understanding the origins of a statement 
or argument could be local, regional, cultural, 
societal or even planetary. 
We should note that even "subjectivity" - one of the 
constitutive 
necessarily 
elements of "reality" 
presume the privileging of 
- does not 
a human 
boundary. Given our acceptance of the fact that the 
boundary between human beings and their "environment" 
is only one of many possible boundaries that can be 
privileged, a subjectivity can be seen as rooted in any 
boundary containing a person. This boundary might be 
the person's body, it might be their society, their 
immediate environment, their country, or (again) even 
the planet. 
We see quite clearly that this vision of ontology 
overcomes the bonds of humanism that tied the early 
work of Habermas. It does not prevent the use of a 
human boundary, but refuses it any a priori privilege. 
It is therefore consistent with the ecological 
perspective outlined in Chapter 13. 
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14.9 Ontology and Ontological Complexity 
We now have the beginnings of an ontological vision 
that, I would argue, promises to be both credible in 
terms of internal logic, and legitimate given our 
current ecological concerns. 
In the next chapter I intend to return to the main 
theme of this thesis, methodological pluralism, in 
order to show how this vision of ontology might 
underpin it. However, before rounding this chapter off, 
I need to deal with one final issue. 
In Chapter 10 I introduced the notion of ontological 
complexity. This is the understanding that complexities 
of the objective natural "world", the normative social 
"world", and our subjective inner "worlds" corne 
together to form a meta-level complexity - an 
"ontological complexity" - that we have to deal with in 
our inquiries. 
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This is important because so many of the issues we are 
dealing with today, especially global issues, are 
characterised by a complex interdependence between what 
we see as ecological truths, ways in which groups of 
people think it is right to behave, and individual 
perspectives that impact upon both of these. 
To refresh our memories, we left Chapter 10 with an 
acknowledgement that the term "ontological complexity" 
would be taken as given, but would be fleshed out later 
in the thesis. It is time to do this now. In 
particular, I need to explain why I have called this 
complexity "ontological". 
Our meta-level complexity can be described 
"ontological" because, in trying to deal 
interdependence between the 
complexity through conceptual 
various realms 
rationality, 
as 
with 
of 
we 
inevitably concentrate upon the relationships between 
truth statements, rightness statements and statements 
about subjective meaning. These statements reflect the 
three constitutive elements of "reality" in our 
ontological discourse: object relations, power 
(expressed in the evolution and use of normative rules) 
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and subjectivity. 
Thus our discourses of ontology, ontological complexity 
and ecology become enmeshed together. We have a vision 
of "reality" that is constituted by objective 
phenomena, power and subjectivity (see earlier in this 
chapter); an understanding of complexity that focuses 
upon meta-level relationships between these 
constitutive elements as they come to be separated out 
through rational thinking (Chapter 10); and an emerging 
ecological perspective that requires both the 
possibility of decentring human beings (Chapter 13) and 
the inclusion of normative and subjective concerns 
alongside explorations of objective phenomena (Chapters 
10 and 11). 
14.10 Conclusion 
Here I have begun the task of developing a 
ontology that is consistent with the 
ecological perspective outlined in Chapter 
which clarifies the notion of ontological 
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vision of 
critical 
13, and 
complexity 
introduced in Chapter 10. 
In the next chapter I will be in a position to focus 
thesis, 
how the 
once again upon the central theme of this 
methodological pluralism, in order to show 
vision of ontology presented here might help us 
understand systems practice and deal with some of the 
philosophical problems raised by bringing ideas from so 
many diverse paradigms into one new home. 
Notes 
1. Translated from Greek into German by 
(1954), and from German into English by 
Capuzzi (1975). 
Heidegger 
Krell and 
2. Let me acknowledge that, in reducing all writing on 
ontology down to three paradigms, I am riding rough-
shod over the intricate arguments that have been played 
out in the literature. No doubt there are philosophers 
who would argue for defining a multitude of paradigms, 
but here I am talking about clarifying three meta-
paradigms. 
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3. I am presuming here that such a new, multi-faceted 
paradigm would be useful. In contrast, Wooliston 
(1991c) sees no need for one: he talks in terms of a 
"unity of difference" being provided by the localised 
act of focusing upon what is supposedly incommensurate. 
Wooliston's 
counterpoint 
Ultimately, 
incompatible 
perspective 
to my own, 
provides 
and is 
an interesting 
worth exploring. 
however, I do not see wooliston's view as 
with the ideas expressed in the current 
paper because I am not holding up this new paradigm as 
an absolute first principle. Essentially, because I 
acknowledge that paradigmatic statements about ontology 
are discursively true, rather than "true" in an 
absolute sense, I regard the multi-faceted paradigm I 
am developing as useful in relation to other discourses 
we are currently dealing with: i.e., those surrounding 
the notions of pluralism, complexity, interdependence 
and the future of systems science. It therefore has a 
"local" significance (in both time and space), even 
when our discourses are about "global" issues! 
4. We should note that Habermas drew upon, and adapted, 
366 
the work of Popper (1972) when developing his "three 
worlds" idea. 
5. Although I am drawing upon the work of Habermas 
here, I feel that it is important to state my own, very 
different, view of what 'good' rational argumentation 
is. Habermas (1984a,b) says that 'good' argumentation 
is to do with extricating the three "worlds" from one 
another in any analysis. Some cultures, he maintains, 
have a prevailing "world view" which collapses two or 
more of the "worlds" together. For instance, the rights 
and wrongs of social relationships might be seen as an 
extension of nature in some cultures because the 
dominant view of both is governed by some form of myth. 
What is considered right is therefore taken for granted 
because of what is considered to be true, and both are 
"solidified" in myth. Habermas believes that such 
"world views" represent an intrinsic restriction of 
'good' rational argumentation: "myth binds the critical 
potential of communicative action, stops up, so to 
speak, the source of inner contingencies springing from 
communication itself" (Habermas, 1984b). In contrast, I 
believe that what constitutes 'good' argumentation has 
to be defined in the context of other discourses we 
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regard as important. It is therefore possible for us to 
claim that, in some contexts (e.g., when we are dealing 
with complex global issues), extricating the three 
"worlds" from each other might be necessary, while in 
others it might not be. We therefore escape Habermas's 
inevitable conclusion that forms of rationality other 
than the most "advanced" Western rationality must in 
some sense be "poorer". 
6. An 
about 
example of systems practice that 
the use of Habermas's three 
is explicit 
domains of 
rationality has been described by Fairtlough (1989). 
7. It should be noted here that subjectivity and 
consciousness are not synonymous: a person's subjective 
perspective includes far more than they are consciously 
aware of. 
8. Of course even time and space, like any other 
"objective phenomena", depend for their recognition 
upon the existence of multiple subjectivities and 
power (expressed through the evolution and use of 
normative rules), so we have not escaped into a simple 
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ontological realism here. 
9. We also have to acknowledge that the ontological 
statement presented here entails a further 
"inadequacy". We have noted that we have no choice but 
to deal with "reality" in terms of a series of issues, 
moving from one related issue to another, because we 
cannot think about truth, rightness and subjective 
meaning simultaneously. Obviously human linguistic 
expression is severely limited, and there is an immense 
irony in recognising this limitation. While I have made 
an ontological statement about the way that objective 
phenomena, power and subjectivity constitute reality 
together, this is explicitly a truth claim. It asks us 
to focus on its propositional content, referring to the 
"world" of object relations, to the (hopefully 
temporary) exclusion of the values it presupposes and 
its subjective meaning, which remain implicit. This is 
ironic because, although I have claimed that the three 
are absolutely interdependent in constituting reality, 
one cannot 
ontological 
aspect of 
even express this interdependence in an 
statement without focusing upon just one 
that reality! This is, as we have seen, a 
function of the linear nature of language. All we can 
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do, as I have done to an extent in this paper, is make 
a statement (in this case a truth statement about 
"reality") and then go on to raise the issues that have 
been made implicit by this - in this case the rightness 
of the statement in terms of other discourses 
(pluralism, ontological complexity, etc.), and its 
possible subjective meanings. 
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CHAPTER 15: ONTOLOGY, PLURALISM AND LEGITIMATION 
It is now time to return to the main theme of this 
thesis. I need to show how the vision of ontology I 
have evolved might underpin our understanding of 
methodological pluralism. 
Following this we will be in a position to link all the 
various issues pursued so far in Sections 2 and 3 of 
this thesis: a multi-faceted ontology, ontological 
complexity, critical ecology, the ideal of the unity of 
science, and methodological pluralism. In summary, we 
will be able to conclude that pluralism is actually 
essential for the continued legitimation of systems 
science. 
15.1 Ontology and Pluralism 
Let us begin by demonstrating how the vision of 
ontology evolved in the last chapter might underpin our 
notion of pluralism. 
I have suggested that, reflecting our three 
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constitutive aspects of "reality" (objective phenomena, 
power and subjectivity), are three ideals of inquiry: 
"truth", "rl" ghtness" and" b' t" d d" su Jec lve un erstan lng" , 
Pursuit of the ideal of "truth" means trying to gain as 
'accurate' a knowledge as possible about objective 
phenomena; pursuit of the ideal of "rightness" means 
trying to use the most appropriate normative rules (it 
is the evolution and use of such rules that constitute 
power) , and pursuit of the ideal of "subjective 
understanding" is about gaining as clear a picture as 
possible of a particular subjective perspective, 
Now, if "truth" , "rightness" and "subjective 
understanding" are all legitimate ideals to aim for, 
and we acknowledge the fact that all methods designed 
so far prioritise one ideal over the others, then 
methodological pluralism becomes essential if we are to 
address ontological complexity adequately. 
Of course, the above paragraph hinges on the words "all 
methods designed so far prioritise one ideal over the 
others", so let us look at this assertion a little more 
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closely. 
What we find when we begin to look at methodology is 
that different research methods do indeed emphasise the 
use of these ideals of "truth", "rightness" and 
"subjective understanding" in different ways. There is 
therefore a direct link between our vision of ontology, 
the three ideals of inquiry, and research methodology. 
We can consider some examples. Over the coming pages I 
will look at both "hard" (positivistic) and "soft" 
(interpretive and emancipatory) systems methods to show 
how these ideals are pursued!. 
15.2 Hard Systems Methods 
Hard (positivistic, 
divided into those 
quantitative) methods can be 
which are "summative" and those 
which are "formative". This distinction comes out of 
the evaluation literature. 
Summative methods are those which involve presentation 
of findings in the form of a report as the sole means 
of communicating the results of research. Formative 
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methods, on the other hand, are generally conducted in 
organisations and involve an ongoing, dynamic 
relationship between the researcher and the researched , 
where each inform and shape the practice of the other. 
15.2.1 Surnrnative Methods 
We can begin with sumrnative methods. These try to 
reveal what the subject of investigation 'is really 
like'. In other words, their primary purpose is to 
pursue the ideal of truth. In this pursuit of truth, 
the value system giving rise to the initial selection 
of variables is not up for analysis. Indeed, it is 
often ignored completely. We therefore find many 
summative, hard systems methods described in the 
literature as value neutral. 
Methods which are explicit about the ideology 
underpinning them tend to be the exception rather than 
the rule. Good examples of summative, hard systems 
methods which do declare their ideological standpoints 
(in this case methods for evaluating services for 
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"disadvantaged" people) have been designed 
Wolfensberger and Glenn (1975) and Wolfensberger 
Thomas (1983). However, we should recognise that 
standard, quantitative framework these authors 
would become redundant if the underlying ideology 
to be open to guestion during the actual conduct 
research. 
by 
and 
the 
use 
were 
of 
Interestingly, the methods designed by Wolfensberger 
and co-workers rely to some extent on interviews with 
individuals to generate data. Here the ideal of 
understanding subjectivities comes into play, but of 
course the subjective expressions of the interviewees 
are judged solely in terms of the value systems handed 
down in the methods. Information from interviews simply 
goes toward building a picture of the "truth" (seen 
through the particular value-filter being used). 
While methodological rigour is thought to be important 
in the pursuit of truth, there is little methodological 
guidance provided for the exploration of subjectivity -
and, as we have noted, the value-filter through which 
truth is pursued is not open to analysis at all. 
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15.2.2 Formative Methods 
Indeed, this is not just the case with summative 
methods. We also find that hard, formative systems 
methods are equally dominated by the pursuit of truth. 
Although some might claim that, with formative methods, 
the question "is it true?" is replaced by "does it 
work?", this latter question can be paraphrased more 
accurately as "is it true that it works?". 
In cases where organisational change is stimulated by 
quantitative analysis using a mathematical model, and 
the results are fed back to improve the model, there 
may also be discussions about the selection of 
variables. Such discussions will revolve around issues 
of rightness - "which are the right variables to use?". 
They will, however, have improvement of the model 
i.e., improvement of pursuit of the truth - as their 
primary focus [see the work of Forrester (1961, 1969), 
Meadows (1980) and Roberts et al (1983) for examples]. 
Therefore, rightness issues remain subordinate to 
ｱｵ･ｳｾｾｯｮｳ＠ of truth. 
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Hard (positivistic) methods, then, whether summative or 
formative, are all essentially truth-seeking. In so far 
as rightness and subjectivity come into play at all, 
their exploration is always subordinate to the 
overriding ideal of truth. 
15.3 Soft Systems Methods 
We can move on now to look at soft (qualitative) 
methods. Essentially two different kinds of soft method 
have evolved in the systems sciences: 
First, there are those which have come to be called 
interpretive. These methods seek to establish visions 
of ideal states, or desirable options, which reality 
and subjective viewpoints can be tested against. They 
attempt to clarify differences of viewpoint in order to 
promote dialectical argument and, ultimately, mutual 
understanding and agreement. The idea is that a degree 
of consensus-formation and/or rational decision-making 
on rightness issues (perhaps a compromise based on a 
feasible option) will result from the exploration of 
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viewpoints, although discussion will often have to be 
iterative and on-going. 2 
Second, there are those methods which have been termed 
emancipatory. These are similarly based upon the 
rational exploration of different viewpoints concerning 
rightness, but they place more emphasis on making the 
interests that consensus decisions serve explicit. Let 
us explore each of these in turn. 
15.3.1 Interpretive Methods 
There are many different interpretive systems methods. 
The basic idea of them all, however, is summed up in 
the following transcript of the words of a researcher 
in the field, quoted by Patton (1978): 
This 
"I think that we reported basically other people's 
stories to them. We tried to put a structure on 
it, we tried to analyse it but we were not going 
in with any kind of a priori kinds of 
assumptions". 
quotation reveals the basic assumption of 
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interpretive methods that rightness explorations have 
to come out of inter-subjective communication in the 
local context. The researcher in the field felt that, 
in his or her research, no prior assumptions were being 
made in this exploration, and that the imposed 
structure emerged out of the expressions of 
subjectivity themselves. 
Patton (1987), on the other hand, retreats from 
"negative connotations associated with the term 
'subjectivity'" and asserts that: 
A 
"The practical solution may be to replace the 
traditional search for truth with a search for 
useful and balanced information, and to replace 
the mandate to be objective with a mandate to be 
fair and conscientious in taking account of 
multiple perspectives, multiple interests and 
multiple possibilities". 
number of interpretive systems thinkers have 
emphasised the importance of seeking neutrality. 
Principle amongst these is Checkland (1981). The 
neutral researcher is said to be .... 
"one who is not predisposed toward certain 
findings ahead of time". [He or she] "enters the 
field with no axe to grind, no theory to prove, 
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and no predetermined results to support" (Patton, 
1987). 
This requirement for "neutrality" helps clients avoid 
dependency on the "expert", but it also means that once 
a consensus on rightness (or a compromise to effect 
practical action) has been arrived at, the researcher 
is 'prevented' from engaging in further explorations of 
the interests this consensus or compromise might serve. 
If explorations of rightness are the main focus, yet 
there are multiple viewpoints, explorations of 
subjectivity will obviously be needed to promote the 
mutual understanding that is necessary for rational 
debate about rightness issues. Such explorations of 
subjectivity will always be subordinate to the main 
purpose of the work, however: they will be conducted in 
order to facilitate debate (and ultimately consensus or 
compromise) on rightness. 
Similarly, if interpretivists wish to discard the 
pursuit of truth in favour of "a search for useful and 
balanced information" [Patton (1987)], this information 
will only be "useful" in the context of its 
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relationship with issues of rightness. What 
interpretivists are actually doing, then, is making 
truth-orientated explorations subordinate to inquiries 
into rightness. 
Clearly, it is the ideal of rightness that comes to 
dominate in interpretive research, with the ideals of 
truth and exploration of subjectivity playing 
subordinate or contingent roles. Once a consensus or 
compromise upon rightness has been arrived at, however, 
there is no methodological requirement for further 
challenge. Indeed, the possibility of further challenge 
is actually impeded by a requirement for the researcher 
to remain "neutral". 
15.3.2 Emancipatory Methods 
Supporters of an emancipatory systems approach are 
similarly concerned to avoid domination by the 
"expert", but they tend to differ from interpretivists 
in their understanding of what this should entail. 
Interpretive thinkers stress the "neutrality" of the 
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researcher when it comes to forming a rational 
consensus or compromise on rightness. In contrast, 
emancipatory thinkers seek, as far as possible, to 
avoid merely replacing the unquestioned ideology of the 
expert with the unquestioned ideology of the 
participant group. 
Interpretive research accepts intuitive consensus-
formation about rightness judgments as a valid meeting 
point of subjectivities, whereas the emancipatory 
perspective insists that the interests being served by 
any such consensus be laid open to analysis. 
Here, then, emancipatory researchers part company with 
interpretivists. They refuse to accept the idea that 
the researcher can ever be neutral. While 'democratic' 
participation is regarded as important, this doesn't 
mean automatic acceptance of consensus or compromise 
without an understanding of where this is coming from. 
Emancipatory thinkers also emphasise that as wide a 
variety 
their 
of interested parties as possible should give 
consent to compromise or consensus. Inevitably, 
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then, the researcher is not absolved from the moral 
responsibility of contributing to the formation of the 
vision of rightness, both through helping to assemble 
the interested parties and through direct participation 
in debate. 
In using emancipatory methods there will inevitably be 
a tension between respect for the viewpoints of others 
and the need for everyone, including the researcher, to 
remain critical of the values underlying consensus or 
compromise. This is, essentially, a tension between the 
different "moments" of inquiry (truth-seeking, 
rightness-seeking or seeking an understanding of 
subjective viewpoints) that may inform the inquiry 
process in different ways. 
Nevertheless, we can still say that emancipatory 
in a similar manner research, 
pursues 
dominant 
the rationalisation of 
to interpretivism, 
rightness as its 
ideal. 
explorations 
contingent 
of 
roles. 
Truth-orientated 
subjectivity play 
inquiries 
subordinate 
and 
or 
Arguably truth-seeking (about 
interests being served) has a more prominent role in 
emancipatory research than in interpretive inquiry, but 
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they are still both harnessed in the interests of 
rightness exploration. 
15.4 Exploring Subjectivity 
We see from the above that hard systems methods 
emphasise pursuit of truth as the dominant ideal, while 
soft (interpretive and emancipatory) methods focus 
primarily upon rightness. Interestingly, as far as I am 
aware, there are no systems methods which concentrate 
on subjective understanding as a dominant concern: 
there is clearly scope for development here. 
It is not my intention to pursue this development in 
the current thesis. Nevertheless we might note that, 
given the arguments presented here, there is a need for 
a truly subjective systems perspective within, and not 
instead of, a pluralist perspective. This must be 
distinguished from the interpretive writings of 
Churchman (e.g., 1968a), Ackoff (e.g., 1974) and 
Checkland (e.g., 1981) which, although acknowledging 
subjectivity, still hold rightness as their dominant 
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ideal. 
Perhaps 
the work 
construct 
the psychoanalytic tradition [descended from 
of Freud (e.g., 1915)], Kelly's personal 
theory (1955), and existential philosophy 
[e.g., Merleau-Ponty (1962)] will be of use in creating 
such a subjective systems perspective. 
15.5 Underpinning our Vision of Pluralism 
There is a clear line, then, running from ontology, 
through our understanding of inquiry, and into research 
methodology. The three constitutive elements of reality 
come to be separated through rational analysis, and are 
explored through the pursuit of three different ideals 
of inquiry. Separate systems methodologies have evolved 
which take one of these ideals and make it pivotal, but 
the various methodologies actually make different 
ideals pivotal. 
The Critical Systems idea of pluralism would suggest 
that, in systems research, the three ideals of "truth", 
"rightness" and "subjective understanding" all need to 
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be considered, but also each needs to become pivotal at 
different times - that is, if we are to deal adequately 
with the ontological complexity that I have claimed is 
a key feature of many of the problems, especially those 
of a global nature, that we are currently facing. 
If we accept the argument that there is a need to 
address ontological complexity, and we also accept that 
different systems methods prioritise these ideals in 
different ways, then confining research to the use of 
one method, or a limited set of methods that are all 
seen to work in a similar manner, is nothing short of 
contradictory. This is because such confinement will 
inevitably prioritise one of the ideals of "truth", 
"rightness" or "subjective understanding" over the 
others. 
15.6 Paradigmatic Assumptions 
Having 
regard 
established the beginnings of what 
as a credible philosophical basis 
I would 
for the 
Critical Systems notion of pluralism, it would be 
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useful to reflect once again upon the 'problem' I 
identified in Chapters 7 and 8: that the various 
approaches drawn upon in a pluralist paradigm could be 
seen as philosophically contradictory if we are not 
rigorous in our thinking. 
In Section 1 I suggested that the paradigmatic 
assumptions of a pluralist perspective would need to be 
declared in order to resolve potential contradiction. 
Effectively I have begun the task of doing this by 
starting construction on a new ontology. 
However, I would suggest that the specifically multi-
faceted ontology I have begun to build has implications 
for how we might describe the difference between a 
pluralist paradigm (encompassing a meta-theory) and an 
isolationist one. 
15.6.1 A Paradigm of "Moments" 
To restate Flood's position (1989a), the theoretical 
isolationist operates with a limited "world view" which 
allows a degree of methodological complementarism, but 
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this 1S kept within strictly defined limits. We have to 
ask: how do pluralist "meta-theories" differ from 
isolationist "world views"? 
The key difference actually lies in the way pluralists 
and theoretical isolationists view the operation of 
methodology. All the methods employed by a theoretical 
isolationist will be seen as working in a similar 
manner. In contrast, pluralists recognise that there 
are different 
will attempt 
differ. In 
"moments" in inquiry. Their meta-theories 
to explain how and why these "moments" 
every case theoretical isolationists see 
only one kind of "moment". 
Therefore, as I suggested in Chapter 8, pluralists 
contextualise the essential elements of the ontological 
and epistemological paradigms that methods are drawn 
from. We can now clarify that this contextualisation 
takes the form of reconstructing essential elements as 
"moments" within a wider vision of inquiry. In 
contrast, theoretical isolationists do indeed denature 
the essential elements of other paradigms, reducing 
everything they stand for down to one single "moment". 
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This is why it is important for pluralists to talk 
about the impoverishment of isolationist perspectives 
and not try to challenge their validity. Validity 
debates in this area will inevitably be unproductive 
because all the main paradigmatic positions can be 
defended in their own terms. 
Productive communication can be achieved, however, by 
looking at the legitimacy of pluralist versus 
isolationist perspectives in relation to their 
implications for research (and general) practice. We 
need to discuss the ways in which research impacts upon 
the world, and ourselves within it. 
15.7 The Legitimation of Systems Science 
Indeed, this argument holds for the practice of systems 
science as a whole. Systems science receives legitimacy 
from its ability to handle particularly complex issues; 
especially, at the present time, global issues that 
cannot be defined by any single disciplinary boundary. 
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If we accept, as I have proposed, that many 
issues are characterised by ontological 
rather than a more limited "natural world" 
then a methodological pluralism that can 
partner pursuit of the ideal of the unity 
will actually be essential for the 
legitimation of systems science. 3 
15.8 Conclusion 
of these 
complexity 
complexity, 
effectively 
of science 
continued 
In this chapter we have completed the line of argument 
from ontology, through ontological complexity, through 
ideals of inquiry, to research methodology. We have 
seen how, if we are to deal with ontological complexity 
in an adequate manner, we must indeed embrace a 
pluralist research practice. Therefore we arrive at the 
final conclusion of this thesis: pluralism is essential 
for the continued legitimation of systems science. 
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Notes 
1. The "split" between positivistic, interpretive and 
emancipatory systems methods has been inherited from 
the work of Jackson (1987a). 
2. It might be controversial to assert that discussions 
on rightness are the primary focus of interpretive 
methods. However, I believe that a careful, critical 
reading of Checkland (1981) will confirm this. 
Checkland talks about generating options that are both 
"systemically desirable" and "culturally feasible". 
What he is saying, then, is that the right options will 
be those which are both desirable in relation to the 
"selection of root definitions and conceptual model 
building", and feasible in the sense that they can be 
implemented given the characteristics of the people 
involved in the situation. Judging systemic 
desirability and cultural feasibility therefore means 
judging what the right course of action is, given the 
circumstances and the outcomes of previous explorations 
- or, more accurately, given a truth statement about 
the circumstances and the outcomes of previous 
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explorations. Now, Checkland has been criticised for 
"managerialism" - that is, allowing the views of those 
with power to predominate over others [Jackson (1982), 
Burrell (1983), Rosenhead (1984), Green (1991)]. One 
could interpret this as meaning that his methodology 
takes a dominant view of rightness for granted. We must 
be clear, however, that this would be wrong: 
managerialism does not result directly from a lack of 
critical thinking about rightness, but from a lack of 
critical thinking about truth. In other words, the 
managers' view of the circumstances against which 
desirability and feasibility are to be judged is taken 
for granted. Because truth and rightness are intimately 
linked, a narrow view of truth will restrict the 
rightness options that can emerge. 
3. We should note, of course, that such a pluralism 
should be consistent with an ecological approach which 
can be critical of anthroprocentrism if it is to 
maintain legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER 16: WORK FOR THE FUTURE 
In Section 1 of this thesis I outlined the idea of 
pluralism as it has been discussed in systems science, 
reviewed Critical Systems Thinking (the perspective 
which gave birth to the idea), and conducted some 
initial work on the paradigmatic nature of this 
perspective. 
In Section 2 I explored some of the contexts of the 
debate about pluralism. I demonstrated that pluralism 
is essential if we are to pursue the ideal of the unity 
of science in a holistic manner. Further, I argued that 
many of the problems we are currently facing, 
especially global problems, are characterised by 
ontological complexity rather than a simple "natural 
world" complexity. In order to address ontological 
complexity adequately, I argued that we need 
methodological pluralism. 
In Section 2 I also noted that the focus upon ecology 
encourages us to rethink the history of systems 
science. We find that ideas of holism have a history in 
Western thought stretching back to pre-Aristotelian 
393 
philosophy, and that our current concerns are by no 
means new. They have, however, been marginalised by a 
powerful scientific discourse of dualism and 
reductionism which is only now losing its dominance 
through the rise of the ecological perspective. As we 
have seen, this ecological perspective demands 
pluralism to achieve the reintegration of the 
objective, normative and subjective realms. 
In Section 3 I moved on to look at an ontological 
position that could underpin our notion of pluralism, 
granting it legitimacy as well an internal logical 
validity. I noted that some kind of multi-faceted 
ontology or epistemology is required in order to 
contextualise all the potentially contradictory 
assumptions made by methods drawn from other paradigms. 
One possibility identified was Habermas's 
epistemological theory of knowledge-constitutive 
interests. However, this was found to lack legitimacy 
because of the humanist assumptions it makes. A start 
was therefore made on developing a new vision of 
ontology which suggests that "reality" is constituted 
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by objective phenomena, power (expressed in the 
evolution and use of normative rules) and subjectivity. 
Also in Section 3 I explained how our vision of 
ontology underpins a theory of three ideals of inquiry. 
Each different systems methodology makes a different 
one of these ideals dominant, so we see a logical line 
running from ontology, through the ideals of inquiry, 
into research methodology. 
Finally, I left the last Section by returning to the 
need to address ontological complexity. It was argued 
that, if we are to deal with ontological complexity 
anywhere near adequately, we have to be able to make 
any of the three ideals dominant at any time in our 
research. Of course, methodological pluralism is 
necessary to achieve this. Indeed, if we accept that 
the very purpose of systems science is to deal with 
complexity, methodological pluralism must be seen as 
essential for the continued legitimation of systems 
science. 
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16.1 Critical Systems Thinking Revisited 
NOw, I would suggest that, if they are taken seriously, 
these ideas will necessarily effect the whole discourse 
of Critical Systems Thinking. Many of the arguments 
presented in this thesis have direct implications for 
other peoples' work (as reviewed in Chapters 4 to 6). 
To explore all these implications adequately would 
inevitably fill another thesis. When I started writing 
up, it was essential for me to draw some boundaries 
around what needed to be included to produce a logical 
argument. Some things therefore had to be left out 
(given realistic time and space restrictions). I 
decided that providing a full analysis of these 
implications could in fact be pursued as part of my 
post-doctoral research. 
However, I thought that it might be interesting for the 
reader if I were to put up some "sign posts" for future 
work. Hence this chapter. Over the coming pages I want 
to focus on just a few areas in which the work I have 
conducted looks like it might have the greatest impact. 
Toward the end I will also include some thoughts that 
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go beyond simple explorations of the possible impact of 
this work on the Critical Systems literature; I want to 
identify some new and fruitful areas for research. 
At this stage, none of the ideas will be explored ｾｮ＠
any depth, and little support will be given for the 
positions I will be adopting: the purpose of this 
chapter is merely to mark out territory for future 
exploration. 
16.2 Ontology and the Language of Research 
Clearly, the vision of ontology I have begun to develop 
moves us beyond the ontological schema worked out by 
Flood and Keys (1989). Perhaps, as we no longer need to 
talk about "ontological nominalism" and 
"epistemological anti-positivism", we should not follow 
Flood (1988, 1990a) in pursuing his "substantive soft 
systems language". Maybe all languages (objectivist, 
moral and subjectivist) have their appropriate place. 
397 
16.3 What is "Being Critical?" 
Such a rethink of appropriate language also leads into 
a rethink about what we mean by "being critical". 
Perhaps, to be truly critical, we need to be relating 
information about the objective natural "world", the 
normative social "world" and the subjective inner 
"worlds" of individuals together. I believe that it 
should be possible to demonstrate that confinement to 
just one of these "worlds" - pursuit of only one of the 
ideals of inquiry - results in a mere juxtaposition of 
alternative viewpoints rather than real critical 
thinking. 
While on the subject of critique, I also hope to 
challenge what I see as an artificial divide between 
critical thinking and commitment. Every rational 
thought requires commitment: if one is critical of 
something, one must be critical from some standpoint 
one has committed oneself to. 
Such a development should offer an effective challenge 
to some of the post-modern writings of Wooliston (e.g., 
1991a) who, if I have understood his argument 
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correctly, appears to be suggesting that critical 
thinking using ideas drawn from the margins of 
convention should be pursued for its own sake, rather 
than for the sake of what one has committed oneself to. 
16.4 Emancipation 
Then there is the question of the relationship between 
the Critical Systems "commitment" to "emancipation" 
(using Jackson's terminology, 1991b) and the vision of 
pluralism I have devised. 
Perhaps deciding whether or not it is relevant to talk 
about emancipation, or defining emancipation (if we 
have already decided that it is an appropriate term 
given our purposes), can be seen as a research project 
in itself. Such a project requires pluralism to explore 
it critically, yet the outcomes of it may shape future 
concrete expressions of pluralism by giving rise to a 
diversification of new meta-theories. 
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16.5 Subjective or Communicative Ethics? 
Talk of emancipation leads to Ulrich's insistence 
(1983) that an emancipatory ethics must be 
communicative rather than subjective. However, the 
vision of ontology I have developed would suggest that 
ethics should be seen as both communicative and 
subjective. 
16.6 An Ideal Model of the Research and Change Process 
If explorations of subjectivity must indeed play a 
major role in systems practice, and yet the System of 
Systems Methodologies fails to contextualise methods 
that prioritise this ideal of inquiry, it might be 
worth developing an alternative meta-theory for use in 
organizational research. 
I already have such an alternative in the developmental 
stages, and this will also address problems of coercion 
(that cannot be resolved through rational debate) and 
"false consciousness" (a useful term to describe 
thinking that has been limited by system constraints). 
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I would suggest that Flood and Jackson (1991), who have 
arguably produced the most complete description of the 
way the System of Systems Methodologies works in 
practice, still only make nominal mention of coercion 
and false consciousness. 
16.7 A Diversification of Meta-Theories 
In Chapter 12 of this thesis I suggested that 
epistemology or ontology should be related directly to 
the different methodologies rather than to dimensions 
of a meta-theory such as the System of Systems 
Methodologies. 
Now, this should actually allow a diversity of possible 
meta-theories to develop, each of which will be useful 
in different situations. Furthermore, which meta-theory 
should be used at any particular time will become a 
matter of debate because different visions of rightness 
will be embedded in them. 
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16.8 Diversification at the Methodological Level 
Just as diversity needs to be encouraged in the 
development of meta-theories, diversity also needs to 
be promoted at the methodological level. 
If we are to take the notion of pluralism seriously, 
then we should not stick solely to methods that have 
been described in systems terms: we also need to 
include methods from the traditional sciences and other 
areas of 
research. 
practice such as evaluation 
This will inevitably take us 
boundaries of organizational research. 
and action 
beyond the 
Furthermore I would argue that, if we are really going 
to try to deal with coercion, then there is a pressing 
need to break down the boundary between "scientific" 
methods and the methods of political action and 
campaigning. 
16.9 What is this Thing called "Science"? 
This is where my thoughts depart from the relatively 
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simple task of 
Thinking in the 
reflecting upon Critical 
light of the work in this 
Systems 
thesis. 
Breaking down the boundaries of "science" to include 
methods of political action and campaigning raises the 
question originally posed by Chalmers (1982): "What is 
this thing called science?". 
Because it is virtually impossible to boundary science 
in a logically consistent manner (Weimer, 1979), we 
inevitably have to move toward Foucault's understanding 
(1970) that addition of the term "science" to a 
discourse is essentially a means of legitimising it, 
while controlling its content and expression through 
the imposition of a set of normative, discursive 
assumptions. 
Of course such normative assumptions are what I have 
defined in this thesis as constituting power, and I 
have described power as an inherent aspect of reality. 
We cannot get away from the operation of power. Even if 
we abandon the term "science" in favour of something 
else, this will still have its normative assumptions. 
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Are we unable, then, to take control of the terms we 
use? To liberate the meanings of words? Foucault's 
thinking would suggest a pessimistic answer because any 
supposed 'liberation' would merely represent the 
domination of a new set of normative assumptions. Thus 
there is no real concept of 'agency', accept the agency 
of knowledge and power, in Foucault's work. 
While this may be the case from a purely Foucaldian 
position, a challenge for the future might be to 
develop a new philosophy of science that can help us 
get to grips with the notion of agency (whether human 
or other), perhaps in a pluralistic sense. This is 
something I am only now beginning to think about. 
16.10 Conclusion 
So, we see that there is much more that remains to be 
done. In this penultimate chapter I have marked out 
possible future areas of research. Some are already 
quite well worked out, while others are only ideas at 
the stage of germination. No doubt there are also a 
myriad of other possibilities that I am unaware of as 
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yet. We shall see. 
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CHAPTER 17: CONCLUSIONS 
Now it is time to conclude this thesis. I intend to 
close by reviewing the five central, interlinked aims 
for this work that I set out in Chapter 1. Each of 
these represents an area of work that is new to, or 
develops, the Critical Systems literature. The aims 
were: 
(1) To explain why a pluralist meta-theory must be 
paradigmatic. 
(2) To explain why methodological pluralism and 
pursuit of the ideal of the unity of science are 
so intimately bound together. 
(3) To examine the social and ecological contexts 
of the debate about pluralism. 
(4) To make a start on demonstrating how the 
Critical Systems understanding of pluralism might 
be underpinned by a credible vision of ontology. 
(5) To demonstrate how pluralism might enhance the 
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legitimacy of systems science for the future. 
Let me take each of these aims in turn: 
17.1 The Paradigmatic Nature of Pluralist Meta Theories 
The first aim was to explain why a pluralist meta-
theory must be paradigmatic. This was done by showing 
how people who support isolationist perspectives can 
always object to pluralism in their own terms, meaning 
that there are inevitably paradigmatic assumptions 
embedded in the notion of pluralism. 
The main assumption we can draw out is that pluralists 
recognise different "moments" in inquiry. Their meta-
theories will attempt to explain how and why these 
"moments" differ. In every case theoretical 
isolationists see only one kind of "moment". 
Therefore, pluralists contextualise the essential 
elements of the original ontological and 
epistemological paradigms that methods are drawn from. 
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In contrast, theoretical isolationists and imperialists 
denature the essential elements of other paradigms as 
their working methods are plundered. 
17.2 Unity and Pluralism 
The second aim of this thesis was to explain why 
methodological pluralism and pursuit of the ideal of 
the unity of science are so intimately bound together. 
A review of a diverse range of disciplines reveals the 
fact that different methods, assuming different visions 
of epistemology, have evolved to address different 
subject areas. We can therefore say that subject and 
method are intimately linked. 
Disciplinary scientists acknowledge that pursuit of the 
ideal of the unity of science is important, but do so 
by recognising complementarity between the various 
subject areas. Therefore they rarely venture onto each 
others' territories. 
systems scientists, on the other hand, refuse to 
408 
recognise disciplinary separation. They pursue the 
ideal of the unity of science through a process of 
defining and redefining systems. As a consequence, the 
breadth of the subject matter that they inevitably 
tackle raises problems that no isolationist 
epistemological or methodological position has yet been 
able to deal with. 
Specifically, systems scientists find that the 
objective, normative and subjective elements of their 
inquiries rub together abrasively. The result, given 
that everybody can see flaws in everybody elses' 
epistemological positions, is a destructive form of 
isolationist entrenchment. 
We see that disciplinary scientists only nominally 
pursue the ideal of the unity of science. Systems 
scientists, on the other hand, take this ideal more 
seriously. However, if subject and method are indeed 
intimately linked, then access to the whole subject 
area of science must depend upon the development of 
methodological pluralism. 
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17.3 Social and Ecological Contexts 
The third aim of the thesis was to examine the social 
and ecological contexts of the debate about pluralism. 
Reflection 
especially 
reveals 
upon 
issues 
that 
some 
of 
they 
of the major issues of 
a global ecological 
are characterised 
today, 
nature, 
by 
interdependencies between the ecological, the social 
and the personal. There are, for example, intimate 
relationships between the maintenance of ecological 
harmony, social justice and personal freedom. 
Indeed, it might be that the re-emergence of holistic 
ideas in the form of modern systems science is tied in 
with these ecological issues. Traditional science, 
which concentrated on the pursuit of objective 
information and marginalised issues of rightness and 
subjective understanding, "worked" while human beings 
were able to accumulate material wealth without any 
drastic ecological consequences. 
Now we are no longer able to do this, there is a need 
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to reintegrate the objective, normative and subjective 
realms. Since pre-Aristotelian times this integration 
has been central to the project of holism. Perhaps 
modern systems science has surfaced in the 20th Century 
to fulfil this reintegrative function through the 
pursuit of pluralism and the ideal of the unity of 
science. 
17.4 Ontology 
The fourth aim of the thesis was to make a start on 
demonstrating how the Critical Systems understanding of 
pluralism might be underpinned by a credible vision of 
ontology. 
The problem all pluralist perspectives appear to face 
is philosophical contradiction. This is because they 
bring many contrasting methods into the pluralist 
paradigm, and yet the original paradigms these ideas 
are drawn from make fundamentally different assumptions 
about the nature of 'reality' and our knowledge of it. 
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The defining assumption of a pluralist perspective is 
that it is possible to contextualise the essential 
elements of each of the original paradigms in a new, 
multi-faceted vision of ontology or epistemology. It is 
necessary to make such a vision explicit if we are to 
avoid philosophical contradiction. 
The epistemology that most Critical Systems thinkers 
use to underpin their understanding of pluralism is 
Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests 
(1972). Unfortunately, this makes some major humanist 
assumptions, and it therefore lacks legitimacy given 
our need to address the ecological issues facing us 
today. 
A possible alternative is a vision of ontology in which 
'reality' is said to be constituted by objective 
phenomena, power (expressed in the evolution and use of 
normative rules) and multiple subjectivities. 
These constitutive elements are entirely 
interdependent, but in the process of rational analysis 
they come to be separated out from one another through 
pursuit of three ideals of inquiry: "truth" , 
"rightness" and "subjective understanding". 
In looking at methodology, we find that different 
methods make different ideals dominant, suggesting that 
this multi-faceted vision of ontology does indeed 
provide the basis for a credible philosophical 
underpinning for our notion of pluralism. 
17.5 The Legitimation of Systems Science 
The fifth aim of the thesis was to demonstrate how 
pluralism might enhance the legitimacy of systems 
science for the future. 
If systems science is going to address issues that are 
characterised by interdependencies between the 
ecological, the social and the personal, then it will 
need to deal with complexities in all three areas. 
Indeed, we not only have to address "natural world" 
complexities, "social world" complexities and "internal 
world" complexities, but we have to deal with the meta-
level complexities of relationships between all three. 
413 
I have described these meta-level complexities as 
"ontological". This is because the three kinds of 
complexity reflect the three constitutive elements of 
reality in the vision of ontology I have presented. 
My argument is that pluralism and pursuit of the ideal 
of the unity of science are such important issues now 
because only a pluralistic and holistic research 
practice will allow us to address ontological 
complexity adequately. This is how embracing pluralism 
will enhance the legitimacy of systems science for the 
future. 
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